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This project uses critical development theory to examine relationships between rural 
residents pursuing multiple livelihoods in remote spaces, globalized industries that dominate 
these sparsely-populated edges of the global economy, and state agents tasked with serving both 
groups in Chile’s Aysén Region. 
Since the 1980s, southern Chile has emerged as an aquaculture frontier.  But state officials, 
aquaculture operators, and rural residents enact the frontier differently based on their distinct 
social projects.  Following Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, state officials introduced new 
social programs and conservation initiatives.  They provided services, subsidies, and public 
employment which rural residents incorporated into their longstanding pursuit of multiple 
livelihoods.  This allowed for the maintenance of a delicate status quo.  Residents benefitted 
from these programs while continuing semi-subsistence activities and aquaculture grew 
exponentially, diversifying Chile’s export sector and fueling the national economy without 
employing rural residents.   
A series of harmful algal blooms (HABs), however, have upset this status quo. These 
dynamic phenomena exhibit a toxic vitality and the distributed causality behind them makes 
them difficult to predict even as they grow more severe.  Evidence suggests that HABs, which 
were once unheard of in southern Chile, have worsened due to aquaculture operations and rising 
temperatures in the southern Pacific.  Whatever their causes, they have destabilized the region: 
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residents of Aysén now regularly protest state inaction in the face of threats to their livelihoods 
and the degradation of their once pristine coastline.  
Whereas before both state officials and rural residents saw the sustained occupation and 
development of the coast as their primary goal, it has become clear that the development favored 
by state officials—one that privileges multinational corporations over rural workers and growth 
over sustainability—is incompatible with the goals of residents.  Thus, HABs are more than 
symptoms of global climate change and coastal contamination; they inspire the contestation, 
negotiation, and reorganization of Chile’s development project.  Through strikes, blockades, and 
ship seizures, rural residents pressure state officials to distribute public funds as compensation 
for their lost livelihoods and the contamination of their landscape, effectively linking the moral 









Los que descienden al mar en naves 
y hacen negocio sobre las grandes aguas 
han visto las obras del Señor 





E.B. White, who lived and died in a farmhouse on the coast of Maine, said that a writer has 
“the duty to be good, not lousy; true, not false; lively, not dull; accurate, not full of error.  He 
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early drafts of several dissertation chapters, Florence Babb taught me much of what I know about 
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and I do not agree on which notebooks serve the ethnographer best, we agree on just about 
everything else, including the importance of lively meals with colleagues at conferences.  
Christopher Nelson was a profound voice of encouragement, particularly over the past two years, 
as I revised chapters for publication and tried to chart a course for my academic career.  Colin 
West likewise offered excellent advice on professional development and pushed me to attend 
conferences and meet scholars I might not have known otherwise.  Miguel La Serna was an 
enthusiastic champion of my “historically oriented” anthropology and his seminar on collective 
memory helped inspire my first peer reviewed article. 
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The Procession of San Pedro 
 On June 29, 2018, I rode from Puerto Aguirre to Caleta Andrade with my friend Luis1 and 
several others in a beat up Toyota pickup.  Puerto Aguirre, with its nine-hundred souls, is the 
largest community in the Islas Huichas archipelago, three hours off the coast of Chilean 
Patagonia.  Its small, shingled houses perch on a steep hillside covered with damp vegetation.  
Caleta Andrade, with five hundred souls, is the second largest community in these islands.  It sits 
on a plain about three kilometers away from Puerto Aguirre on the same island, its houses more 
spread out due to the more accommodating topography. 
 
Figure 1: The Islas Huichas Archipelago and the Aysén Fjord 
 I was in the pickup with Luis because his group was performing at the liturgy of San Pedro in 
the Catholic Church in Caleta Andrade and then accompanying San Pedro himself on his 
                                                        
1Unless otherwise noted, all names are pseudonyms used to protect the anonymity of interlocutors. 
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procession.  There weren’t many people in the church when we arrived, and the band, with Luis 
on accordion and his friend Carlos on guitar, discussed the order of songs with the two 
diminutive women coordinating the day’s events before tuning their instruments and practicing 
for a several minutes.  Once they lit the candles on the alter, the women conversed briefly and 
then Doña Rosa, in oversized purple jacket and spectacles, exited the church and began to ring 
the bell on the steps outside. 
 Within a few minutes, another twenty-five people had arrived—mostly older women—
bringing the total attendance in the church to nearly forty.  Doña Rosa’s companion, Doña 
Angela stepped to the lectern and read a prayer to the assembled congregants.  She read out the 
names of other community members for whom the congregants should pray, either because they 
were ill or because they, like her husband, had recently gone to the Lord.  This list of names 
contained its share of Chavez-es and Vargas-es, but was overwhelmingly filled with Chilote—
and therefore indigenous Huilliche—last names: Nahuelquín, Chihuay, Nancúl…   
 Doña Angela finally invoked the origins of the feast day—and the origins of San Pedro 
himself—connecting the day’s events to island livelihoods and members of the community.  
 “San Pedro has been a little forgotten and we have many people who have worked many 
years in the sea… who worked the loco (abalone), the merluza (hake) and who have done well,”  
she said, referencing the “abalone fever” of the early 1980s and the “hake boom” of the late 
1990s and early 2000s. “And for this we have to give thanks to San Pedro.  We do not, after all, 
thank the merluza, for delivering our success and earning the money we have made.” 
 The women concluded the ceremony by giving communion “to those who want it,” though 
they forced it on Luis and the other musicians, putting wafers in their mouths as they continued 
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playing their Chilote folk songs.  Then she blessed the wreath of artificial flowers that would be 
released into the sea to honor the fishers whose bodies were lost there. 
 The men at the back of the church—more numerous than usual since the ongoing ban on 
harvesting and selling mollusks kept them ashore—picked up San Pedro from beside the alter.  
The saint was momentarily caught on a piece of crepe paper decoration before the men lowered 
him carefully to clear the decorations and doorway, but soon enough San Pedro was outside and 
fully upright.  The musicians followed, playing their instruments and taking their places behind 
another pickup truck into which San Pedro was loaded.   
 The entire crowd then walked behind 
the truck as it made its way past the 
plaza and to the pier, where several 
motor launches with the names and 
logos of aquaculture companies were 
waiting to transport workers to nearby 
salmon cultivation centers.  Our group 
passed these without a glance as we 
walked to the end of the pier where 
several large steel-hulled boats were rafted together.  The men loaded San Pedro onto the closest 
of these, secured him behind the boat’s hydraulic crane—a fixture on diving boats used for 
contract work at cultivation centers—and rigged a PA system for the musicians.  I hopped 
aboard, avoiding the gaze of several sailors from the Chilean Navy who were there to ensure 
safety and security.  I did not want to slow things down by having to explain that, while I was 
foreign, I was competent on boats and that I had to stay close to Luis in order to observe the 
Figure 2: Loading San Pedro after the service in Caleta Andrade 
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procession.  My worries were unfounded.  The sailors looked on dispassionately, doing the 
minimum required of them.  Besides, to be in the Islas Huichas is to know the sea. 
 The two other boats rafted to ours shoved off, and soon we too were pulling away from the 
pier.  The procession constituted a veritable flotilla whose varied vessels testified to the layered 
nature of this frontier.  Our steel-hulled diving boat, with its hydraulic crane and air compressor, 
was normally under contract with area salmon farms.  Alongside, however, were eight pangas—
traditional four-meter wooden boats used by Chilotés for over a century to fish and harvest 
firewood in Chile’s southern archipelagoes.  Though their traditional sails gave way to small, 
inboard motors starting in the 1960s—and many of these have now been replaced with new, state 
subsidized outboard motors—they connect communities like Puerto Aguirre to the Chiloé 
archipelago and its unique 
history.  Two traditional wooden 
embarcaciones followed the 
pangas.  These larger fishing 
boats with enclosed cockpits, 
cabins, and cargo holds are used 
for longer fishing expeditions in 
deeper water, but their traditional 
construction has much in 
common with the smaller pangas.   
 The final boats in our procession were two fiberglass launches from the Chilean aquaculture 
firm Invermar and an inflatable dingy with an outboard motor piloted by two sailors who by this 
time were mostly making fun of their two compatriots on our boat and taking photos with their 
Figure 3: A wooden embarcación and two pangas during the 
procession 
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phones.  The sailors lived at the tiny naval base in Puerto Aguirre, established during the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990).  Constructing the base in its current location 
required destroying several palafitos—stilt houses whose presence, like that of the pangas in our 
flotilla, signaled the community’s historical connection to Chiloé—effectively remaking the 
waterfront in Puerto Aguirre. 
 The flotilla headed first to the far side of Caleta Andrade before doubling back and coming to 
a stop just off the tiny island where the community cemetery is located—all with music playing 
and the Doña Rosa singing loudly into the PA system and directing prayers and shouts of “viva 
San Pedro” and “long live the pescadores (fishermen) of the Islas Huichas!”   
 Here several of the other boats in the flotilla haphazardly rafted up with ours, and the women 
aboard passed brown paper bags of sopaipillas (deep fried dough rounds) over the rail to the 
other boats, as well as plastic cups of navegado (mulled wine).  These were shared among 
everyone aboard our boat, children included.  Two of the pangas moved off swiftly before 
stopping close to the island of the dead, where one of the crews cast a net over the side of the 
boat.  On the opposite side, they used long sticks to beat the shallows into which they drifted, 
beam-to, ostensibly to scare any fish into the net.  Upon their return, Doña Rosa implored them 
to show us what they caught but those in the panga had to shrug.  Their nets were empty. 
 Doña Rosa then led our boat and the others in the Lord’s Prayer, as another, younger woman 
threw the blessed flower crown into the shallows in front of the cemetery.  This accomplished, 
the flotilla sped up again, the music turned raucous once more, and we passed the new cement 
piers of Puerto Aguirre. Several more pangas and launches joined our flotilla as it passed the 
fishing pier where the Naval squadron’s pickup was waiting.   We zoomed by, traveling all the 
way to the edge of the community and southern terminus of the island’s shore-front road before 
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doubling back to land at the fishing pier.  As we turned back towards the pier to make our 
landing and unload San Pedro, the men broke into a new song, different from the others they 
played as we left the church in Caleta Andrade.  Luis’s voice rang out as he leaned forward to 
sing into the microphone in front of his accordion.  This song named ports known to all those 
present.  “Puerto Aguirre, beautiful even in the fog,” Luis sang, making a joke about his own 
community. This was a fisherman’s song on the fisherman’s day, and its performance was 
jocular and tied to places where Luis and others present had experienced booms and busts.  As 
we landed, Doña Rosa reminded those 
within earshot to remember San Pedro 
and that only he could save them and help 
them when they were at sea.   
The procession was not what I 
expected or even, on some level, what I 
wanted.  Since I had come to this remote 
frontier zone looking to make good on the 
exhortation to consider not only local 
people but also the agency of local 
natures (Barney 2009:147) I half-
expected my interlocutors—Hector, Doña 
Rosa, Luis, and the others—to somehow, 
with their procession, challenge the 
Modern division between nature and culture that has so vexed contemporary social theorists and 
Figure 4: Doña Rosa with Luis and the other musicians 
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to interact with their island in such a way as to signal that they recognized it as an actor with its 
own agency. 
But though it is part of an enchanted landscape, its inhabitants see nothing sacred in 
circumnavigating it.  There are no people living on the windward side, where weather and waves 
make landing difficult and there is no natural harbor.  Their claim on this rugged coastline comes 
from ontologically separating themselves from nature as they exploit and reshape it—making 
communities and the nation in the process.  The procession therefore asserts their status as 
colonists—Catholic mestizos who created Puerto Aguirre and, later, even more remote places 
like Puerto Gala and Puerto Gaviota along the coast of Patagonia.  It is an homage to a Galilean 
saint who died in Rome, two millennia and half a world away.  Yet it is also an homage to those 
who first settled this coastal frontier—colonists who have pulled catches out of the dangerous 
fjords and channels of this far flung region and heated their homes with firewood from its 
forbidding native forests for generations.   
Patagonia, Inc. 
Puerto Aguirre and nearby Caleta Andrade are three hours offshore in good weather.  They 
sit amidst a watery landscape of clouds, tides, and currents, which render huge portions of the 
coast inaccessible by land and hardly accessible by sea.  Though cruise ships periodically stop in 
the nearby industrial port at Puerto Chacabuco, at the head of the Aysén Fjord, to refuel and let 
passengers stretch their legs, for the most part there is no land-based tourism here, and even at 
sea, these massive vessels stick to the main thoroughfare, passing through Canal Darwin and 
Canal Moraleda on their way north to Puerto Montt. 
This is not because the coast of Patagonia doesn’t offer breathtaking vistas or rich 
biodiversity.  Indeed, here, beginning just south of the big island of Chiloé at the northern tip of 
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the region and running all the way to the bottom of the continent, the Central Valley between the 
western, coastal cordillera of the Andes and the main range that forms the border with Argentina 
runs underwater.  Whereas in the north this valley provides a fertile landscape that sustains 
virtually all Chilean agriculture and viniculture, here it sustains seafood production that supplies 
tables worldwide.  
 
Figure 5: The Coast of the Aysén and Los Lagos Regions 
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The Aysén Region sits near the bottom of the world, parallel, in terms of latitude, to the 
southernmost tip of New Zealand and little else—besides vast expanses of water.  The weather 
and storms kicked up in the Southern Ocean and driven east, across an area referred to by sailors 
as the “roaring forties,” encounter virtually no resistance until they meet the remote coast of 
Patagonia.  The coastal cordillera—here steep and verdant islands that jut up from the depths—
therefore scrapes massive quantities of moisture from the clouds, soaking tiny island 
communities like Puerto Aguirre, and Caleta Andrade.  The rain then continues inland, rendering 
Puerto Chacabuco and Puerto Aysén equally damp.2  But as the clouds, fog, and rain from the 
Pacific push farther ashore, up the valley where the fast flowing Rio Simpson cuts its way to the 
fjord, they lose speed and moisture.   
Coyhaique, the capital of the Aysén Region, is situated on a plateau high above the river.  
Coastal precipitation seldom reaches this far inland and the city is therefore dry and frequently 
sunny, though it is considerably colder than the coast in winter.   This is the Patagonia that 
appears in the marketing materials of Patagonia Inc.  Indeed, the American apparel company, 
founded in 1973 by amateur mountaineer Yvon Chouinard, recently opened a boutique facing 
Coyhaique’s pentagonal plaza de armas. 3   But though the international image of Patagonia has 
been shaped by Patagonia Inc., burnishing this image is also a Chilean state strategy—most 
visible in the national and regional offices of Sernatur (the National Tourism Service)—for 
making the extreme south a source of both financial and cultural capital for the nation.  This 
process began, presumably to the delight of the neoliberal economists who have directed Chilean 
                                                        
2Puerto Aysén’s driest month is February, when it only rains fifteen days, on average. 
 
3Patagonia, Inc. has positioned itself as a leader in “corporate responsibility” (Patagonia 2018) has—somewhat 
controversially—become a major player in the effort to keep the interior of the vast, South American region that 
gave the company its name free from dams and other development. 
 10 
development since the 1970s, with private foreign investment.  The founder of The North Face, 
Inc. Douglas Tompkins, for instance, bought up vast tracts at the northern and southern edges of 
the Aysén region in the name of conservation beginning in the early 1990s.  Upon his death in 
December 2015,4 his widow, Kristine McDivitt Tompkins (herself former CEO of Patagonia, 
Inc.) began the process of transferring ownership of Parque Pumalin in the north, and Parque 
Patagonia in the south to the Chilean government.  The Bachelet administration was delighted to 
receive such a generous donation and made Parque Patagonia the centerpiece of its network of 
national parks—positioning her administration, and by extension, the nation, as caretakers of a 
pristine landscape that belongs to the world. 
The New York Times ran a front page story complete with photographs of the park’s 
sweeping vistas and ubiquitous guanacos5 (“With 10 Million Acres in Patagonia, a National Park 
System is Born,” The New York Times, February 19, 2018).  The creation of the park system was 
only the latest victory for international environmentalists in Patagonia.  In 2012, with the 
financial backing of Tompkins and others, Chilean and international conservationists came 
together to challenge and ultimately defeat the HidroAysén project, which would have built five 
dams across the Pasqua and Baker Rivers on the southern border of the Aysén region (Patagonia 
Sin Represas 2008; HidroAysén 2010; Vince 2010).  While there is still opposition to 
environmentalists, both on the grounds that Tompkins’ land deals threatened national 
sovereignty and important industries like mining, a majority of Chilean politicians have 
embraced Patagonia’s emergence as a global ecotourism destination.  Indeed, the biodiversity 
conservation underway in the Patagonian interior represents the kind of “green capitalism” in 
                                                        
4 He died of complications from hypothermia after a kayaking accident on Lago Carrera, just north of his privately 
funded Parque Patagonia. 
 
5 And of course, of Kristine McDivitt Tompkins herself. 
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vogue with individual and corporate donors alike, as it allows for the setting aside of vast tracts 
of land while also allowing for the production of value from nature through the consumption of 
resources in situ (Mendoza et al. 2017), no extraction necessary. 
It makes sense then, that on any given day between the end of December and the beginning 
of March—the austral summer—one can walk down the street in Aysén’s regional capital, 
Coyhaique, and hear French, English, German, and Dutch spoken almost as often as Spanish.  
Besides the new Patagonia Inc. boutique, the city’s plaza boasts North Face and Doite6 stores as 
well as an open air market where vendors sell artisanal goods and souvenirs to tourists.  Services 
in town cater to both foreigners and upper-middle class Chileans who have come from Santiago 
to travel the Carretera Austral (southern highway), and offer trips to nearby destinations like the 
Campo de Hielo Norte ice field, Capillas de Marmól rock formation, and the Queulat Glacier 
near Puyhuapi. 
It is here, away from the wet, watery world of the Patagonian coast, where eco-barons and 
tourism operators set themselves up in the sun, and where visitors from as far away as Berlin and 
San Francisco explore the “pristine” wilderness they have seen in nature specials and in 
advertisements for outdoor apparel.  While they will surely see photographs and hear stories 
about the gauchos who settled the interior with their livestock, these visitors will never encounter 
the Chiloté fishers who settled the coast around the same time.  In Coyhaique, Patagonia is a 
brand, and its nature can be consumed in situ and exported in photographs.  On the coast, 
however, Patagonia is an active frontier producing “pink gold”—farmed salmon—destined for 
                                                        
6 A Chilean brand selling outdoor sports equipment and apparel, Doite has successfully ridden the wave of emerging 
ecotourism in Chile, though it is still considerably less popular with well to do Chileans than North American and 
European brands, which represent not only quality products but also status and wealth in a highly class-conscious 
society. 
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tables around the world.  Every day, ten or eleven well-boats, floating aquariums full of live fish, 
cross the Gulf of Corcovado with cargo destined for processing in the factories in Quellón.  
Frontiers, Development, and the National Imaginary 
 What are frontiers? How do they create the conditions for rural people’s continued 
dependence on the natural landscape and create distinct conditions for environmental harm?  
What political and economic strategies do rural people use to put the state, industry, and nature 
to work sustaining their communities?  And how do these strategies—and the responses to them 
by state officials—shift during moments of environmental crisis?  These are the central questions 
that motivated my ethnographic research and that guide this dissertation.   
 Patagonia is a frontier, though one that has advanced and receded at various historical 
moments according to the designs of state planners, the demands of global markets (Eilenberg 
2014), and the utopian visions of environmentalists (Fletcher 2014; Mendoza et al. 2017).  
Aysén, however, has emerged as a resource frontier where an extractive industry is dramatically 
altering social and environmental conditions as it produces commodities for faraway markets.  
Since the 1980s, and accelerating in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the region has produced 
massive quantities of farmed salmon—primarily Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) that are native to 
the icy waters of the north Atlantic.  Although non-native salmon were originally introduced by 
Americans with limited success, the seeds for the Chilean salmon industry were planted as 
concerns about their own dwindling salmon populations in Hokkaido prompted the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to send eggs, equipment, and technical experts to 
southern Chile in the late 1960s (Swanson 2015:104).  When Dictator Augusto Pinochet seized 
power in 1973, his economic advisors and neoliberal reforms encouraged foreign investment and 
eliminated labor protections (Barton and Fløysand 2010:742). With financial backing from a US 
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multinational, the military regime established the technical and social viability of large-scale 
production as well as a system that created low cost concessions, granted for an indefinite period 
of time to aquaculture firms, which provided exclusive rights to the entire water column (Soluri 
2011:61). The regime also established laws during this period provided tax incentives and wage 
subsidies for investors—foreign and domestic—in the aquaculture industry (Latta and Cid 
Aguayo 2012:172).  Pinochet and his advisors also reshaped the physical landscape, blasting 
tunnels and building bridges to create the Carretera Austral and connect Aysén’s far flung inland 
settlements as well as to facilitate the rapid deployment of troops in the event of trouble with 
Argentina—or opposition at home.  They also established military bases and radio towers along 
the coast.  When Chile transitioned to democracy following the 1988 plebiscite, its Christian 
Democrats and Socialist leaders largely continued Pinochet’s infrastructure projects and 
maintained his economic policies (Alexander 2009:1; Winn 2004:4) and the industry continued 
its rapid growth throughout the 1990s.  Today, Chile is second only to Norway in terms of total 
farmed salmon production—and in 2018 boasted a higher rate of growth than their Scandinavian 
counterparts (FAO 2019)—and the Aysén region produces 49% of the country’s farmed salmon 
(SERNAPESCA 2016).  
 It was not always this way.  The Los Lagos Region is where the Chilean aquaculture industry 
began, and Puerto Montt remains a hub where many Chilean firms still maintain corporate 
offices.  However, as the industry became an increasingly important part of Chile’s export 
platform, the country’s lack of environmental regulations encouraged firms to prioritize growth 
over sustainability and to externalize operating costs into vulnerable ecological systems 
(Carruthers 2001).  Sea lice and later, Infectious Salmon Anemia, ravaged salmon populations 
and devastated the industry from 2007-2010.  In response, Subpesca established a host of new 
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sanitary guidelines to prevent the spread of diseases and mobilized an army of veterinarians 
(Barrett et al. 2002) to oversee the treatment of farmed fish with antibiotics and antifungal agents 
(Buschmann 2001).  New regulations also required more distance between cultivation centers 
(Iizuka 2016) but the problem of eutrophication—the result of an overabundance of organic 
material in the water column—remained, and harmful algal blooms (HABs) became a regular 
occurrence in the coastal waters around Chiloé, peaking in 2016 when an unprecedented bloom 
closed fisheries around Chiloé for months and sparked protests across the island and up and 
down the country (Daughters 2016b; Thomas 2018). 
 It was against this backdrop that the industry pushed south into spaces that could still be 
called—and crucially, could be marketed as—pristine.  The fjords of Aysén, with their ample 
supply of freshwater from the coastal cordillera and sparse population, represented the perfect 
environment for industry expansion.  Its narrow fjords and channels sheltered cultivation centers 
from the howling winds of the Southern Ocean and its sea floor had not yet been inundated with 
the organic material—primarily fish feces and surplus fishmeal—that is a byproduct of salmon 
farming and that turned vast stretches of the formerly abundant bottom into desert farther north.   
Industrial salmon aquaculture, despite being promoted as sustainable by operators and state 
officials alike, has been highly extractive in practice, providing little direct benefit to local 
communities and contaminating the landscape upon which they depend.  As we shall see, the 
spread of the industry has meant the spread of the harmful algal blooms that now plague much of 
southern Chile, setting the stage for a new series of conflicts in Aysén. 
 These conflicts have arisen because a sparse population is not the same as no population, and 
Aysén was already a frontier—and a much wilder one, more in keeping with “classic” frontier 
narratives about lawlessness and rugged individuals—before the arrival of aquaculture.  Chilotés 
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from the Chiloé archipelago but also penquistas from Concepción, talcahueños from 
Talcahuano, and valdivianos from Valdivia all arrived to exploit the region’s abundant resources 
over the course of the twentieth century.  They became adept at foraging, fishing, and 
maintaining small greenhouses in which they grew cabbage, onions, garlic and carrots.  Outside 
they planted potatoes, native to the Chiloé archipelago7 and even apple trees from which they 
fermented cider for mingas where the community came together to pool their labor—clearing 
land and then feasting when the work was done.  At the turn of the 20th Century, these colonos 
arrived hunting sea lions and cutting cipres de las guitecas, a species of cedar prized for its 
durability and resistance to rot.  In the 1980s and 1990s another wave of settlers arrived during 
the “boom de merluza” and “fiebre del loco”—the events Doña Angela referenced in her 
sermon—selling catches to middlemen who would ship them as far away as Spain.  This too was 
a result of Pinochet’s economic policies which, in the words of Chilean scholars, created a 
“frontier style ‘open season’ on Chile’s natural wealth” (Latta and Cid Aguayo 2012:165), in the 
name of diversifying exports and growing the economy.  Today, many of the same families that 
moved south pursuing the merluza austral (Merluccius australis, southern hake) harvest erizo 
(Loxechinus albus, sea urchins) and centolla (Lithodes santolla, snow crab) destined for Japan 
and the United States, respectively, as well as choros (Mytilus platensis, blue mussels) and 
several kinds of almejas (Veneridae, clams) for their own family tables and firewood to cook and 
to heat their homes. 
 This kind of staggered settlement—individuals and families arriving in boats and pursuing a 
diverse array of activities inextricable from the watery environment itself—has, for generations, 
                                                        
7 While the potato is widely associated with the Peruvian Andes, most of the potatoes consumed around the world 
are actually native to the Chiloé archipelago as they are better adapted to the temperate conditions outside of South 
America where they have been most widely adopted.   
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meant that the fjords, channels, mountains, and forests of Aysén constitute a multifunctional 
landscape for the region’s inhabitants.  Movement through, and small-scale exploitation of, this 
landscape is how my friends Hector and Edith Nancúl came to be raised in Puerto Aguirre.  Their 
grandfather arrived with his parents in 1944 when he was just 8 years old.  Luis, who we met in 
the introduction, and his wife Isabel arrived (separately) in the early 1990s, fishing merluza in 
“plastic towns,” temporary fishing camps that, since this period, have either become permanent 
settlements or disappeared entirely.  She fished merluza, but also sold sopaipillas, empanadas, 
and other baked goods to others fishing in the same fjords.  By the end of that decade, she would 
lose a son to the toxins produced by harmful algal blooms.  Today, the couple runs the boarding 
house in Puerto Aguirre, but Luis still fishes and maintains his reputation as one of the best 
navigators in the community.  Oscar Raín’s son, Milton, was born in the Islas Huichas, after his 
father established a home there as well as a seasonal fishing camp on a nearby island in the early 
1980s where he planted apple trees and potatoes.  Though Milton attended school in Chiloé and 
worked for a time at a salmon cultivation center, he returned to help his father catch and smoke 
róbalo (Elenginops maclovinus, rock cod) and cut the firewood they sell in Puerto Aguirre when 
it becomes impossible to fish.  And then there is Périco.  The head of a fishing syndicate and a 
consummate schemer, he retains an outsize influence in Puerto Aguirre despite the fact that he 
sells his fishing quota, rarely goes to sea, and lives down the island’s only road in Caleta 
Andrade, for he has the phone number of the provincial governor in Puerto Aysén and the 
intendenta (appointed regional superintendent) in Coyhaique.  Along with Marcela—herself a 
fisher who is seldom to be found without her plastic folder of tramites (bureaucratic forms), 
notes, and lists—Pancho is capable of mobilizing hundreds of his fellow islanders, performing 
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the kind of distributive labor (Ferguson 2015) that has always been necessary in communities 
like Puerto Aguirre, but that today requires accessing public funds. 
These individuals keep the communities in the Islas Huichas alive.  They are colonos, 
colonists with a paradoxical rather than pre-historic attachment to place.  Theirs is an attachment 
born not of longstanding ties and staying, but to networked ties and moving along a frontier that 
until the 1980s was entirely fluid and that until the mid-2000s remained stubbornly so.  These are 
settlers who are capable of challenging and reorienting state initiatives designed to develop 
Chile’s remote south and to open up the territory for the needs of capital.  They are the ones who 
would be displaced by an aquaculture industry that, as it has formalized and established new 
standards for sanitation, efficiency, and safety for the sake of the global marketplace (Latta and 
Aguayo 2012), no longer has a place for rural people with little formal education or experience.  
Though this industry created an estimated 45,000 positions prior to the ISA crisis (2007-2010), 
dominating the economy in the Los Lagos region and reshaping the social landscape, it employs 
relatively few ayseninos (people from Aysén).  Moreover, most of them continue to get by 
pursuing a range of diverse activities tied to the local landscape that have enabled them to avoid 
low wage jobs in the aquaculture sector.  The Patagonian coast—imagined as pristine by state 
planners and international environmentalists alike—is therefore a variably occupied landscape of 
multi-generational communities making a living by continuing semi-subsistence practices 
embedded in local ecologies and occupying global market niches.  Until recently, those who did 
not seek it out were able to live lives unaffected by aquaculture.  This is no longer the case, 
however, and the coastal waters that provided recurring cycles of seasonal opportunities, 
resource variability, and meteorological risks for rural inhabitants now deliver destructive 
unpredictability.  
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Resource Frontiers and Global Markets 
 Frontiers like Aysén are dynamic, relational spaces.  As previously noted, these are spaces 
that wax and wane according to state and market forces (Eilenberg 2014; Geiger 2008).  They 
are inherently unstable spaces (Tsing 2003) where processes tied to the landscape unfold at 
dramatically different scales.  Ecologies collide along frontiers, as competing systems for 
exploiting natural resources interact and the industrial production and extraction of commodities 
degrades the landscape and limits the viability of older systems that produce resources for local 
communities (Kirsch 2014). 
 But they are also imagined spaces with profound implications for both the individuals living 
along these remote edges of the global economy and the nations to which they belong.  Frontier 
imaginaries are invoked by politicians who seek to frame them as territories of “opportunity” 
with limitless, as-yet unexploited resources (Tsing 2005) or, increasingly, as “pristine” spaces 
where nature can be commodified in-situ through market oriented conservation programs and 
ecotourism (Fletcher and Büscher 2017; Fletcher 2014; Mendoza et. al. 2017:97).  Crucially, 
frontiers are layered, patchworked landscapes (Barney 2009:152); often, as in the case of Aysén, 
early waves of settlers and smallholders find themselves displaced when a new, more valuable 
resource is discovered or new technologies enable a long-standing resource to be exploited at 
previously inconceivable rates.  The discovery of oil off the coast of the Falkland Islands8 has 
raised tensions yet again between Argentina and Britain, as both nations consider the profitability 
of leasing concessions to multinational petroleum companies off the coast of islands where 
                                                        
8 These islands are known in Latin America as the Islas Malvinas, and most South Americans I have met support 
Argentina’s claim to them, however I have chosen to use their official name for the sake of simplicity and clarity, 
not out of any political allegiance of my own.  It is also worth noting that during the Falklands War Pinochet’s 
unwavering support for Britain and the Thatcher Government also had a role in shaping the development trajectory 
of Southern Chile because resulting tensions with Argentina helped spur the construction of military infrastructure 
throughout the region. 
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settlers originally produced little more than wool.   New technologies that have enabled the 
removal of entire mountaintops in the coal producing areas of West Virginia and Kentucky have 
meant there is less work for miners as well as many more toxic contaminants in the groundwater 
upon which they rely.  
 As I have tried to convey in the opening pages of this dissertation, in Aysén, all of these 
processes are unfolding across a dynamic landscape which continues to change through the 
interplay of human and non-human actors (Tsing 2005, 2003) and to frequently defy the best laid 
plans of politicians and experts in Santiago.   This frontier emerges from the state-backed 
movement of the aquaculture industry into a new landscape conceived of as “virgin” territory 
where a spatial fix (Harvey 2001:24-25, 1975) averts, however temporarily, the dual capitalist 
crises of our time: overproduction and contamination.  But it also emerges, in a more traditional 
vein, from the lives and livelihoods of its inhabitants.  Ayseninos have exploited their 
multifunctional landscape for several generations—with considerably less impact than the 
aquaculture sector has wrought in just one—and they have strategically shifted between 
subsistence and market-oriented activities.  Finally, the remoteness of Patagonia, long an 
obstacle to the kind of development envisioned in Santiago, has allowed the region to emerge as 
the kind of “wilderness” appreciated and defended by international environmentalists (Cronon 
1996:21).  This was made possible, ironically, by policies designed to promote foreign 
investment and diversify the Chilean economy established under a regime that violated the 
human rights of many of its own citizens.9  These forces interact, push against one another, and 
produce unexpected outcomes, demonstrating that neither rugged individuals nor state and 
market forces alone make frontiers—or even determine their boundaries.  As local people contest 
                                                        
9 Though it was also helped by the glamorous writing of a varied cast of travelers, from Guevara (2003) to Chatwin 
(1978). 
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the development initiatives favored by both international environmentalists and neoliberal 
capitalists, they deploy novel strategies of resistance, even as state power expands and 
bureaucrats seek to make more elements of social and economic life “legible” (Scott 1998). 
The Coast of Patagonia in Global Context 
 Any ethnographer who sets out to examine some aspect of human behavior invariably stands 
on the shoulders of giants.  Explaining Chile’s development trajectory and local responses to 
state interventions—and really development along any contemporary resource frontier where 
state and capitalist forces are reshaping the social and physical landscape in the name of 
“progress”—requires an understanding of a diverse range of literature.  I began my academic 
career drawn to the kind of sweeping narratives that consider centuries of history to explain how 
and why the world we inhabit developed as it did and to define the economic and political 
parameters within which communities act today.  Karl Polanyi, Ferdinand Braudel, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Andre Grunder Frank, Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, and more recently, David Harvey, 
Doreen Massey, Saskia Sassen, and Jason W. Moore have provided these kinds of narratives—
tracing capital flows and the political forces which sustain them.  This kind work goes in and out 
of fashion within anthropology, but it endures all the same.  Until recently, however, most of 
these authors were not particularly concerned with the agency of rural people and natures within 
a context of landscape formation (Barney 2009:147).  For most of the World Systems Theorists 
writing in the 20th Century, parts of the global south, and particularly Latin America, were little 
more than “open veins” (Galeano 1997) where rural people were exploited and  riches were 
extracted.  These far flung but resource rich spaces provided the capital to industrialize the 
metropoles that—at least nominally—governed them.  Rural people amounted to a kind of 
proletariat and nature was reduced to little more than the commodities extracted from it—or an 
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obstacle to be overcome for the sake of this extraction.  Eventually, the logic went, through their 
exposure to the twin forces of colonialism and capitalism, people along commodity frontiers 
engaged in similar activities and “were driven to take part in the construction of a common 
world” (Wolf:1997:385).  Yet, as has already been well-established, the geographic fringes of the 
global economy are dynamic spaces and their development does not follow a single model from 
wilderness to frontier to just another part of the nation state.  What to make of frontiers that defy 
consolidation? 
 In response to this kind of sweeping narrative, the relational approach that foregrounds the 
agency of human and non-human actors within the context of frontiers and the “capitalist ruins” 
(Tsing 2015) of the early 21st Century has come primarily from the emergent and 
interdisciplinary field of critical political ecology, particularly works grounded in assemblage 
theory (Bennett 2010; Deleuze and Guatarri 1987), “rhizomatic” thinking (Ogden 2011), and 
Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005; Lien 2015).  Much of this literature productively probes 
the “unruly edges” of the global economy, where it is evident that the nature/culture binary is 
nothing more than a Modern, European construct and where a host of actors survive and thrive in 
“the limit spaces of capitalism, neither properly inside nor outside, where the inability of 
capitalist forms of discipline to fully capture the world is especially obvious” (Tsing 2015:278).  
Yet as we approach the end of the beginning of the 21st Century, what can truly be said to be 
“outside” or beyond the influence of global capitalist forces? Furthermore, what can we make of 
people whose identity is bound to their own distinction between nature and culture? These are 
questions I turned to again and again in the course of my research in a space where the same 
families who made a living cutting firewood, fishing, and collecting other marine resources also 
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carried smartphones and bought groceries on credit provided by the Chilean state bank—a bank 
largely funded by copper mined in the Atacama and destined for China.   
 The work of Karen Hébert was particularly instructive as I tackled these apparent 
contradictions.  She argues that her interlocutors—salmon fishers in Bristol Bay, Alaska—retain 
an “intimacy with ecological cycles” (Hébert 2015:33) which allows them to endure even within 
the booms and busts of contemporary global capitalism, and this endurance in turn allows 
capitalism itself to endure in far flung places where it is otherwise not sustainable.  She also 
argues persuasively, drawing on the work of Elizabeth Povinelli among others, that in 
contemporary capitalist production, “crisis” becomes a chronic condition rather than a 
punctuated event—something increasingly evident in Aysén, where red tides are becoming 
cyclical phenomena that appear every summer.  Taking a relational approach to frontiers now 
means considering the toxins and plastics that wash ashore—byproducts of industrial capitalist 
production to be sure—and their impacts.  It means understanding environmental crises as 
“ordinary, chronic, and cruddy rather than catastrophic, crisis-laden, and sublime” (Povinelli 
2011:13). Aysén’s coastline is littered with plastic and the sea itself is toxic for months at a time. 
Coyhaique, the regional capital, is slowly choking to death (WHO 2016). 
 But while her consideration of how contemporary capitalism endures in far flung places is 
instructive, Hébert’s is primarily concerned with those working in a single sector and reliant on a 
single species (wild salmon) and the model she proposes only works in a context in which 
capitalist forces are not yet capable of reshaping—or degrading—the environment on a large 
scale.  In Aysén, those living on the coast have continued to practice what has been variously 
called “livelihood diversification” (Ebel 2018; Ellis 1998; Scoones 1998), “livelihood bricolage” 
(Dressler et. al. 2016), “multi-occupational careers,” or “pluriactividad” (De Grammont and 
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Martínez Valle 2009; Martínez 2010), and to rely on a multifunctional landscape capable of 
providing a range of resources throughout the year.  Furthermore, many of the same natural 
conditions that make the archipelagos of Aysén ideal for salmon farming—narrow leeward 
passages through steep mountains that afford protection from the high winds and currents that 
pummel less protected areas—also make them vulnerable to contamination as aquaculture firms 
externalize their costs by dumping organic material that ends up on the sea floor.  
 Since the late 1990s, in part because this (relatively) new industry appeared ascendant as a 
solution to the much touted “crisis” of overfishing, a scholarly literature has emerged around 
aquaculture.  This literature can be divided into four categories.  The first category uses a 
Marxist framework to position aquaculture an extension of agriculture, with concessions 
representing a new kind of enclosure movement.  It draws on Marx’s concept of the “metabolic 
rift” (Bellamy Foster 2000, 1999; Marx 1981:949) to demonstrate how overproduction at sea 
leads to ecological crises (Claussen and Clark 2005).  The second category of literature on 
aquaculture draws on the field of Science and Technology Studies and Actor Network Theory to 
examine salmon as a domesticated species capable of co-producing regions, networks, and 
publics where it is cultivated (Blanco et al. 2015).  Other scholars working in this vein examine 
how salmon is a species “multiple” that is enacted differently and that requires distinct kinds of 
human action at distinct stages of production (Lien 2015; Lien and Law 2011).  The last two 
categories are the least theoretically informed, but perhaps the most interesting for their 
opposition to one another.  Chilean scholars who examine aquaculture are overwhelmingly 
careful in their approach and frame the industry as largely beneficial (or at least inevitable) and 
either pose questions about how it is governed and how this governance could be improved 
(Bustos-Gallardo 2013) or posit that the latest—always reactive, never proactive—regulations 
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and practices will establish the “sustainability” of the sector,  allow it to be more “flexible,” and 
prevent future crises (Barton and Fløysand 2010:751; Iizuka 2016; Tecklin 2016).  This has, 
needless to say, not been the case.  Challenging this scholarship, journalists and 
environmentalists both in Chile and beyond have published a series of polemics—largely in the 
popular press and on social media—decrying the devastation salmon farming wreaks on local 
ecologies due to the dumping of toxic materials, the use of antibiotics, and the fish’s tendency to 
eradicate other, native species in the wake of frequent mass escapes from cultivation centers 
(Barrionuevo 2008; Fernando Gonzales 2016; Hartmann 2018).  This is the final category of 
literature on aquaculture and though there are exceptions, as we shall see this body of literature 
has profoundly impacted the language and media strategies used by the industry and its 
proponents, but accomplished little else, thanks to the financial might of the industry and its 
importance to the Chilean state. 
 This has meant a failure to consider aquaculture—particularly salmon farming—within other 
frameworks, particularly scholarly examinations of extractivism in Latin America and elsewhere.  
The reality on the ground in Aysén is that aquaculture resembles “traditional” extractive 
industries, and considering it in this light enables a productive engagement with a host of 
literature on toxicity (Fortun 2014), contamination (Nixon 2011; Tsing et al. 2017), and, 
critically, work that examines the corporate social technologies that companies use to silence or 
sideline their critics even as they cause irrevocable harm to local ecologies (Benson and Kirsch 
2010; Hirt 1994; Kirsch 2014).  The harmful algal blooms (HABs) that have emerged since the 
aquaculture industry arrived in Aysén in the early 1990s have caused devastating red tides—
events which require ethical and political consideration (Povinelli 2011) and which provide the 
basis for biological citizenship claims (Barrios 2017).  These toxic assemblages are symptoms of 
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the Anthropocene—not only the result of industrial agricultural and aquacultural operations that 
deposit tons of organic material into rivers and oceans but rising water temperatures (Anderson 
et al. 2002; Glibert 2018).  They now appear at higher latitudes, last longer, and devastate larger 
areas than ever before (Hallengraeff 2010).  In Aysén, harmful algal blooms are undermining 
coastal residents’ longstanding exploitation of the multifunctional landscape, and consequently, 
undermining aquaculture managers’ ability to expand their operations without incorporating 
these “unreliable” people, destabilizing the region. 
Longue Durée Ethnography 
 Most of the ethnographic material in this dissertation was gathered during the 2017-2018 red 
tide that caused a “mass mortality event” for the salmon farms operating in Aysén and forced the 
Ministry of Health to ban shellfish harvesting across the entire Aysén region.  The harmful algal 
bloom that caused this red tide was the most severe in recorded history, as dinoflagellates 
proliferated at previously unseen levels and filtered through the water column, making their way 
up the food chain, poisoning fish, marine mammals, and eventually humans.  This story also 
documents the contradictions that emerged during this crisis.  Rural people, long the subject of 
development initiatives dreamed up by state planners in Santiago and frustrated by the failure of 
state bureaucrats and corporations to deliver on promises of better services and more lucrative 
employment, have begun to act like bureaucrats themselves to apply pressure at critical 
junctures—often physical choke-points within the natural landscape—to reorient state responses; 
officials with a mandate to ensure the sustainability of the region’s resources and deliver services 
for the wellbeing of the rural population are failing to do either; an aquaculture sector that has 
touted its “sustainability” and driven regional development has proven just as susceptible to 
busts as other extractive industries found on resource frontiers. 
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 Both this crisis and the responses to it reveal the lingering effects of the Pinochet 
dictatorship, and the ongoing contestation over collective memory of that period.  The military 
regime helped the aquaculture industry become profitable and competitive by ensuring it was 
unfettered by labor and environmental regulations and aided by foreign partnerships and 
investment.  Pinochet and his advisors also altered the physical landscape along the coast of 
Aysén through massive infrastructure projects designed to modernize the region and facilitate the 
flow of its valuable commodities to faraway markets, tunneling through mountains and building 
military bases, roads, bridges, and piers.  During this time, state-driven development was indeed 
an “anti-politics machine,” not only “expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power 
while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect” (Ferguson 1994:21), but also in 
the most literal sense eliminating political opposition and making further opposition—at least 
from within Chile—all but impossible.  The nation was, in this sense, a laboratory for neoliberal 
development.  The state under Pinochet supported industrialization, weakened labor regulations, 
dismissed environmental protections, and encouraged foreign investment—organizing actions 
(Foucault 2003) undertaken to ensure the economic growth and the “modernization” championed 
by Chilean elites across the political spectrum. 
 Three decades after the return to democracy, Pinochet continues to cast a long shadow.  The 
social programs that have been used to provide public, community based employment, subsidies, 
and direct cash transfers are largely carried out by agencies and via programs that were created in 
response to the abuses of the dictatorship years, in part to repay the “debt” owed to Chilean 
citizens for what they endured at the hands of their government (Aylwin 1991; Han 2011).   
These programs operate through distributive labor (Ferguson 2015; Guyer 2015)—both formal 
redistribution programs that allocate public funds to families or individuals deemed vulnerable 
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by state officials and informal networks of distribution in which the recipients of public funds 
redistribute these to their own “sub-dependents” (Ferguson 2015:104).  Thus, while the state 
continues to underwrite industrial development and privilege economic growth above all else, it 
also acts as the guarantor of support—a material benefactor—for “vulnerable” rural people 
working and living within an ever narrowing capitalist reality.  Yet as the recent, massive 
protests in Santiago have made clear, these programs are inadequate for those left out of Chile’s 
economic dynamism, and there is widespread dissatisfaction with political elites on both the right 
and the left sides of the political spectrum.  President Sebastian Piñera’s initial response to these 
protests—declaring martial law in Santiago and announcing that the country was “at war with a 
powerful enemy”—evoked the abuses of the Dictatorship years and further inflamed tensions.  
His eventual agreement to a referendum on adopting a new constitution has been viewed by most 
Chileans as a victory—one that not only acknowledges the need to replace laws established 
during the Dictatorship but that will also finally make good on the empty promises of subsequent 
democratic regimes that maintained neoliberal economic policies detrimental to the middle and 
working classes.  
 Because of these enduring legacies of the Dictatorship and the return to democracy, this 
project draws heavily on scholarship on collective memory, how it is contested, and how it is 
embodied (Bourdieu 1979; Connerton 1989). Steve Stern’s Memory Box Trilogy represents an 
outstanding inquiry into memory struggles during and in the wake of the Dictatorship (2006, 
2010).  Memory struggles over how this period is remembered in Aysén—which are much 
different than those in Santiago—continue to shape local leaders’ responses to state interventions 
and projects, their perspective on politics, and the political discourses they mobilize.  As such, 
they limit certain political possibilities even as programs that compensate citizens for 
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development initiatives they endured at the point of a gun facilitate a kind of distributive labor 
that, as we shall see, sustains communities like Puerto Aguirre when productive labor becomes 
impossible.  The need to access such programs during such moments—particularly when 
individuals who feel they deserve compensation are ignored by state officials—leads to novel 
political arrangements and strategies among rural people even as they claim they “aren’t 
political” or malign those who participate in party politics. 
Data Collection 
The data presented in this dissertation were collected using four distinct methodologies: 
creating career history calendars, generating participatory maps, conducting semi-structured 
interviews, and performing participant observation at worksites.   
I created career history calendars to document “rotation” (the extent to which workers shifted 
between multiple livelihoods) for thirty-five individuals.  While I originally planned to create 
eighty of these calendars, it soon became clear that nearly all those who agreed to work with me 
were participating in a diverse array of activities and also receiving public funds, either in the 
form or short-term public employment, cash transfers in times of crisis, or subsidies.  I generated 
participatory maps by working with seven local fishers in Puerto Aguirre and Caleta Andrade, 
noting at their direction where various marine resources could be found. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with sixty-six people during the course of my 
fieldwork.  Of these, twenty-seven were public employees, defined for the purposes of this study 
as those working directly for state agencies, those who received zona pay while working in 
public-private organizations, or those participating in community-based public employment 
projects for more than six months out of the previous year. Given my focus on development, 
commodity production, and resource governance,  I spoke to officials from SERNAPESCA (the 
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National Service for Fishing and Aquaculture), Subpesca (the Sub-secretary for Fishing), Seremi 
de la Economía (the Regional Secretary of the Ministry of the Economy), Seremi de Salud (the 
Regional Secretary of the Ministry of Health), Banco Estado (the public-private bank that 
handles the distribution of public funds), the Carabineros de Chile (Chile’s national police force), 
Conaf (the National Forest Corporation), and the Municipality of Aysén. 
The other thirty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals working in 
the private sector.  Of these, slightly more than half (n=22) were involved in what I define as 
“traditional” sectors of the coastal economy—primarily artisanal fishing, firewood harvesting, 
maritime trade, and boatbuilding.  The others worked in aquaculture.  While a number of 
aquaculture firms were reluctant to participate in my study—many executives with whom I 
spoke or corresponded believed I was either a radical environmentalist or looking to steal 
industrial secrets—I was able to speak to managers and workers from five different aquaculture 
companies (four Chilean and one Norwegian) as well as workers from both seafood processing 
plants operating in Puerto Chacabuco.  
My participant observation, like the interviews I conducted with aquaculture workers, proved 
most significant when it occurred by accident.  I would not have been in the Islas Huichas during 
the mobilizations there had I not received word via social media that fishers there were planning 
to press the regional intendent for compensation for their lost livelihoods.  I worked in Puerto 
Aguirre and Caleta Andrade during this time, and subsequently, because I had visited these 
communities during preliminary fieldwork in 2016 at the suggestion of a Chilean friend.  
Likewise, the maritime temporalities that I describe shaping life on the coast of Aysén also 
played a role in my accessing important interlocutors.  The boarding house in Puerto Aguirre run 
by Isabel and Luis is a haven for stranded aquaculture workers who have completed their shifts 
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but cannot leave the coast due to inclement weather or other logistical difficulties.  Thus, I found 
myself with daily access to individuals in the aquaculture sector who were more than happy to 
discuss their work, their concerns about the industry, and the sacrifices they made to earn wages 
so far from home. 
Telling the Story 
 In the opening chapters of this dissertation I introduce the human actors who have, to varying 
degrees and for varying lengths of time, been able to shape Chile’s southern frontier and its 
development.  Chapter One tells the story of the families of colonos, most of whom came from 
Chiloé by sea in order to extract the region’s abundant natural resources—both for their own 
subsistence and to sell for cash.  This chapter explores how the subsistence strategies and 
community building undertaken across generations and in accordance with the region’s 
unpredictable weather and unique ecology continue to shape life in remote coastal communities 
today, even as new industries encroach on the landscape and new state policies and programs 
seek to organize and incorporate these rugged people into wider networks. 
 Chapter Two describes the lives and practices of bureaucrats and other state officials who are 
tasked with organizing traditional industries such that they are easily legible, regulating the 
various sectors of the local economy, providing services to rural citizens, and, increasingly, 
responding to social and environmental crises—all crucial tasks within the Modern, vertically 
encompassing state.  This chapter also explores the tension between the impersonal and 
indifferent bureaucratic structures established during the Pinochet Dictatorship—structures 
designed to oversee Chile’s modernization and integration into the global marketplace—and the 
personal commitments of individual bureaucrats to the rural people they serve and the rural 
landscapes they now call home. 
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 Chapter Three outlines the emergence of aquaculture in Aysén, situates this industry within 
the wider global economy, describes its impact on the landscape, and explores the lives, 
livelihoods, and perspectives of those who work in this rapidly growing sector, most of whom 
are, as we say in Maine, people “from away.”  These men—and they are nearly all men—are 
primarily doing work under short term contracts in turnos (multi-day shifts) supplying salmon 
farms with fish meal, antibiotics, and other industrial necessities, cleaning and mending the cages 
and scaffolding that hold these enormous structures together, or monitoring the feeding, growth, 
and eventual harvest of fish from on-site living quarters that are equipped with satellite TV, the 
internet, and cameras that can provide up-to-the-minute information about the goings on 
offshore. 
 Chapter Four explores the toxic vitality of harmful algal blooms as well as their social, 
economic, and environmental impacts.  This chapter chronicles the spread, diagnosis, and 
responses to Aysén’s devastating red tide among scientists, bureaucrats, aquaculture operators, 
environmentalists and residents of the region’s island communities.  In this chapter, I argue that 
while HABs can be considered natural phenomena, red tides are socionatural disasters—events 
that inspire those affected to articulate biological citizenship claims and therefore necessitate a 
state response.  Red tides like the ones that closed fisheries along Chile’s southern coast in 2016 
and 2017-2018 are becoming the “new normal” in the 21st Century, and I consider how the 
disparate actors impacted by the outbreak enacted this complex phenomenon in accordance with 
their own distinct social projects. 
 Chapter Five examines the mobilization of the fishing community at Puerto Aguirre in 
response to the state’s failure to resolve economic and social problems generated by the 2018 red 
tide.  Here, I explore the strategies employed by local people to make themselves visible to state 
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officials and politicians and to win compensation for their communities.  I foreground how the 
introduction of new policies and programs—in particular transferable fishing quotas and 
community-based public employment for citizens deemed “vulnerable”—influence local 
perceptions of the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the state among residents of remote 
coastal communities and shape their strategies in moments of crisis.   
 I conclude the dissertation by placing the ethnographic material I have collected into a wider 
context and arguing that the hard-won agency of local people in places like Aysén actually plays 
an outsize role in the development of resource frontiers even as these far-flung places are 
incorporated into the global economy due to the demands of faraway markets.  Furthermore, I 
argue that the clear environmental degradation wrought by supposedly “sustainable” industries 
on these supposedly pristine spaces allows rural people to hold state officials to account and 
make environmental crises far costlier—challenging the corporate externalization of costs by 
dumping and otherwise exploiting cheap nature (Moore 2015)—even when a “politics of scale” 
that helps forge alliances between international activists and marginalized people (Escobar 2008) 
remains largely absent.  
Some Notes on Terminology 
I must confess that I have, at times, been amused by the lengths to which anthropologists go 
to “problematize their terms” at the outset of their projects.  Thus, it is with some trepidation that 
I must explain several choices that I have made in the writing of this dissertation.  First, I have 
thought a great deal about Ben Orlove’s extended meditation on the use of “fishermen” in Lines 
in the Water, his book on Lake Titicaca (Orlove 2002:52-56).  This is in part because of a 
conversation I had with Dr. Florence Babb in her seminar on feminist ethnography, in which she 
remarked upon my own use of this gendered term in some preliminary writing I had done on 
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Aysén.  I (somewhat self-consciously) defended my choice by pointing out that virtually all of 
those who I had met up to that point who engaged in fishing were men, and that the Spanish term 
pescador is gendered and most often translated as “fisherman.”  I thought of Linda Greenlaw, a 
swordboat captain who, like me, grew up on the coast of Maine, and of her desire to be called a 
fisherman rather than a fisherwoman (Greenlaw 1999). 
However, the conversation stayed with me, and the more fishing families I got to know and 
the more I learned about the history of fishing in Aysén—particularly the “boom de merluza” 
and “fiebre del loco”—the more I realized that it was the advent of aquaculture and the 
formalization of the fishing sector (and the formalization of civil society organizations within the 
sector) that erased women from the story or pushed them into factories (Schurman 2004).  
Furthermore, just as the practices of maintaining a greenhouse or cutting your own firewood 
have proven more durable in Aysén’s remote island communities than they have on the 
mainland, so too has the traditional division of labor in which entire families fish together.  
Historically, women have often been responsible for holding the boat in place during rough seas 
(no small task) and running the compressors that provide oxygen to their husbands or partners as 
they dive for erizo and other species, sometimes simultaneously supervising children who have 
come on the voyage.  Moreover, I met several women—Isabel included—who went to sea when 
they were young and unmarried because there was money to be made there and who did quite 
well for themselves.  Thus, I have come to disagree with Orlove and Greenlaw—despite my 
respect for their work—and to employ the gender-neutral term “fisher” to describe those who 
make their living off the catches available in Aysén.  
I have also chosen to use the term “metropole” in several places throughout this text to 
describe Santiago and its relationship to communities in Aysén.  This is a deliberate choice that I 
 34 
have made in order to highlight the ongoing colonization processes taking place in this remote 
region (recent, white-collar transplants drawn to the region and who intend to stay repeatedly 
called themselves colonos, colonists, during interviews), ayseninos’ continued preoccupation 
with the problem of centralismo (centralism, or too much power concentrated in the capital), and 
the fact that most formal decisions about the trajectory of development in Aysén during my 
fieldwork were either made in Santiago or Valparaíso10 -- or by appointed representatives of the 
current government sent to Aysén with this mandate.  Just as frontiers wax and wane according 
to the designs of state planners and the demands of global markets (Eilenberg 2014), so too does 
the process of colonization accelerate and decelerate in such places.  Thus, colonization is 
ongoing and the term “metropole” continues to have a great deal of utility for those of us who 







                                                        
10 The national, coordinating office of SERNAPESCA is located not in the landlocked capital, but in the port of 
Valparaíso, which, given the agency’s mandate to regulate fishing and aquaculture, makes sense.  The Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies are also located in Valparaíso while the executive branch operates out of La Moneda in 
Santiago.  This unusual geographic division of its branches of government owes more to Chile’s history—and 
conflicts between branches in the 19th Century—than anything else. 
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CHAPTER 1. COLONISTS AND CAPITALISTS: THE LAYERED FRONTIER IN 
CHILEAN PATAGONIA 
 
The “Problem” of Rotation 
It was late afternoon, and I was in the regional office of a Norwegian aquaculture firm in 
Puerto Chacabuco.  The occasion was a meeting with the company’s regional chief of operations 
and its director of human resources. I was trying to explain why I needed access to workers at 
their plant and various offshore cultivation centers, and they were trying to figure out what I 
could offer them in return.  I explained again that my project was to investigate the nature of 
work in traditional and new industries along the coastline as well as the work of state agents 
charged with developing and regulating these industries.  The most I could really offer, I said, 
was insight into how workers make decisions as to when and where they work. 
“This will be very beneficial to us, I think,” the HR director interrupted, speaking more to her 
colleague than to me, “because there is a lot of rotation…” 
“We have 350 workers here in the plant,” the chief of operations explained, “and at the 
centros (cultivation centers) there are fewer obviously, but in the plant especially we have lots of 
problems with absenteeism.  We train people and we bring in new people but then nearly half of 
them… they don’t come back or they work a short time and then they decide not to continue.” 
“And it’s not like this in the X Region [Los Lagos],” the HR director clarified, referring to 
the birthplace of salmon aquaculture in Chile.  “So what we would like to know, and what you 
may be able to help us with, is whether… well, is this something where we can do something to 
 36 
create conditions that will make the people want to stay or is this something where, in the end, 
there is nothing we can do?” 
As I described in previous chapters, Aysén constitutes a contemporary aquaculture frontier.  
The expansion of aquaculture operations from Los Lagos into Aysén, primarily in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, dramatically altered the ecology of Aysén’s fjords and estuaries.  The opening 
of the region’s waterways for salmon farming, the construction of processing plants in Puerto 
Chacabuco, and the expansion of export infrastructure to move processed fish constituted an 
extended “frontier moment” in which the power of state and capitalist forces to remake the 
landscape was on full display. 
But while state planners and capitalists may have imagined this landscape as one of unlimited 
virgin wilderness and “pristine” waters freely available for exploitation (Eilenberg 2014; Tsing 
2005, 2003), this particular frontier moment was just the latest in a series of such moments.  
Furthermore, as my conversation with the HR director in Puerto Chacabuco made clear, the 
social projects (Povinelli 2011) of those already living in this watery landscape are not so easily 
remade. Moreover, because previous frontier moments in Aysén required foraging and salvaging, 
longstanding practices tied to multifunctional landscapes, residents in these communities 
continue to resist—sometimes tacitly, sometimes overtly—proletarianization.  The creation of 
new frontiers is thus highly contingent, and contemporary frontier dynamics are profoundly 
shaped by what came before (Barney 2009; Middleton 2019).  Simply put, despite capitalist 
dreams and desires, there are no “empty” spaces and nothing is free.  What happens along 




What is a frontier? 
Anthropologists and geographers have demonstrated how frontiers are dynamic spaces which 
expand and contract according to the designs of state planners and faraway market fluctuations 
(Cons and Eilenberg 2019; Eilenberg 2014; Fold and Hirsch 2009; Geiger 2008).  But these 
“spaces of desire” (Tsing 2003) are also relational spaces, where the “the everyday practices of 
local people and the ‘agency’ of local natures are typically unacknowledged, but crucial, actors” 
(Barney 2009:147; Walker 2006; Tsing 2005).  Before they become subject to the designs of 
capitalists and state planners, these “local natures” represent multi-functional landscapes to local 
people who pursue multi-occupational careers defined by seasonal variability (Dressler et al. 
2016; Levi-Strauss 1962). 
Contemporary frontier dynamics dissolve the social orders and property systems established 
by these local people, however, ultimately reordering space (Nixon 2011:17; Rasmussen and 
Lund 2018) to facilitate the extraction of new (or newly valued) resources.  This is a process in 
which the expansion of state power—often to facilitate capitalist extraction—not only forges 
new relations of production but also creates new territories from which indigenous people and 
early settlers alike are often excluded (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Sack 1986).  The opening 
of new frontiers and consequent displacement have been variously described by historical 
materialists as “primitive accumulation” (Marx 1975:423-433), “accumulation by dispossession” 
(Harvey 2003) or “expulsion” (Sassen 2014, 2010).   
Critical political ecologists have sought to reorient discussions of frontiers to focus on nature 
and the ways in which it comes to be discursively framed as a resource—or collection of 
resources—that can be commodified (Tsing 2009; 2005).  These scholars are also concerned 
with the ways in which the forces of capital have re-ordered ecological systems to the point of 
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crisis and they argue that the production of new frontiers is born from capital’s need for “cheap 
nature” from which commodities can be extracted and into which costs can be externalized 
(Moore 2016, 2015).  Many, though not all, of these political ecologists see the ontological 
division between nature and culture as facilitating—or at least accelerating—the destruction of 
local ecologies.  Their descriptions, like those of political economists, see frontier-making as a 
violent act inextricably linked to the capitalist imperative of constant growth.  They differ, 
however, in that they foreground the displacement of non-human as well as human actors—
genocide and extinction are two sides of the same coin. 
Frontier making is not exclusively a destructive process, however.  The capital-driven 
frontier dynamics of resource exploration, extraction, and commodification that produce new 
territories (Rasmussen and Lund 2018:388) also produce new opportunities and identities.  
Moreover, as Jason Cons and Michael Eilenberg note, “capitalism is only one, if a central force 
producing resource frontiers” (2019:4).  Though we live in an era in which multinational 
corporations exercise power not seen since the seventeenth century, the state still retains ultimate 
authority over the ordering of space, even if it exercises this authority for the sake of economic 
growth, and by extension, capital.  Indeed, though Weber’s famous assertion about the state and 
its maintenance of legitimacy is often truncated, it is worth quoting in full: “a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory” (Weber 1978:54, emphasis added).  In other words, while capitalist demands 
create the necessity of new frontiers, it is state power that opens these spaces.  Scholars 
interested in the exercise of state power have demonstrated how this power is highly contingent, 
and results from the complex assembly of actors and authority into durable associations that can 
be mobilized towards the achievement of particular objectives (Rose 2006:148).  This 
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assemblage of actors and authorities, they argue, actually constitutes multiple, overlapping 
governmentalities that “jostle to define the policy agenda in different locations” (Fletcher 
2017:311; Foucault 2008).  New forms of politics therefore emerge from the contestation of state 
policies and development objectives in moments and locations where various governance 
strategies and programs have not yet been made coherent. 
But new forms of politics also emerge from the natural conditions that define the lives of 
those doing the contesting.  When nation states open or expand frontiers, they require settlers to 
make them operational.11  Moreover, creating the “durable associations” that underwrite state 
power takes time.  What happens between the opening—and settling—of frontiers and the 
establishment of property systems, political jurisdictions, and other institutions?   How do the 
overlooked “everyday practices of local people and the ‘agency’ of local natures” (Barney 
2009:147) impact the trajectory of frontier development?  How do social projects “dependent on 
a host of interlocking concepts, materials, and forces that include human and non-human 
agencies and organisms” (Povinelli 2011:7) in frontier zones determine what is possible both 
within these zones and in the nation writ large? 
The inclusion of non-human agencies and organisms is important, but it signals a trend 
among academics and activists to challenge the Modern distinction between nature and culture 
(Castree 2014; Klein 2014; Latour 2005; McKibben 1990).  The reasons for this are laudable.  
Humans wield enormous power when it comes to shaping their environment and altering the 
climate and anthropogenic climate change represents an existential threat to our species.  
Arguing that the distinction between nature and culture is a false binary born of Cartesian 
                                                        
11 The quintessential example of this imperative comes from the 1862 Homestead Act, signed by President Abraham 
Lincoln, which granted 160 acre tracts of land west of the Mississippi to families willing to settle them.  This 
incentivized able-bodied heads of households to move west even as the US Government needed men to fight in the 
ongoing Civil War. 
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Dualism and that humans have “never been modern” (Latour 1993) has brought needed attention 
to non-modern ontologies that do not distinguish between the two, particularly indigenous 
cosmologies that de-center human beings.   
An unintended side effect of constructivist approaches that challenge the nature-culture 
distinction, however, has been to overlook the life-making projects of thoroughly Modern settlers 
living along contemporary resource frontiers.  After all, opening, settling, and exploiting new 
frontiers—in a word, colonization—is a hallmark of Modernity and arguably created the modern 
era (Mintz 1985; Wolf 1987).  Just as people at the edges of global markets can be 
simultaneously self-reliant and enmeshed in wider, market-oriented networks (Hébert and 
Mincyte 2014), they can also position themselves in opposition to nature and natural forces while 
depending on them.  Chilotes, the mestizo Chileans who first settled the coast of Aysén, inhabit 
an enchanted landscape, but they continue to ontologically separate nature from civilization.  
They live close to nature and continue to favor multi-occupational careers tied to the 
multifunctional landscapes they inhabit, but for them nature remains a formidable and dangerous 
external force.  This Modern understanding of nature as something that can be exploited but 
cannot be controlled defines frontier life—and sets those who have lived along the coast of 
Aysén for a generation or more apart from the capitalists running the plants at Chacabuco and 
overseeing offshore salmon cultivation centers.  Producing “civilization” in formerly wild places 
like Puerto Aguirre and Puerto Gala and Puerto Gaviota—the latter two of which were “plastic 
towns” made of timber and tarpaulin until the early 2000s—is a source of pride and informs 
residents’ sense of self. 12   
                                                        
12 Anthropologist Piergiorgio Di Giminiani has written about the distinction between Mapuche farmers and mestizo 
settlers’ attachment to place, describing the latter as “built around histories of specific families and their abilities of 
transforming the landscape” (Di Giminiani 2016).   
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I wish to focus on the emergent properties of frontier life along the coast of Patagonia.  
Following Andreas Malm, I define these emergent properties as properties of a system “resulting 
from the organization of its parts.” (Malm 2018:67, emphasis in original).  Emergent properties 
come into being through relations, and along frontiers these are first and foremost relations 
between people and nature—relations that create multi-functional landscapes capable of 
supporting multiple livelihoods tied to local ecologies.  Relations between citizens and the state 
come later and are, I contend, following Turner’s famous “frontier thesis” informed by 
conditions along the frontier (Turner 1975).  Relations between citizens and corporations come 
last and—as my conversation with the human resources director in Puerto Chacabuco made 
clear—these relations are the most tenuous.   
Settler Colonialism on the Coast of Patagonia 
The settlement of the southern Chilean interior, from Los Lagos to Magallanes, has much in 
common with the settlement of the prototypical frontier, the American West. A series of wars 
between newly independent, Euro-descended Chileans and the indigenous Mapuche “pacified” 
new southern territory through expulsion and genocide.  The government in Santiago provided 
land grants to white families willing to build farms and cultivate this territory, bringing waves of 
Europeans—initially Germans but later Italians and Croatians—to the south and turning formerly 
wild spaces into productive parts of the expanding nation. Throughout the 19th Century, Chilean 
elites saw European immigration as a means of improving the country (Burns 1980) and 
espoused their own whiteness to draw a contrast with their northern neighbors (Beckman 2009).  
By 1880, Chilean politicians were calling their country an “empire of the Pacific” and describing 
their civilizing mission in language eerily similar to that used to describe “Manifest Destiny” in 
the United States. 
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But this was in the interior, on the plains between the rugged coastline and the peaks of the 
Andes.  The settlement of the coast was far different.  Here, with little backing or support from 
Santiago, settlers radiated outward from the archipelago of Chiloé. 
Chiloé has always been distinct from the rest of the country.  The cultural heart of the 
Chilean “extreme south,” the tiny communities that developed in the archipelago’s inlets and 
natural harbors built churches in the same way they built boats13 and, from the very beginning, 
resisted the nationalist aims of the expanding Chilean state.14  Their Spanish ancestors mixed 
with the Chonos—a now vanished indigenous group known as canoeros (canoers) for whom the 
southern archipelago in Aysén is named—as well as the Huilliche band of the Mapuche people.  
It was Chilotes in wool gorros (hats), not Patagones with their boinas (berets), who first settled 
the coast of Patagonia in the second half of the 19th Century, for they were adept at navigating 
the coast and exploiting its resources with subsistence strategies defined by movement. 
Chilotes and the Chiloé archipelago have been of great interest to anthropologists and 
sociologists, both Chilean and international, particularly since the advent of aquaculture (Bustos 
Gallardo 2017, 2013; Daughters 2019, 2016a; Gerhart 2017; Hayward 2011; Pitchon 2015).  
Puerto Montt and the Chiloé archipelago were the epicenter of the early days of the industry, and 
the fish processing factories in places like Castro and Quellón employ a significant portion of 
islanders, despite historically poor labor conditions there (Schurman 2004).  But the commonly 
held view among the Chilean public is that Chilotes, both those living on the island and their 
diaspora that extends as far south as Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, traditionally made their 
                                                        
13 These famous churches are UNESCO world heritage sites and were the first sites to be recognized as such on the 
Chilean mainland.  Only the moai on Rapa Nui pre-date Chiloé’s churches on the UNESCO list. 
 
14 Indeed, Chilotes remained loyal to Spain during the Latin American wars of independence—in part a loyalty born 
of their extreme fealty to the Catholic Church—and the archipelago was the last part of the country populated by 
mestizos to join the new nation in 1826 (Daughters 2019). 
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livelihoods from fishing.  This is a misconception, albeit one that informs historical narratives 
and contemporary governance strategies of the Chilean state as well as the approaches of the 
aquaculture firms now operating throughout Los Lagos, Aysén, and Magallanes. 
Chilotes are fishers, but not exclusively so.15  They are, in the parlance of Claude Levi-
Strauss, bricoleurs in the most literal sense.  Those who have studied the island have noted the 
persistence of the minga (Daughters 
2019; 2016a), an Andean tradition for 
working communally and completing 
tasks for the good of the community 
at large that has its roots in the ayllu, 
or community of human and non-
human beings living in relation (de la 
Cadena 2016; Colloredo-Mansfeld 
2009).  This is a tradition that has 
long disappeared from other parts of 
Chile, but one that persists on its 
southernmost islands.  Like many 
rural people in Latin America (Cleary 
1993; De Grammont and Martínez 
Valle 2009; Martinez 2010), Chilotes 
and their descendants engage in multi-
occupational careers based on local 
                                                        
15 Or as Marisol de la Cadena might say, “but not only” (de la Cadena 2016). 
Figure 7: A wooden embarcación under construction in Caleta 
Andrade 
Figure 6: A greenhouse in Puerto Aguirre 
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ecology as well as their ability to strategically engage with outsiders.  They plant and harvest 
potatoes and maintain greenhouses for growing cabbage, onions, carrots and garlic.  They 
provide maritime transportation and build fine wooden boats capable of carrying them across the 
rough and unpredictable seas around their archipelago, as well as across the Gulf of Corvado 
where they cut hardwood from mainland forests.  They raise sheep and cows and produce dairy 
products.  They do put to sea and pursue finfish but have historically preferred harvesting clams, 
mussels, and other mollusks that are more easily collected.  Like others who rely on marine 
resources (Acheson 1980) the Chiloté-descended people living on the coast of Aysén are well 
adapted to uncertainty.  Their multi-occupational careers and “intimacy with ecological cycles” 
(Hébert 2015:34) have, until recently, allowed them to endure the difficult and highly variable 
conditions along the coast of Patagonia and avoid dependence on wage labor in industrial ports 
like Puerto Chacabuco—even as their counterparts in Quellón work in that city’s bustling fish 
processing plants. 
Chilote Livelihoods 
There is a rich literature on rural people’s pursuit of multiple-livelihoods, and as a result this 
practice is known by many names.  As early as 1993, David Cleary critiqued “classic” political 
economic approaches to studying frontier zones, noting “when you can scratch a peasant and 
find a miner, a construction worker and an extractivist, when a wage laborer, smallholder and 
percentage stakeholder are all rolled into one, consistent relationships to the means of production 
dissolve” (Cleary 1993:342). 
More recently, scholars working in economic anthropology have examined the “new rurality” 
that has emerged across Latin America (Martinez 2010; Schneider 2009; Kay 2008), observing 
how the implementation of neoliberal policies that emphasize export sectors has facilitated multi-
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occupational careers by creating new opportunities—in particular outside of the agricultural 
sector.  In his work on Sub-Saharan Africa, Frank Ellis has written extensively on how 
households increasingly rely on “an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and assets” in 
order to sustain themselves and improve their overall well-being (Ellis 2000:14) and presents this 
“portfolio diversification” as a means of mitigating risk, an approach taken up by scholars 
working in the Chiloé archipelago today (Ebel 2018). 
Chilean anthropologist José Bengoa uses the somewhat ambiguous term “displacements” to 
describe how rural residents respond to trans-local forces by combining new and old activities in 
novel ways, reconfiguring their livelihoods in the process.  Yet he cautions that while 
participation in a range of activities may provide greater freedom, it also reduces autonomy and 
increases precarity among workers (Bengoa 2003:82).  
In their work on the Philippines, Wolfram Dressler et. al. describe “livelihood bricolage” and 
define it as “the process by which livelihoods are (re)combined from resources available in the 
landscape, as embedded in and drawn from the social-cultural relations of family, kin, and 
community, and as impacted by trans-local political economic influences” (2016:78).  Crucially, 
they see “livelihood bricolage” as depending on the kinds of multi-functional landscapes that are 
fast disappearing—either subsumed within frontier zones where only the most lucrative resource 
is valued or undermined by market-oriented state conservation programs that sever the link 
between bricoleurs and their environment (2016). 
These last two ways of theorizing rural residents’ pursuit of multiple livelihoods—those 
proposed by Bengoa and Dressler et al. – are useful in understanding conditions along the coast 
of Aysén.  Bengoa’s emphasis on the combination of old and new sectors from which rural 
people now cobble together multi-occupational careers and Dressler et. al.’s emphasis on the 
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linkage between multifunctional landscapes and the “livelihood bricolage” practiced by those 
inhabiting them also respond (however incompletely) to recent calls to connect the practices of 
local people and the agency of local natures” (Barney 2009; Walker 2006; Tsing 2005).   
Among those living in Aysén, this agency is never in doubt.  Moreover, the multi-
functionality of the coastal landscape—in particular the steep islands that form the region’s 
archipelagos—provides ample opportunities for residents to subsist and even thrive under harsh 
conditions.  But it is not just a question of subsistence.  The small-scale exploitation of nature, 
whether in the form of firewood cut 
from old-growth hardwood forests 
or shellfish collected in shallow 
bays and estuaries, informs the 
cultural logic of islanders.  As long 
as there are uninhabited spaces and 
unexploited patches of the sea floor, 
the factory jobs in Puerto 
Chacabuco are superfluous. 
Visiting the fishing camp of Oscar Raín and his son Milton in their six meter panga named 
“Boris” (his open-cockpit wooden boat), this was especially evident.  Oscar has occupied the 
fishing camp, which consists of two tarpaulin covered structures, since 1982, when he came to 
the region by boat from Quellón, on the big island of Chiloé.   These two structures, black and 
slightly off-kilter, serve as a smokehouse and dining area and a bunkhouse, respectively.  They 
have dirt floors but are quite dry.  The smokehouse, where Oscar cures the róbalo (rock cod) he 
Figure 8: Recently cut firewood and pangas in Puerto Aguirre 
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catches, contains a small gas generator that he explains is for la luz (electricity) while the 
bunkhouse contains a wood burning stove.   
The lengthy occupation of this camp and the otherwise uninhabited island became even more 
evident when Oscar revealed the diminutive apple trees he planted and the small plot where he 
has cultivated potatoes since shortly after his arrival.  Most striking, however, was the massive 
shell midden that took up nearly half of the shoreline where the camp is situated.  This mound of 
mussel shells—some of them larger than a grown man’s hand—was easily over six feet tall.  
Sensing my awe, Oscar and Milton laughed.  “Nuestra fabrica,” (our factory) Oscar said, waving 
towards the mound, “somos ricos,” he added— “we’re rich.” 
At the time of my visit, however, 
the two men could not safely eat any 
of their “riches” because of the 
paralyzing toxin filtered through the 
bivalves upon which they had so often 
feasted.  A red tide that caused the 
Ministry of Health to ban shellfish 
collecting was now entering its third 
month, and there was sadness in Oscar’s aged eyes as he told me that he was waiting for the 
mollusks to be safe again.16  Since they couldn’t harvest mussels, Milton explained, they cured 
more cod than usual and cut stands of 
                                                        
16 Islanders do not always take government ministries or officials at their word when it comes to the safety of marine 
resources.  Local practices for ensuring that mollusks are safe to eat include feeding a portion to a household cat or 
dog and seeing how they react before serving mussels or clams on the family table.  Another strategy is to discard 
the digestive tract of the mollusk, since this is where the highest levels of toxins build up, and then only consume the 
rubbery muscle and “foot” of the bivalve. 
Figure 9: Oscar and Milton's camp 
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hardwood on islands near their camp, to sell as firewood in nearby Puerto Aguirre and Caleta 
Andrade, where they had family.  Their inability to subsist on the most abundant resource on 
“their” island also meant that the two men were mostly living in Estero Copa, the smallest 
permanent settlement in the Islas Huichas—something unusual for the peak of summer when 
they would normally take advantage of better weather to spend extended periods at their camp. 
Before we left on our return voyage to Puerto Aguirre, I noted that the inlet where they had 
their camp also contained ample evidence of the aquaculture sector, most of it now repurposed to 
suit the needs of the two men.  The mooring ball where they tied their small dingy, painted in the 
same gray and white scheme as the slightly larger Boris, was massive—suitable for a boat twelve 
meters in length or larger—and had broken free from a nearby cultivation center and washed 
ashore, where they appropriated it.  Likewise, the “dock” onto which they could step without 
getting their feet wet when their panga nosed ashore was effectively a floating causeway made of 
Styrofoam floats that had previously been attached to a much larger structure.  These too had 
washed ashore on the various beaches surrounding the fishing camp, and Oscar lashed them 
together to make it easier to load and offload the Boris.  The landscape—both natural and 
constructed—provided for most of Oscar and Milton’s needs if they were creative enough to take 
advantage. 
Fishing camps like Oscar and Milton’s still dot the archipelagos off the coast of Aysén, as 
they once dotted the interior islands off the coast of Chiloé.  From these bases, long-time 
residents of the region harvest mollusks, cut firewood, fish, cure their catches, and cultivate 
small plots, switching from one activity to another depending on the seasonal availability of 
resources, and—increasingly—the presence or absence of toxins in the sea. 
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A Second Wave of Settlement 
When I returned to Puerto Aguirre with Oscar and Milton, it was the first time I had come 
into port aboard a panga.  On previous visits I had arrived via ferry and lancha rapida (a small, 
rapid steel-hulled motor launch), but coming into the port in the low-slung, wooden Boris gave a 
different perspective.  The steep hill on which residents built their shingled houses looked even 
taller and more imposing from my position so close to the waves.  The smell of the wood smoke 
that here only lingers briefly before being swept away by the near constant wind seemed 
stronger. 
The community at Puerto Aguirre was founded in 1942, though Chilotes had been coming to 
the Islas Huichas far longer, at least since Melinka, at the top of the Aysén region across the Gulf 
of Corcovado from Chiloé, was established in 1869.  The Chilotes who founded the town 
maintained their ties to the ancestral archipelago, returning to trade fish and sealion skins for 
potatoes and other agricultural goods produced on the big island.  The itinerant nature of Chilote 
life meant that these connections endured, and Puerto Aguirre grew slowly for a generation. One 
room houses on stilts gave way to three and four room dwellings—always built with the shingles 
that are a hallmark of Chiloté architecture.  Gradually, this hillside community became a base as 
stores opened and goods from the mainland began to arrive more frequently.  Fishing families 
traveled between Puerto Aguirre and their camps rather than between Puerto Aguirre and Chiloé. 
In the 1980s, the pace of growth quickened.  The boom de merluza (hake boom) and fievre 
del loco (abalone “fever”) brought new arrivals and scores of boats filled the formerly quiet 
harbor.  More families came from Chiloé to fish the waters to fish the Moraleda Channel and the 
bays and inlets of the region, but fishing boats also came from farther north.  Talcahuano, a port 
on the mainland near Puerto Montt sent so many men south that the men of Puerto Aguirre 
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developed a special enmity with the newly arrived talcahuanos, accusing them of thievery and, 
more importantly, of courting their sisters and wives. 
The hake boom also created “plastic towns.” Some of these, like Puerto Gala and Puerto 
Gaviota would eventually become towns not unlike Puerto Aguirre (albeit smaller) with regular 
ferry service and medical outposts.  Others, like Kalkiman, disappeared after the boom subsided.  
These boomtowns provided a base where fishers lived and from which they put to sea, returning 
at night to sell their catches to middlemen and to drink and gamble.  Fortunes were won and lost 
around smoky fires and under tarpaulins, which provided the only protection from the near 
constant rain. 
Carlos Montes, who I met in Puerto Aguirre, lived in Puerto Gala in the early 1990s, buying 
and selling hake for several different seafood companies in Puerto Montt.  Though he has now 
moved to Santiago where he runs a seafood company that exports fish to the European Union, 
his memories of the hake boom remain vivid.  As he described: 
This was during the boom de la merluza, and I was in charge in Gala… near to Isla 
Magdalena.  And there were two brothers I had worked with.  They came to me and 
asked for an advance and told me that they would go out and fish for me that day.  And I 
told them no, that they already owed me money and anyway I wasn’t sending any boats 
that day.  It was a strange day.  You could look out and tell it was strange.  The clouds 
weren’t moving; they were low… everything was gray… it was a strange day. 
 And these brothers, they were so insistent. “No,” they said, and I remember the 
conversation and what they looked like… they were tall, like you, which caught my 
attention because generally Chilotes are short, but they said, “no, let us go out there 
today, we’ll make a catch and clear our debt, you’ll see.”  And I told them again that I 
wasn’t sending boats.  But they were so insistent that I told them that if they went, I 
would buy [their catch] and this way they could settle their debt. 
 And it wasn’t just them… that day maybe 150 boats went out, because in that era, it 
was a locura (madness) how much was happening, all the time.  But I remember by 11 in 
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the morning, they started to come back.   It was like a parade of boats, and I knew this 
meant that they had lost the ability to fish, otherwise they all would have stayed.  But 
they couldn’t fish.  Because, off Moraleda [Channel] a huge storm had come up.  And so 
the boats came back in a long line.  And the last boat belonged to these brothers.  But 
there was only one. 
 What had happened was that a huge wave had come over and carried off the other.  
And the brother was afraid and he said to me, “we have to go out, you have to help me,” 
and so we went, and so did many other boats to look for his brother.  And we searched 
[off and on] for three days, and we never found him.  And eventually, because he 
couldn’t go in his boat alone, I had to find other work for the brother [who survived] so I 
put him on another boat headed to Quellón and that was the last I saw him.  That is how it 
was in those days. 
 But I still think of that morning.  I think that if I had stood firm in my decision, if I 
hadn’t been convinced, it wouldn’t have happened.  And for months after I thought about 
those brothers and I felt guilty.  But this is how it was in those days, and for me it really 
was a beautiful experience… well, no, not beautiful.  It was an interesting experience. 
It may seem odd that Carlos could call an experience defined by such hardship and loss 
“beautiful”—even briefly—but this is indicative of the pride Carlos still feels at having been able 
to survive and even thrive where others could not.  Huge storms were and are a fact of life on the 
coast of Patagonia and the watery landscapes where fishers operate can turn deadly very quickly.  
In this context, living and working in a tiny pocket of civilization—one that you have built with 
your own hands and one that is surrounded by unforgiving sea and sky—is an accomplishment.  
Furthermore, implicit in Carlos’s story is the fact that storms and natural disasters can claim 
anyone, at virtually any time.  This creates a sense of shared vulnerability that produces 
collective action and community support even among competitors; despite the dangerous 
situation offshore, Carlos went out “and so did many other boats” to look for the lost brother.   
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The hake boom represents another frontier moment, similar to but distinct from Chilote 
settlement along the coast of Aysén.  Instead of just Chiloé, fishers who arrived in the 1980s and 
1990s came from cities like La Serena, Coquimbo, and Concepción as well as smaller ports in 
between. Like the Chilotes who came before them, however, many of these fishers stayed in the 
region and—though they arrived with their own distinct practices and traditions—they gradually 
came to have more in common with their Chilote neighbors than those back “home.”  The 
difficult and unpredictable conditions along the coast of Aysén changed them, as did the 
networks in which they operated.  Many intermarried—it was not just talcahuano men who came 
and sought companionship, but also many women.  Cristobal Cerda, originally from Valdivia 
and a self-identified “founder of plastic towns,” came to Aysén in 1987 and married a woman 
from Puerto Aguirre, eventually opening a small store on the town’s main street when a 
persistent medical problem stopped him from fishing.  Isabel, who now runs the boarding house 
in Puerto Aguirre with her longtime partner Luis, also came during the hake boom.  She fished 
for hake but also sold baked goods in the plastic towns and in fishing camps before she met 
Luis—himself a locally famous fisher and navigator—and settled permanently in Puerto Aguirre. 
Maritime Temporalities  
As is common in other parts of the Andes—but uncommon in other parts of Chile—those 
living in the Islas Huichas practice a highly syncretic form of Catholicism.  Many of the people I 
spoke to blend indigenous Huilliche myths about sea serpents and witches with Catholic stories 
about saints and angels.  The traditional stories of Chiloé endure in the folklore of the Islas 
Huichas and other communities along the coast of Aysén.  Hector, a jolly, diminutive man who 
works as a clerk in one of the small general stores in Puerto Aguirre, is particularly adept at 
telling winding stories that blend the fantastical with the everyday.  For Hector, it isn’t a matter 
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of “believing;” mermaids, saints, and El Caleuche—the spectral ship that appears in the waters 
offshore as a dark omen—simply are.  They are woven into the fabric of the community because 
the stories themselves make them real. 
One of Hector’s favorite stories is about the night Luis, with whom he fished during the hake 
boom, became disoriented and was nearly lost at sea.  Luis’s reputation within the community as 
a fisher and navigator is even greater than his reputation as a guitarist and folksinger, although he 
never mentions it himself.  So it was in a hushed tone that Hector described to me how Luis, “an 
expert who guided us when I went out to fish with him at night many times during those good 
years,” became confused when he was coming back from Puerto Chacabuco one night in his 
fiberglass panga.  As Hector described: 
He had made this voyage thousands of times, and he was just picking up some things 
from the port… propane and things like that.  But on this night for some reason he was 
confused and he couldn’t see the tops of the hills17 or islands along the way.  So all night 
he went in circles, never getting any closer to [Puerto] Aguirre but going between this 
island and that, as though he was being called to them or something was holding him in 
place.  It was a miracle that he made it back early the next morning, once the sun came 
up.  Many of the people here [in Puerto Aguirre] thought he was lost to the sea. 
This story, about how even an expert navigator accustomed to the rugged coastline can be 
lost because of an unexpected twist of fate or supernatural influence, points to an advantage that 
islanders have over state officials and aquaculture operators—whether they descended from the 
first waves of Chilote settlers or came to the Islas Huichas later.  Over generations, those who 
have settled and worked the fjords of southern Chile have depended on a landscape that is always 
breathtaking, but also frequently unpredictable.  Islanders mobilize informal, experiential 
                                                        
17 For those used to navigating the narrow fjords and channels that divide the mainland and archipelagoes the 
distinct, jagged tops of the various mountains provide useful waypoints even at night. 
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knowledge to navigate this environment, but they are also fatalistic when this knowledge fails 
them. 
I grew up on the coast of Maine, where the semi-diurnal tides rose and fell in a steady, 
observable cycle.  Aysén, like most of Chile, experiences mixed tides, but unlike the rest of the 
country, its coastline of inlets, fjords, channels, and narrow bays cause these shifting tides to 
appear different across the landscape.  Likewise, the weather is some of the most extreme in the 
Southern Hemisphere, with clouds and moisture sweeping across the entirety of the South Pacific 
before crashing into the archipelagos off of Aysén. 
In my various trips to the offshore communities at Puerto Aguire, Caleta Andrade, and Estero 
Copa, on the Islas Huichas, I was never able to leave as planned.  My first trip was especially 
harrowing as the launch left Puerto Aguirre and made it as far as the mouth of the fjord on its 
return journey to the mainland before being forced to turn back.  I vividly recall seeing 
crewmembers calmly but hurriedly trying to seal the forward hatch as water leaked into the 
passenger compartment and hearing the motor sputter as seawater made its way into the engine 
compartment, threatening to leave us dead in the water in eight-meter seas.  Before we turned 
back to Puerto Aguirre to wait out the powerful winds threatening our voyage, one of the 
passengers—a woman who worked for Seremi de Salud and lived in Coyhaique, in the region’s 
interior—began wailing, crossing herself, and, in her panic, demanding to be let off the boat.  
Those passengers who lived along the coast, however, sat in stoic silence as they waited for the 
captain of the vessel to decide how to handle the perilous situation. 
Other trips were less dramatic, but yielded the same result: extra days, and once nearly an 
entire week, spent in Puerto Aguirre waiting for news of the weather, usually delivered by others 
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working in the port.  When I asked Hector what would happen to his store if the ferry did not 
arrive with new goods to stock the shelves he shrugged at the obviousness of the solution. 
“We’ll sell what we have,” he said, indifferently.  “It’s never a problem.” 
This is not strictly true.  Impassable weather and delays to the ferry—the state subsidized 
transportation service that links the permanent settlements up and down the coast and the only 
public option for transporting vehicles and heavy machinery—are a problem, but not for 
islanders.  The issues they present belong to those bound by Modern, terrestrial temporalities.  
Marx himself wrote about the conquest of space by time and the annihilation of both through 
ever increasing circuits of capital, a refrain taken up later by other scholars of the world economy 
(Altvater 1989; Harvey 1990) but this depends on technology being able to successfully 
attenuate the problems posed by natural phenomena such as distance and weather.  This is not 
yet the case in Aysén, and I am not alone in having spent considerably more time than planned in 
far flung communities like Puerto Aguirre.  It is common to see aquaculture workers, whose 
companies pay handsomely for direct flights on chartered planes from the airstrip outside Caleta 
Andrade, wandering idly through Puerto Aguirre as they stare at the clouds and waves and wait 
for conditions to improve so that they can get home to their families.  Despite its power, capital 
cannot, as yet, challenge the weather. 
The successful acclimation to these natural conditions, however, shapes relations between 
rural people and state officials by providing rural people with a distinct advantage: they are used 
to waiting, and they answer to no one but themselves and their neighbors.  Just as state officials 
and aquaculture operators understand the coast as an “official landscape” (Nixon 2011:17) with 
space determined by fixed boundaries drawn onto the maps in their offices, they understand time 
as a valuable commodity.  Delays to the ferry, protesting fishers that blockade ports, and sudden 
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storms all present these outsiders with the same problem, namely, they are inconvenient and 
expensive for those who have strict deadlines (state officials) and must pay their employees by 
the hour (aquaculture operators). 
The Emergent Properties of Frontiers 
I began this chapter by describing the frustrations of a Chilean human resources director at a 
Norwegian owned aquaculture firm as she struggled to retain trained workers.  Local people 
were working for weeks or months on the factory floor but then leaving for other opportunities—
something uncommon in Los Lagos, immediately to the north, where wage labor in the 
aquaculture sector has largely transformed coastal life.  Why?  The answer lies in the emergent 
properties of frontier life that I have described—properties that emerge from the relations 
between local people, local nature, and the Chilean state. 
First, relations between local people and local nature.  Those living along the coast of Aysén, 
whether they were Chilote settlers or arrived during the “hake boom” or “abalone fever,” 
continue to exploit their multifunctional landscape, pursuing multiple, seasonal livelihoods and 
maintaining semi-subsistence practices that have largely disappeared elsewhere.  But the 
relations between local people and the landscape they inhabit are informed by more than just 
subsistence practices.  Local people live in awe of nature, which remains a powerful external 
force capable of reorienting (or extinguishing) their lives.  Being able to subsist in this context—
to create pockets of civilization on far flung islands in the middle of a stormy sea—creates a 
local identity as much as it informs local practices. 
Second, relations between local people and the state.  As I have already detailed in the 
previous chapter, rural people’s “diverse portfolios of activities and assets” (Ellis 2000:14) now 
include direct cash transfers from the state, significant subsidies to cover the cost of utilities, 
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education, and health, and community-based public employment. Over the past decade, coastal 
people have incorporated these public funds—overseen by state officials with a mandate to 
provide services to rural people as well as to organize the frontier economy—into their multi-
occupational careers, increasing their flexibility as they move between various sectors of the 
local economy.  These moves may occur seasonally, but they are not undertaken solely to 
manage uncertainty.  Indeed, perhaps because their syncretic Catholicism and frequent 
powerlessness in the face of overwhelming natural forces makes them highly fatalistic, many of 
those living in island communities outwardly engage in little proactive planning for times of 
scarcity.  This makes the longstanding informal distributive networks found in Aysén’s island 
communities extremely important in times of crisis, and these same networks also enable local 
people to leave jobs in the factories at Chacabuco when opportunities to work with kin or 
neighbors present themselves. 
Frontiers are relational spaces (Barney 2009) and while capital is a central force driving 
frontier dynamics, it is but one of many forces at play in these spaces.  The coast of Patagonia 
has been variably occupied for generations, and those who settled here have long practiced a 
range of semi-subsistence activities bound to both local ecologies and global markets.  They 
have also—particularly since the 1980s—been subject to state policies and interventions.  Today, 
the relations between local people, local natures, and the Chilean state determine what is possible 
for capitalists seeking to extract and commodify resources along this coastal frontier.  As Jason 
Cons and Michael Eilenberg write, “the pasts of frontier production linger on and generate new 
possibilities and challenges within frontier space (2019:5).”   
In Aysén, these pasts include Chilote myths and community-making practices as well as the 
“abalone fever” of the 1980s and “hake boom” of the 1990s and early 2000s that brought new 
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waves of coastal people to the region.  They also include the infrastructure projects of a dictator 
and social programs introduced by successive democratic governments.  These programs, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, emerge from the “advanced” liberal democratic imperative to 
provide for the well-being of the population through the application of expertise (Chatterjee 
2004:34; Foucault 2008; Rose 2006:145) and the legacy of the dictatorship but they are shaped 
by the commitments of the bureaucrats and state officials who administer them.   
Considering all of these pasts, however, should not obscure the continued importance of the 
material and temporal aspects of maritime life—aspects largely determined by awesome and 
terrifying natural forces that simultaneously allow rural people to make a living and threaten 





CHAPTER 2. AUTHORITARIAN BUREAUCRACY, CARING BUREAUCRATS: 
NEGOTIATING FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN POST-DICTATORSHIP CHILE 
 
The General Visits Chaitén 
“It used to be so different.  I grew up in Chaitén,18 which in those days had not even a 
thousand people… maybe four hundred.  And my father was very strict with us, very strict.” 
Pablo, a manager at Banco Estado, the bank responsible for all financial activities conducted 
by the Chilean state, was working on his fourth beer.  Our conversation had turned from the 
current presidential debates underway in Santiago to the Dictadura (dictatorship) and what life 
was like before and after.  
“But we used to watch movies… our whole family would watch these old movies.  This must 
have been in ’76 or ’77.  But the movies would start late at night, and so often we would see only 
half the movie before they cut the power.  In those days the town had only the one generator and 
they turned it off.  So for years I had seen the first half of all these movies!”  He laughed, before 
continuing, “and then they started building the Carretera [Austral] and my friends and I decided 
to hike it… since they were clearing the way.  So we took a boat down to [Puerto] Chacabuco 
and then we hiked back up to Futaleufú.” 
Having hiked the considerably shorter circuit at Torres del Paine National Park on my first 
trip to Patagonia some years back I was curious  how long this journey took, so I asked. 
                                                        
18 Chaitén is a small, coastal town located on the mainland roughly parallel to the largest island in the Chiloé 
archipelago.  It is roughly 10 hours from Puerto Aguirre by sea. 
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“About two weeks, I think,” Pablo offered, finishing his beer and catching the eye of the 
waiter, “but there were so many changes in that time.  I remember it must have been in 1980 that 
we got electricity in Chaitén and then television, because before that all we had was radio.  And 
did you know,” he lowered his voice slightly before continuing, “that The General and his wife 
came to Chaitén once, in those days?” 
I had spent enough time in Chile that the thought of this monstrous figure who murdered his 
political enemies and oversaw the torture, rape, and disappearance of thousands of his 
countrymen no longer caused me to shudder outwardly.  I had seen the old news reels in which 
General Augusto Pinochet appeared as an avuncular figure, accepting flowers from children in 
the countryside and smiling broadly when rural mayors welcomed him to their towns.  It wasn’t 
a surprise to me that older Chileans had trouble reconciling these two sides of the public figure 
who, more than any other in their country’s history, shaped its development. 
“Wow,” I managed. 
“Yes, and it’s funny,” Pablo smiled, “because this was The General, you know?  And he was 
with his wife and they had to have transportation, of course.  So one of his officials came to my 
parents’ house because they had the nicest car in town.  It was nothing!  It was a Toyota Corolla, 
weon, nothing!  But in those days it was the nicest car in town and so The General requisitioned 
it so he and his wife could ride down the main street.” 
I nodded, silently. 
“And my parents were so embarrassed because, you know, these people were used to riding 
in the biggest, nicest cars in Santiago and so when The General’s wife got into the car she hit her 
head!”  He laughed again, “but it was nothing to them, I think they were just happy to have a 
modern car in such a place [like Chaitén] and for my parents, it was an honor.” 
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Looking at Pablo as he told the story, it was clear it was an honor for him too.  
This was not an easy conversation, but it was an important one.  For many people like Pablo, 
who grew up in towns like Chaitén before they were connected to the rest of the country with 
roads, television signals, and power lines, the massive projects inaugurated under the Dictadura 
brought Modernity.  Infrastructure projects undertaken in the name of conectividad 
(connectivity) like the Carretera Austral and the towers that deliver electricity are highly visible, 
and “modernize” rural communities dramatically.  For many of those living in these 
communities—which are already more conservative than cities, especially in the Far South—
these projects had far more lasting consequences than the mass disappearances and 
incarcerations—invisible projects undertaken to ensure the Military Regime’s development 
strategies went according to plan. Furthermore, south of Puerto Montt, where communities like 
Chaitén had tiny populations and most families’ livelihoods were based almost exclusively on 
subsistence activities, the relative lack of political organization spared many towns and villages 
from the violent purges that were common farther north.  Furthermore, today, those who come to 
the region and earn zona pay as professionals are more likely to be members of the upper middle 
class—or eager to join its ranks—and therefore the beneficiaries of the so-called “Chilean 
Miracle” (Berg 2006; Winn 2004) 
This “Miracle” discourse has been challenged by Chilean intellectuals and international 
scholars, who point to the successive economic crises Chile experienced in the 1980s, the state’s 
continued reliance on copper and other raw material exports, and the considerable state spending 
and state action necessary to reorganize the economy and achieve the market-oriented system in 
place today.  Nonetheless, it remains a powerful imaginary that naturalizes practical 
engagements within both the Chilean state apparatus and the landscape (Taylor 2004).  As has 
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been well documented, the successive center-left governments in power after the return to 
democracy largely maintained the neoliberal policies implemented under Pinochet (Han 2011, 
Melillo 2015; Moulian 1998; Stern 2010), even going so far as to privatize the country’s water 
resources and infrastructure during the presidency of socialist Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006).  Their 
slogan was, “Continuity and change,” and “continuity” meant continuing to pursue privatization 
and foreign investment as drivers of economic growth.    
The neoliberal reforms inaugurated by the “Chicago Boys”—Chilean economists who trained 
under Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago—and maintained by the Democratic 
governments of the 1990s and 2000s have garnered considerable attention.  However, 
considerably less has been written about how Chilean state bureaucracies have retained both the 
structure and mandates established during the Dictadura and how the memory of this period 
continues to shape the complex relationships between bureaucrats and the citizens they serve. 
These relationships develop in surprising ways.  As I have described, they are grounded in 
the hierarchical, colonial structures that Chile’s Military Regime considered essential for 
developing and modernizing the country in accordance with neoliberal dogma.  According to this 
logic, rural citizens became objects within the development project, subject to the designs of 
state planners but lacking their own subjectivity.   
Yet this is not how things work in Aysén, where, despite a host of infrastructure projects and 
ongoing efforts to remake the landscape into a series of highly regulated, productive spaces 
(Lefebvre 2009; Scott 1998), emergent forms of governance highlight the interconnectedness of 
the political and moral economies.  This interconnectedness, as we shall see, emerges partly 
because state officials who are far from home become necessarily imbricated in local networks 
of distribution and care.  However it also emerges because of these officials’ commitment to the 
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rural lifeways and ecological practices they see disappearing in other, better connected parts of 
the country—the very commitment that in many cases brought them to Patagonia.  I contend that 
rather than “dead zones” (Graeber 2015), bureaucracies are lively places, and rather than 
indifference (Herzfeld 1992) many bureaucrats in the Chilean Far South practice forms of care.  
Thus, the proliferation of government offices and projects in the Aysén Region has created fertile 
sites where Chile’s development project is contested, negotiated, and organized anew.  
Neoliberal “Reforms” 
The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) began on September 11, 1973 when a US-
backed coup resulted in the death of democratically elected Marxist president Salvador Allende 
and many of his aides and cabinet members.  Investigations conducted since Chile’s return to 
democracy have revealed a host of atrocities, some of which, like the torture and execution of 
students, trade unionists, and folk musicians who belonged to leftist parties or were otherwise 
perceived as a threat to military control, occurred in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Other 
acts, from the enslavement of suspected dissidents at Colonia Dignidad, a walled compound run 
by a former Nazi with ties to the Chilean Armed Forces, to the politically motivated 
assassinations of Diplomat Orlando Letelier and President Eduardo Frei Montalva, occurred 
years later.  Perhaps most infamous, however, was the “Caravan of Death” which transported 
Colonel Manuel Contreras and agents of the DINA (Pinochet’s ruthless secret police) up and 
down the country where they stopped in small towns, arrested, and “disappeared” local 
politicians from leftist parties, trade unionists, and even carabineros and other members of the 
armed forces thought to be loyal to Allende or critical of the Junta’s takeover. According to the 
Rettig Report Findings—announced on national television by President Patricio Aylwin Azócar 
in 1991 and commissioned to pursue justice “to the extent possible” (Aylwin 1991) for the 
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abuses of the Pinochet years—the number of citizens executed or “disappeared” under the 
Military Regime “for political reasons” was 2,115.  The Valech Report, launched to identify 
victims of imprisonment and torture and originally released in 2004, identified another 38,254 
victims of the Dictatorship.  The investigations undertaken by these commissions, however, were 
limited in scope, largely because of the enduring shadow Pinochet himself cast over Chilean 
politics and the reluctance of the military to cooperate (Spooner 2011), and their conservatism 
meant the real figures were certainly higher (Stern 2010:89).  The Museo de la Memoria y 
Direchos Humanos (Museum of Memory and 
Human Rights) in Santiago puts the death toll 
closer to 5,000 and the number of citizens 
imprisoned and tortured at nearly 120,000.  
Tens of thousands of others—primarily those 
with the economic means to do so—went into 
exile.19 
The Chilean south loomed large for 
Pinochet during his years in power.  The area 
south of Concepción constituted a “symbolic 
landscape of threat” for the Military Regime, 
and they alleged that this territory sheltered 
Marxist guerillas and MIR training camps 
(Stern 2006:288).  They also targeted the indigenous Mapuches, who originally inhabited vast 
                                                        
19 This distinction, between the exiliados (exiles), who were primarily upper middle class and upper class 
intellectuals and those who stayed and endured torture at the hands of the regime, who were largely working class 
workers and trade unionists, continues to cause tension among those on the political left in Chile. 
Figure 10: Monument in Coyhaique depicting the 
Dictadura as a rupture in Chilean life 
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stretches of the southern cone from Santiago south into Patagonia, but who were by then—after 
generations of genocide—largely limited to an area around the southern city of Temuco. 
Despite the symbolic power of the wild and restive south to reinforce the idea of a latent 
threat to stability, this was not the only reason that Pinochet focused particular attention on the 
Lakes Region and Aysén.  These X and XI regions20 had long attracted the general for personal 
reasons.  He idealized the countryside—and the lush and temperate south in particular.  His 
economic advisors also saw the south as a region ripe for new industries that could diversity the 
country’s economy by providing valuable exports beyond copper.  Indeed, even as the Regime 
purged public universities of students and faculty deemed dangerous and subversive, officials 
protected and later expanded the departments of economics, engineering, and forestry that they 
deemed essential for the country’s economic future (Henne and Gabrielson 2012).   
The Regime also doubled down on connections with American universities.  Prior to the 
1973 coup that installed Pinochet, an exchange agreement between the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile in Santiago and the University of Chicago allowed hundreds of Chilean 
students—largely the scions of elite families—to study under economists Milton Friedman and 
Arnold Harberger.  These were the “Chicago Boys” who would turn Friedman’s neoliberal ideas 
into policies beginning in 1975 when, under a “reform” mandate, they introduced measures to 
liberalize the Chilean economy and open the country to foreign investment (Stern 2006; Valdez 
1995).  Worker protections were eliminated in the name of economic growth and labor 
organizations, once a formidable force in Chilean politics and a powerful wing of Allende’s 
Popular Unity Movement, (Winn 2004, 1986; Pavilack 2011) were banned.  Though they were 
                                                        
20 It was, in fact, Pinochet and his generals who numbered Chile’s region’s after taking power, a subtle tribute to 
their military backgrounds and ideas of what made for a successful military occupation. 
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eventually reconstituted—like Chile’s political parties, which were also banned following the 
events of September 11, 1973—today they are a mere shadow of what they once were. 
Chile’s role as a “laboratory” for neoliberalism has been well-documented (Han 2012; 
Harvey 2005; Paley 2001; Stern 2010, 2006) and neoliberalism’s effects on its citizens’’ 
subjectivity have been decried by academics and policy makers (Cárcamo-Huechante 2007; 
Moulian 1998).  Theorists of neoliberal governance have identified how this form of 
governmentality, ostensibly built on the premise that the state’s role should be limited and that 
the market will govern itself if regulations are left to a minimum, actually requires significant 
state interventions in order to create the conditions necessary for market oriented logic to become 
hegemonic (Ferguson 2015; Foucault 2003; Harvey 2005).21  Yet for several decades it appeared 
that this was precisely what was happening in Chile, where the Dictadura continues to shape 
civic life thirty years after the return to democracy.   
In the mid-2000s, several lawyers and judges sought to bring many of the individuals 
responsible for human rights violations—including Pinochet himself—to trial, with limited 
success.  Over the last decade, right wing politicians proposed changing the country’s history 
curriculum to deemphasize the period between 1973-1990, in several cases arguing that 
dedicating time and resources to this period damaged national pride.  However, while these 
stories appeared in the Chilean press and sparked discussions in households and on social media, 
Chile appeared to be at a memory impasse (Stern 2010) until October 2019. 
                                                        
21 And this has not been limited to the period since the return of democracy.  Pinochet’s economic team responded to 
several crises with massive public programs designed to stabilize the economy, notably the Minimum Public 
Employment Plan (in 1975) and the Program for Heads of Households (in 1982).  Moreover, following the coup that 
deposed—and killed—democratically elected Marxist Salvador Allende, Pinochet privatized most nationalized 
industries but kept copper, Chile’s most significant export, under state control. 
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Figure 11: Timeline of political events affecting development in the Aysén Region 
 
1955  Academic agreement between Pontificia Universidad Católica and the University of Chicago’s 
Department of Economics established 
1964 Academic agreement between Pontificia Universidad Católica and the University of Chicago’s 
Department of Economics dissolved 
1965 Academic agreement between Universidad de Chile and the University of California system established 
1967 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) sends salmon eggs and scientists to Chile 
1970 Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens elected; US President Richard Nixon directs CIA to take 
covert action in order to “make the economy scream” 
1971 Food shortages in Santiago spark protests 
1973 Coup d’état and death of Allende; Dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte consolidates power; mass 
detentions and disappearances begin 
1974  First economic crisis 
1975 Minimum Public Employment Program (PEM) introduced 
1976 Construction begins on the carretera austral (southern highway) 
1978  Academic agreement between Universidad de Chile and the University of California system dissolved 
1978-79 First successful industrial salmon farms in Chile established 
1980  Military Constitution established; peak of the fiebre del loco (Chilean Abalone “fever”) 
1982  Second economic crisis; Occupational Program for Heads of Households (POJH) is introduced 
1982-85 Chilean aquaculture operators fully adopt pen-based salmon aquaculture developed in Norway 
1988  56% of Chileans vote “No” in a national plebiscite, denying Pinochet another eight years in office and 
inaugurating the democratic transition 
1989 New Fisheries Law proposed 
1990  Return to democracy; Patricio Aylwin Azócar elected President of Chile; Fund for Solidarity and Social 
Investment (FOSIS) created 
1991  Fishing and Aquaculture Law (Law No. 18.892) ratified 
1993 Boom de merluza (hake boom) begins in Aysén 
1994  Chile’s framework Environmental Law (Law No. 19.300) ratified 
2002  Fishing and Aquaculture Law is amended 
2007-10  ISA Crisis devastates Chilean salmon production 
2008 Global economic crisis; boom de merluza ends 
2012 Uprising in Aysén; new FOSIS subsidies are introduced 
2019  #Chiledespertó protests in Santiago and other cities 
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It was then that a proposed fare increase for the Santiago metro inspired high school students 
to jump turnstiles in protest.  When this civil disobedience was violently repressed by 
carabineros in riot gear, millions of Chileans marched in solidarity to protest rising living costs, 
corruption among Chile’s political elites, and neoliberal policies that disproportionately 
burdened middle and working-class citizens.  President Piñera’s decision to place Santiago under 
martial law and assertion that the country was “at war with a powerful enemy” on October 21 
provoked further outrage and violent clashes between police and protestors.  The rallying cries 
#noestamosenguerra (we are not at war), #renunciaPiñera (resign Piñera), and #Chiledespertó 
(Chile woke up) became “trending topics” on twitter, Instagram, and Facebook.  Hundreds of 
thousands of protestors shut down the Alameda in Santiago.  President Piñera insisted that he 
would serve out his term but announced he was replacing his cabinet.  Finally, as protests 
stretched into their third week, the government agreed to hold a referendum on whether or not to 
replace the military constitution under which Chile has been governed since 1980. 
On Bureaucracy 
The heavy handed response to protests in Santiago—in which carabineros gassed and 
clubbed high school students and shot protestors, and in some cases, journalists, with pellets—
exposed the state violence lurking behind Chile’s contemporary bureaucratic apparatus.  This 
kind of violence only becomes visible when bureaucratic norms are violated, as in the case of 
students refusing en masse to pay their metro fares, but it is always there.  Bureaucracies are 
designed to manage social situations founded on structural violence (Graeber 2015:57). 
But the events in October and November 2019 prompted millions of Chileans to mobilize 
against repression, at least in part, because physical violence had largely abated after Chile’s 
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return to democracy in 1990.22 In its place, state bureaucracies and the seemingly endless rules 
and regulations they impose and seek to enforce, proliferated.  By the end of the 20th Century, 
the Chilean state had come to focus primarily on populations rather than people, transforming 
large groups of citizens deemed to have similar characteristics—usually ones deemed 
problematic by state planners.  These populations became the subjects of various “organizing 
actions” (Foucault 2008), targeted interventions undertaken in the name of improving their well-
being (Chatterjee 2004:34; Fletcher 2010; Foucault 2003).  These organizing actions and the 
agencies that oversee them comprise the “state system” and reify the “state idea” (Abrams 1988), 
however, the expansion of bureaucratic state power does not make the state more efficient, it  
simply ensures that “more power relations are referred through state channels (Ferguson 
1994:274).”  
In Aysén, as elsewhere, these “state channels” are the agencies and officials whose actions 
enable the imagination of the trans-local state (Gupta 2012, 1995).  Along the remote coast the 
agencies are mostly “regional secretariats” of government ministries, identified by the acronym 
Seremi (Secretaría Regional Ministerial) though some, like SERNAPESCA and Sernatur are 
“national services” (Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura and Servicio Nacional de 
Turismo, respectively).  The officials are overwhelmingly upper-middle-class bureaucrats living 
and working far from home whose offices become sites, at least in theory, where the designs of 
state planners in Santiago are implemented.   
Territorialization, the dynamics that establish property systems, determine resource access, 
and create political jurisdictions through the organization of space (Rasmussen and Lund 2018; 
Sack 1986; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995), is a critical component of contemporary frontier 
                                                        
22 This is not to say that it ceased to exist entirely as the disappearance of Mapuche activists and routine tear gassing 
of student protestors in 2011 and 2012 should make clear. 
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governance (Barney 2009; Eilenberg and Cons 2019; Eilenberg 2014; Tsing 2005, 2003).  I, 
however, contend that the motives, experiences, and values of the state officials doing the 
organizing determine how the territorializing project is carried out and enforced.  These 
bureaucrats must balance competing mandates: to organize economic life so that it is optimally 
efficient and productive and to provide services that will improve the lives of the rural citizens 
the government in Santiago views as objects of its development project.  As Ferguson and Gupta 
note in their essay on how states are made “vertically encompassing”: 
Village-level state workers, in particular, represented an interesting paradox.  On the one 
hand, their presence in the village made it more difficult to sustain the image of the state 
standing above civil society and the family; on the other hand, as marginal members of 
the state apparatus, they provided a concrete example to other villagers of the verticality 
and encompassment of the state (2002:985). 
Focusing on the state officials with whom I interacted during my time in Aysén, it becomes 
clear that their twin objectives—organizing the economy and providing services—are linked but 
often incommensurable projects.  This means that individual bureaucrats must work, both 
consciously and unconsciously, to render the state development project coherent (Li 2007:275) 
and organize actors, actions, and infrastructure into “relatively durable associations” capable of 
producing and expanding state power (Rose 2006:148).  As geographer Alison Mountz 
succinctly writes, “human agency drives the uneven implementation of state policy” (2010:56).   
But why exactly are some bureaucrats able to successfully implement policies and deliver 
services—becoming well-liked in the process—while others fail or fall short?  To answer this 
question, as I will in the course of this chapter, it is critical to center a very old concept that has 
only recently emerged as a central concern within anthropology: care (Robbins 2013).  Through 
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their efforts to organize the local economy, some officials become enmeshed in the regimes and 
networks of care—the very “non-market” regimes of value that neoliberalism seeks to 
disaggregate and reorganize (Han 2012:5; Greenhouse 2010)—that sustained and organized 
frontier life before it was subject to the designs of state planners in the metropole.  State 
officials’ performance of care both affects and is affected by frontier practices and imaginaries, 
and allows for the negotiation of new forms of governance as officials and rural citizens attempt 
to bring their distinct social projects into alignment (Buch 2015:279; Povinelli 2011). 
“I don’t think he ever held a pen” 
Juan, a senior official at  SERNAPESCA, was preparing onces (typically tea and toast, which 
constitutes dinner for most Chileans), placing bread atop the woodstove in his small cabaña.  We 
were making plans to have firewood delivered, since I lived next door and he had good contacts 
who would deliver quality wood—in that it had been properly cured and would burn relatively 
cleanly—on time and on the weekend.  Our conversation reminded Juan of something that 
happened the last time he had wood delivered, before I had arrived in Aysén. 
“I was getting firewood delivered and a guy came up to me and offered to help me move and 
stack it—you know, sometimes this happens—so I asked him how much and he told me two 
thousand [pesos],23 so… okay.  So we are moving it and it was funny, I asked him, you know, 
what he does for a living normally.”  
Juan continued, “he said he was a fisherman from Puerto Aguirre and that he was in town to 
get his papers in order with SERNAPESCA… and he said it like this and I realized he didn’t 
know I was from SERNAPESCA!  So I started asking him questions, you know? And he told me 
that his experience was super good, that this woman had helped him and everything.  This called 
                                                        
23 Roughly $3.20 USD at the time of this conversation. 
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my attention because normally the people that like us… that have good experiences, you know, 
are younger.  They get it, and they can use the Internet and they know how to complete the 
forms.  But this guy, I don’t think he ever held a pen, you know, and he was older, so it was 
really interesting to me that he had this great impression!”  Juan was laughing now at the thought 
of the old fisherman actually having a favorable impression of his agency, particularly since it is 
tasked with enforcing fishing laws and making sure that the fishers across the region are 
registered in the national database of fishers. 
“Normally,” he explained for my benefit, “they [older fishermen] say ‘ay they’re terrible’ or 
‘they didn’t help me,’ but I think a woman that worked in our office helped him through 
everything and made him a password.  And she didn’t send him off to the municipality to get the 
other stuff he needed with them, you know?  Because—and I know this is crazy—they have to 
fill out some forms there in order to do the paperwork with us.” 
“This is a problem we have, you know?  There are four offices where you have to go for 
stuff.  And the technology has advanced so rapidly that there is a type of person…” he paused to 
find the right way to describe the old 
fisherman, “this type of person, who 
is left behind.  What does he know 
about the internet?  What do people 
from Melinka, or Puerto Aguirre… 
places that are very badly 
connected… what do they know 
about filling in forms and putting in 
passwords?  But most public Figure 12: The SERNAPESCA office in Puerto Aysén 
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employees are like this, and our system is like this.  You have to go here, then here, then to this 
other office.  There are so many parts to the process, you know?  So it made me happy to hear 
that our office had taken care of him.  I think we have to do a better job of this… and that all 
public employees have to do a better job of this.  Actually take care of the people, not just put in 
the time.” 
“Actually take care of the people.”  The phrase is important for two reasons.  First, Juan was 
explicitly identifying care as a crucial part of his work.  Second, by starting with the word 
“actually” he was identifying care as something that was not an official part of his duties, but 
rather something that good public employees do, rather than “just putting in the time.” 
Juan chuckled to himself, as he finished his story, “later, it was funny because I had to go 
back to the office and I had meetings so I put on my jacket [with the SERNAPESCA logo] 
because I wasn’t going to wear it while I was stacking the firewood, you know, and I saw him 
and he was like ‘Ah, I see!  You work in SERNAPESCA!  That’s why you were asking me so 
many questions!’ But he wasn’t annoyed, you know?  And I was really glad that he had told me 
all that stuff without knowing that I worked there because that way, I know it was the truth.” 
Juan is one of a veritable army of bureaucrats in Aysén and was, with his candor and 
generosity, an invaluable resource to me while I was in the region.  He came to Aysén in 2008, 
during the Infectious Salmon Anemia (ISA) crisis, when farmed salmon stocks in the Los Lagos 
and Aysén regions were devastated by the disease.  He had trained as a veterinarian, having 
grown up on a farm in Chile’s Central Valley where his parents still raise livestock and harvest 
wheat, and worked as a veterinarian for SERNAPESCA for several years before being promoted.  
He was well suited to the job: punctual, responsible, young, unmarried, and college educated.  In 
his first years in the region he was one of a group of young professionals brought in to deal with 
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ISA, but as practices for dealing with the disease and preventing its spread went into effect and 
the crisis abated, he was the only one who stayed on. 
Juan’s family connection to Chile’s Central Valley is important.  From an early age, it 
exposed him to two seemingly contradictory but connected forces at work in Chilean society: 
nostalgia for a rural lifestyle that was fast disappearing as Chile barreled towards Modernity, and 
the rapid reorganization of space in the name of economic efficiency and growth.  Juan’s story is 
explicitly about the issues that fishers—especially older fishers who have lived along this remote 
frontier for generations—have navigating bureaucratic measures implemented to make their 
ecological livelihoods legible to state officials (Scott 1998).  However it is implicitly about 
Chile’s contemporary development project and how state officials often enact what they consider 
rural values through the performance of care.   This care, underwritten by these values, allows 
some officials to solve social problems created by the very project they are tasked with carrying 
out: bringing the country’s farthest flung provinces into line with its cosmopolitan metropole. 
As I indicated in the introduction to this dissertation, I am not using the terms “Modernity” or 
“metropole” uncritically, or without reflection.  Santiago has, I contend, a colonial relation with 
the rest of the Chile.  Since the very beginning of the Chilean experiment, centralismo 
(centralism) has shaped the nation-building process. Scholars have demonstrated how Modernity 
is the historically situated product of Western European Enlightenment and the basis for the 
continuation of colonial practices in post-colonial Latin American societies (Blaser 2010; 
Escobar 2004; Mignolo 2012; Quijano 2000).  In Chile, as elsewhere centralismo, as a practice, 
has largely benefitted urban elites who built and inhabited their capital in a style similar to the 
Europeans they sought to imitate (Beckman 2009; Burns 1980).  It has frustrated working-class 
citizens from Chile’s rural areas, where resources destined for export (copper in the north, 
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produce in the Central Valley, timber and fish in the south) generate revenue that pays for 
Santiago’s office towers and world-class metro.24   
The “Chicago Boys” saw the diversification of Chile’s export sector as a crucial step towards 
achieving their neoliberal goals; however, these economists did very little organizing at 
production sites.  This task fell to another, less well-known group of US-trained Chileans whose 
ideas about mechanized agriculture transformed their country’s Central Valley and eventually 
impacted even its remote southern fjords. 
The Landscape of Dictatorship 
“We used to live down there,” Hector explained, pointing out the window of his sister 
Edith’s house to the bright blue roof of the Naval Base.  “In those days most of the people lived 
right on the water… over it, and the boats were tied up outside.  Now we have to go up and down 
the hill.” 
“Why was it that you moved?” I asked, suspecting that I already knew the answer. 
“Por ley (by law),” Hector answered simply.  “In those days, the people had no say and the 
government decided that we had to move and took the land for the station and also for the [radio] 
tower.  Now, everyone can give their opinion, but with the Dictadura…” he paused, “well, this 
hasn’t been true for very long.” 
Hector’s grandfather came to Puerto Aguirre in 1944, when he was just eight years old, and 
the community there had existed for only two years.  His family built a palafito (stilt house) over 
the water.  These houses are recognized as part of the Chiloé archipelago’s architectural legacy, 
along with its wooden churches.  Today, very few of these iconic dwellings remain—most of 
them in Castro, the largest city on the big island of Chiloé.  As Chilotes moved south along the 
                                                        
24 Designed and built by a Spanish firm, the Santiago metro is virtually identical to the one in Madrid, albeit with 
fewer stops and more crowded cars. 
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coast, however, and settled places like Melinka, Puerto Aguirre, and Tortel, however, they 
brought this style of dwelling with them. 
This kind of vernacular 
architecture, however, had no value 
to a regime that delighted in the same 
kind of high modernism to which 
other 20th Century fascist 
governments were drawn, and the 
palafitos with their brightly painted 
shingles and algae encrusted pylons 
were soon in the crosshairs of 
development schemes that saw concrete piers and military bases as the key to a well-ordered 
coastline. External forces intervened as well.  When Pinochet aligned himself with Margaret 
Thatcher during the Falklands War in 1982, Chileans feared reprisals from Argentina.  This 
justified the construction and expansion of military bases in Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén as well 
as the deployment of troops to the normally sleepy border crossing between Chile Chico and Los 
Antiguos on the shores of Lago Carrera.  Offshore, the Chilean Air Force installed a series of 
beacons that could be used to guide jets along the coastline so that they did not have to cross or 
fly dangerously close to the border.   
But it was not only security from foreign adversaries and the high-modernist aspirations of 
state planners in Santiago that motivated the displacement of families like Hector’s and the 
reorganization of the Patagonian coast.  Increased productivity and the diversification of the 
export sector played a role here as well.  While the “Chicago Boys” are widely recognized as the 
Figure 13: Palafitos in Castro, Chiloé 
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technocrats behind Chile’s neoliberal turn, it was Chileans enrolled at the Universidad de Chile 
who studied agriculture, viticulture, and veterinary medicine at the University of California, 
Davis who were the architects of much of Chile’s agricultural development plans.  Like the 
exchange program between the Pontificia Universidad Católica and the University of Chicago, 
the Convenio—as the University of California program was known—began well before the 1973 
coup.  This program, which received $9.75 million USD from the Ford Foundation, operated 
from 1964 to 1978 and involved 323 Chilean students and faculty. More than fifty of these 
students and faculty attended the University of California, Davis, where they received training in 
modernizing and scaling up Chilean agricultural operations—primarily in the fruit and grape 
sectors (Melillo 2015:162).  These “Davis Boys” oversaw the importation of and 
experimentation with non-native fruits and other agricultural products that would become staple 
exports from Chile during the final decades of the 20th Century.  While the labor “reforms” 
designed by the Chicago Boys led to lower wages, precarious employment, and the feminization 
of agricultural labor in Chile (Tinsman 2004), the highly technical, large-scale agricultural 
production designed by the Davis Boys fueled exponential growth in Chile’s export sector. 
So it should come as no surprise that when Chilean economists sought to develop salmon 
aquaculture in the Far South they created a maritime system strikingly similar to the terrestrial 
system of property rights and land tenure that had—in their view—revolutionized production in 
Chile’s Central Valley.  Though, like the work of the Davis Boys in central Chile, this process 
had begun in the 1960s25 it accelerated under the Dictadura in the 1980s when policies favoring 
foreign investment led to partnerships with American and Japanese firms (Soluri 2011; Swanson 
                                                        
25 Though non-native salmonidae were introduced as far back as the turn of the 20th Century, when rivers in 
southern Chile were stocked with salmon and rainbow trout in an effort to develop the kind of recreational fishing 
that had become popular in Britain, South Africa, and the United States. 
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2015).  The explosive growth of the aquaculture sector along with the introduction of Chile’s Ley 
de Pesca in 1991, rapidly transformed the coast of Patagonia from an unruly, unproductive 
landscape into a grid of aquaculture concessions and officially recognized caletas (fishing 
grounds) and its towns from difficult, disorganized settlements into a network of government 
offices and military bases. Or at least, that is how it appeared in Santiago. 
Bureaucratic Pilgrimages  
Veronica, like Pablo whom we met at the outset of this chapter, works for Banco Estado.  
She is originally from Talca, where her brother is a fairly successful lawyer and her parents still 
live in the house where she was raised.  In the late 1980s, however, her parents lived in 
Coyhaique.  Her father also worked for the bank, and his bosses needed someone with 
“professional” experience to work in the small, but rapidly growing, regional capital.  Within a 
few months, Veronica’s mother moved back to Talca, taking her children with her.  She found 
the cold and isolation of Aysén “unsupportable” and to this day refuses to visit, but in 2008, 
Veronica herself accepted a transfer from Banco Estado’s branch in Talca—a dusty city that 
boasted, until a recent earthquake, numerous Spanish colonial and early Republican buildings as 
well as world-class wineries—to Coyhaique, the city where her father had helped establish a 
branch some twenty years before. 
Because it is responsible for the Chilean state’s financial services, Banco Estado sits at the 
intersection of a host of social programs.  Every Chilean citizen has a cuenta RUT, a bank 
account connected to their unique identification number.  This is where direct cash transfers are 
deposited to those who qualify for public funds, though individuals can and do use this as their 
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primary bank account.26  Following the uprising of 2012, when the Chilean state agreed to create 
a heating subsidy for “vulnerable” families to defray the rising costs of firewood it was agents 
from Banco Estado who accompanied the team from FOSIS (Fund for Solidarity and Social 
Investment) with cash to distribute to those who qualified in places like Puerto Aguirre, Melinka, 
and Villa O’Higgins. 
Veronica’s move to the Banco Estado branch in Coyhaique was financially motivated.  
Patagonia had not been part of her plan, but the bank provides its employees with zona pay.  The 
zona pay scale is Chile’s system for determining the salaries of state officials and incentivizing 
state officials to work far from Santiago. According to this system, state officials are paid 
proportionately according to their distance from the metropole.  This distance is not calculated 
“as the crow flies” however, but on the facility of travel to Santiago—meaning that public 
officials working in Aysén enjoy higher salaries than their counterparts anywhere else. 
Though the zona system pre-dated the 1973 coup, it was during the Dictadura that the system 
took its current form.  Military personnel—who were directly under Pinochet’s command and 
critical to repressing any and all opposition to his plans—retained  the incentives they had 
always enjoyed.  In Aysén, this meant (and still means) that members of the armed forces receive 
double what they would be paid in Santiago.  However, when the system was reformed in 1974, 
civil employees of the state saw their salaries adjusted dramatically: henceforth they would 
receive only 40% more than their peers in Santiago. 
 Still, earning 40% more than she earned in Talca for doing the same job made the move to 
Coyhaique appealing to Veronica. Likewise, Andres, her colleague who originally hails from 
                                                        
26 The rules regarding how much can be deposited and withdrawn within a month, however, make the cuenta RUT 
less appealing as the primary account for upper middle class and wealthy Chileans, who require the flexibility to 
move larger sums and therefore usually have a second or third account with another, private bank. 
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Osorno, nearly doubled his (already higher than average) salary by accepting a transfer from 
Coyhaique to the tiny Banco Estado branch in Chaitén, in the province of Palena,27 effectively 
receiving a zona adjustment on his already adjusted salary.  Over at SERNAPESCA, Juan was 
able to pay off his student loans, bail out his father when wheat prices plummeted in 2016,28 buy 
a parcel of land north of Puerto Aysén, and build a house in the span of just a decade. 
Even if the initial move to the region is financially motivated, however, transferring to Aysén 
creates new commitments for bureaucrats like Veronica, Andres, and Juan.  Theirs is a new kind 
of bureaucratic “pilgrimage” (Anderson 1991:53-60; Turner 1974), albeit one that is the reverse 
of what Anderson describes.  For Anderson, movement to and from the colonial capital on the 
part of creole elites—and the denial of access to the metropole—inspires loyalty to an abstract 
territory (the soon-to-be independent nation).  In contemporary Chile, it is movement from the 
metropole to the rural edges of the country that inspires loyalty to a concrete territory 
(Patagonia).  Living in the most isolated part of Chile forces these bureaucrats to not only create 
community with their fellow elites, but it also enmeshes them in networks of distribution and 
care with rural citizens who have never seen Santiago. 
But it is not just these networks and the social relations that establish and sustain them that 
create this committment to the region.  It is also how they imagine Patagonia.  As others have 
observed, the Patagonian interior is imagined by global elites—mostly in the United States and 
                                                        
27 Palena, a province known colloquially as “Chiloé Continetal” for being the mainland zone across the interior sea 
from the Chiloé archipelago, is technically part of the Los Lagos Region, but because there is limited road access 
connecting it to the rest of the region—and because it is accessible via the Carretera Austral—it is administered as 
part of Aysén.  This makes it one of the most remote stretches of Chile, though in recent years its rapidly flowing 
Futaleufú River and Pumalin Park (one of two founded by American conservationist Doug Tompkins) have made it 
a destination for visitors interested in extreme sports and ecotourism. 
 
28 This was the result of a flood of wheat from Argentina saturating the market following the election of current 
president Mauricio Macri and the implementation of neoliberal “reforms” designed to pull Argentina out of debt and 
better integrate their struggling economy into regional and global markets. 
 81 
Europe—as one of the “last truly wild” places on Earth.  This has led to battles over the region’s 
conservation and to the establishment of a thriving eco-tourism industry that allows for the 
commodification of nature in situ (Mendoza et al. 2017).  Among Chileans, however, this is only 
a small (and very recent) part of the Patagonian imaginary.  More significant is the idea, that this 
region is the last bastion of rural life in Chile—a redoubt where rural people continue traditional 
practices pushed to extinction virtually everywhere else.  This is not a fiction.  Despite the 
designs of state planners and Pinochet’s Army Corps of Engineers literally moving mountains, 
Aysén remains isolated.  Pinochet’s pet project, the Carretera Austral, connects the region’s far 
flung communities to one another, but not to the rest of the country.  To the south, massive ice 
fields block its path and to the north, the inlets and as-yet impenetrable forests of Palena require 
multiple ferry crossings.   
To understand how bureaucrats experience the agency of nature, become imbricated in local 
networks, and imagine Patagonia—as well as how this creates a new set of commitments to the 
Aysén Region—it is instructive to examine, briefly, the firewood trade.   
Because of its relative isolation and expansive hardwood forests, firewood combustion 
remains the primary heat source for virtually everyone living in Aysén.  Most state officials, 
however, come from regions where firewood use is uncommon if not extinct.  This means that 
these officials must attain access to local firewood networks and learn to operate within them if 
they are to survive the harsh winters in Aysén.  Newly arrived state officials buy firewood from 
local leñeros (firewood traders) and, like rural residents, must track who sells dry wood at fair 
prices.  They must also develop firewood skills, learning how to split logs, start a fire, and safely 
dispose of hot embers and coals (Thomas 2018).   
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Their involvement in firewood networks connects them with local people and practices, 
while their mastery of firewood skills—and employment of these skills—reiterates and reifies  
the exceptionalism of Patagonian life.  Whereas other parts of the country have abandoned 
firewood, Patagonia continues to depend on this ancient material.  Becoming imbricated in 
firewood networks and mastering firewood skills reinforces a sense of belonging on the part of 
state officials and by extension an emergent set of commitments to the communities and citizens 
they serve.   
Salvador, who works at Colegio Santa Teresa in Aysén, embodies these commitments—and 
not just because the first time I visited him we spoke for more than twenty minutes about 
firewood.  He and his wife, Teresa, moved to Aysén in 2006.  While both of them would earn 
zona pay for working in the region, they were motivated by a desire to leave Santiago for, as they 
put it, “the provinces” where they could raise their children in a more “tranquil” environment.  
When we first met, Salvador told me that he considers himself a colonist of the region—and an 
heir to the Chilotes who settled the coast in boats and the Patagones who settled the interior from 
Argentina.  When he is not in Puerto Aysén, Salvador works as the regional representative for 
Chile’s ADP (Alta Dirección Pública), the state agency tasked with appointing individuals to 
high ranking public offices.  In this capacity, Salvador travels to the various schools in the region 
to meet with teachers and administrators and to help appoint new school directors in far-flung 
towns like Cochrane (population 2,300) and Villa O’Higgins (population 600).  During my time 
in Aysén he was also in charge of appointing school directors in the Magallanes Region, south of 
Aysén, after its ADP representative resigned.  While he likes this responsibility, he, like Juan and 
many other public officials I spoke to during fieldwork, is often frustrated with policies that are 
poorly adapted to conditions on the frontier.  In one of our interviews, Salvador fumed about the 
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school director in tiny Puerto Guadal, on the south shore of Lago Carrera, being fined because he 
failed to hold a required meeting with the local council—something required under Chilean law. 
“But the school has five students,” he explained, “and one of them is the [school] director’s 
son.  His wife is one of the teachers and another is his cousin!  Surely the meeting was 
unnecessary and whatever needed to be resolved could have been resolved in an informal 
conversation among family members at home!” 
Teresa is an accomplished photographer, and she also sees a connection to previous waves of 
settlers.  For the past three years, she, along with other local artists, has visually documented 
artisanal fishing in Aysén’s remote coastal communities.  Her “Geopoetics” group has, with 
funding from the regional government and the Ministry of Culture, published a book of their 
photographs, paintings, and folktales that they recorded during visits to places like Puerto 
Aguirre and Tortel.   
Both Salvador and Teresa are public officials (she also works at the colegio) and are firmly 
committed to their work on behalf of the state.  They are also committed to the rural lifeways and 
to the people in their extended network that make Aysén unique, and they demonstrate this latter 
commitment by siding with rural people when they fail to meet requirements laid out in Santiago 
and by documenting what they consider a vanishing way of life in Aysén’s fjords. 
But these commitments between public officials and rural people go both ways, as I learned 
from Jorge Aguilar, a Patagonian native whose weathered features, graying temples, and thick 
mustache make him look the quintessential gaucho.  I met him through Veronica, who had 
become close to the family when she first arrived in Coyhaique to work at Banco Estado.  Jorge 
explained his views on the “diversification” of Patagonia as we sat on his porch while his wife 
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and daughters cleaned the plates from our asado (cookout) in the kitchen next door on 
September 18, Chile’s Independence Day:  
In every town, every small town, you will now find people—maybe even half the 
population—are from other regions or are foreigners.  This is good.  I like talking to these 
people from other places and learning about them and their customs, which are so 
different from ours. They cannot say that they are patagones (Patagonians), however.  I 
know people from Talca who have been here thirty years and they start wearing the boina 
(traditional beret) and they say that they are patagones, but they’re not.  Just because 
they’ve been here thirty years.  You can invest in the region, and extract from it and live 
here, but that is not the same as being a patagone. Besides, there isn’t a traditional 
costume here… the people wore what they had, nothing more.  And the ones [from 
outside] who do business say we are flojos (lazy), but this is not right.  People from here 
think differently about the world.  We think about what is here, and what we are doing 
and that’s it.  I have a neighbor who is norteño [from the north] and he looks at the world 
totally differently.  He arrived here from Talca without practically a peso but he still 
thought that there was nothing here—no transportation, no nothing.  So he decided to get 
a truck to transport frozen chickens.  I thought he was crazy, I thought ‘What do I want 
with frozen chickens?  There are chickens right here in the yard, in front of the house, on 
all sides.’ But he wanted it to be about business. 
Jorge Aguilar’s assertion that people from Patagonia think differently than outsiders 
underscores the tension between public officials’ two mandates.  After all, not all outsiders are 
state officials, but nearly all state officials are outsiders.  On the one hand, these outsiders are 
effectively helping other outsiders who are “about business” by organizing and regulating sectors 
of the regional economy or by connecting the region to the rest of Chile—and the world 
beyond—via massive infrastructure projects.  On the other hand, they are also providing services 
and expanding social programs to include vulnerable households, typically those of families who 
have been in the region for a long time and who are most likely to be labeled “lazy” for failing to 
participate in industries which demand discipline from their workforce. 
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As we will see in the next chapter, the stereotyping of native ayseninos as “lazy” or 
“unreliable” shapes the labor practices of the aquaculture industry.  For now it is worth noticing 
that these stereotypes are nothing new.  As early as 1844, Chilean intellectual Francisco Bilbao 
identified Chile’s cities with “progress” and its rural areas with “barbarism” (Burns 1980:23).  
This thread was taken up again, though with different implications, by Santiago Mayor Benjamin 
Vicuña Mackenna during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) when he praised the Chilean “roto” 
as the backbone of the army while deriding this kind of working-class mestizo from the 
countryside as useless for anything else (Beckman 2009).29 By 1973, this discourse of lazy, 
backward, rural workers was firmly entrenched among Chilean elites and was used to justify the 
expulsion of smallholders from Chile’s agricultural heartland (Mellilo 2015) just as it continues 
to justify the exclusion of rural workers from aquaculture. 
Giving an Explanation Instead of a Fine 
 Puerto Chacabuco, the largest port in the region, has been remade by that industry.  Its docks 
are full of boats and men destined for offshore cultivation centers and its largest buildings are the 
two factories where fish are processed for export.  I was on my way to Chacabuco, as it is known 
locally, to visit one of these factories when I was stopped at a checkpoint by a pair of 
carabineros (national police).  With some satisfaction I provided them my new, hard won, 
Chilean drivers’ license.  Then, once they gave me my documents back, I asked about all the 
checkpoints I had seen in the two weeks before when I saw a number of leñeros stopped and 
                                                        
29 This treatment of the roto parallels how elite Chileans glorified the Araucanos (Mapuche) as noble savages who 
lived lives of honor and fought bravely even as the Chilean government deployed regiments to exterminate them and 
drive them onto smaller and smaller tracts of land.  Pinochet was particularly ruthless when it came to Chile’s 
Mapuche population, many of whom “disappeared” under his rule; yet the general was an avid fan of the Chilean 
soccer club Colo Colo which has a Mapuche lonko (chief) adorning its uniforms and flag. 
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inspected, and whether this increase in checkpoints and inspections was because of the new 
government. 
 The carbinero who had inspected 
my license explained that 
checkpoints always had more to do 
with the season than with whatever 
government.  He continued, saying 
that the reason I had seen so many 
leñeros stopped was because the 
carabineros had to check to be sure 
their documentation had been 
registered with them, Conaf 
(National Forest Corporation), and the internal tax office.  He also said that they had to make 
sure that these people hadn’t cut one of the four species of native trees, including the famous 
ciprés de las Guaitecas (Pilgerodendron uviferum), which, for the sake of conservation, are 
illegal to cut. 
 “A lot of these people don’t know, or don’t care,” the carabinero explained, “But I am from 
Temuco, and there, they cut all the trees they wanted to in the previous generations.  Now we 
know better. I have land there and I have maybe 100 trees… and I treat them like they are my 
own children!  But here, where there are so many natural resources and few people, they don’t 
know.  It’s like—across the whole country—we are clearing the plastic from the beaches, and 
then you get here, and look along the shoreline and it’s… it’s just crazy how much is there.” 
Figure 14: The industrial port at Chacabuco with a docked 
aquaculture pontón and a visiting cruise ship 
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 He continued to draw a contrast between people from outside the region and locals, and 
explained that he had learned to have “another mentality” since he came to Aysén two and a half 
years ago.  
 “Here, you stop someone,” he told me, “and they don’t have a license, they don’t have the 
registration sticker, the car is not registered.  And it’s that they don’t know!  And you have to be 
patient and explain to them that the rules in the north—which for them is everything north of 
Puerto Montt—are the same here, because it’s one country after all, so they have to do these 
things.  You can’t just give them the fine, you have to explain.” 
 Then, unprovoked, he situated his approach within Chile’s recent history, “and this is good, 
giving an explanation in place of giving a fine because it reminds us and them that we work for 
the people.  I always try to think this way, because I joined during the time of transition [to 
democracy], and I am a member of that generation—the transition generation.  Lots of people 
don’t like the carabineros… and I understand of course, because of what came before, because 
they think it’s like the army.  But I always remind myself that we work for the people first, not 
for our superiors.” 
 Returning to how the number and location of the checkpoints has to do with the season and 
situation he explained that last week there were lots of check points along the coast, because it 
was holy week, when people traditionally eat mariscos (mollusks), so they had to make sure no 
one was transporting shellfish, banned by the Ministry of Health because of a harmful algal 
bloom.  “Because you have the fishermen and the people coming from the salmoneras and they 
have a box [of fish or shellfish] in the back and maybe it’s just for them to eat or they are going 
to sell to a few friends but that’s not allowed, especially certain species.  And I am not an expert 
on fish, but in this case we call SERNAPESCA and let them know.” 
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 “But with small towns like this you learn pretty quickly who you are dealing with and you 
remember who you have already stopped because you can recognize them, and their car.” He 
concluded, “so you shouldn’t need to stop them again because you know their documents are in 
order, you know who they are and it’s okay.” 
 The next day at the Conaf nursery in Puerto Aysén, I stopped by the office of their on-site 
social worker, a precise, middle-aged woman named Cristina. I have come to her office to see if 
she has a list, or can help me make one, of the various programs, subsidies, and other benefits 
that are available exclusively in Aysén.  Our conversation turns into a lengthy one in which I 
explained that I was particularly interested in programs that provide employment for people in 
the region who are excluded from the aquaculture sector.  She understood, and our conversation 
about the fact that people are employed by the PMU and others “to cut grass in areas where no 
one ever goes, but mostly sit around chatting because they are people who can’t keep a job but 
need the work” suggested that I was on the right track.   
 She was not bitter, and the fact that she was born and raised in Aysén helped—though she 
left the region to attain a degree in social work and worked elsewhere for years before returning.  
She explained that programs that provide employment aim to keep people busy and “pacify” 
them rather than to give them meaningful work or provide for them long term.  When I 
mentioned that there seemed to have been a number of of state investments in the region 
following the 2012 uprising, she laughed and said that there were lots of highly visible 
investments, but that these have not really been useful.   
 “It’s great that we have this brand new hospital, but how does it help if we have not one 
single specialist working there or if the people still have to go to the old hospital and the new one 
and the clinic before someone can see them?”  She asked, sarcastically. 
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 Returning to my original question she told me that she thought most of the programs, except 
for the ones that had to do with firewood, were national level programs that were poorly adapted 
to the needs of people in Aysén—symptoms of the problems with centralismo.  “That’s why 
these programs aren’t very useful—because the people here have a life that’s totally distinct from 
the people up north, but the programs are supposed to be for everyone.”  She said that in terms of 
these programs, nobody knew exactly which programs would stay and what would be cut 
because of the new government coming in.  She continued that this was always the problem and 
that even the FOSIS bonus for firewood might not happen “because there is nothing about it on 
the FOSIS website and it usually accompanies the ‘bono de marzo’  (the public cash transfer that 
occurs each March).” 
 Referring to the idea that people in the region depend on public employment and that this is 
part of what keeps them from demonstrating she observed, “if they cut the subsidies for people, 
or the programs that give them work, it’s going to be worse than ever.” 
 “But,” she continued, “the people here who benefit from these programs?  They know the 
programs, the paperwork, and how to take advantage of these things better than all of us [public 
officials] combined.” 
 My conversation with the carabinero in Puerto Chacabuco was fresh in my mind, so I 
mentioned his comment about having to explain to ayseninos what is and is not legal because, in 
his words, “they don’t know.”  
 She laughed again, before saying with a rueful smile, “oh, they know all right.  It’s he who 
doesn’t understand, not them.” 
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Connecting the Political and Moral Economies 
 Cristina’s job is to help the women who work at the Conaf nursery in Puerto Aysén enroll in 
various social programs that will benefit them and their families.  Indeed, the nursery itself has a 
mandate to employ single mothers who cannot find other work—provided that they prove to be 
disciplined workers and do well on their biannual evaluations.  The carabinero, by contrast, is 
charged with enforcing traffic laws, regulating the transportation of certain goods, and 
preventing of the transport of illicit products. Yet both of them are making a concerted effort to 
meet local people “where they are” and—particularly in the case of the carabinero, who 
identifies the Dictadura as a powerful influence on contemporary citizen-state relations—
attempting to make up for perceived state indifference.  These state officials, at least, “work for 
the people first, not for their superiors.”  These state officials want to “actually take care of the 
people.” 
 In her work with rural people in Indonesia, Anthropologist Tania Li develops what she terms 
an “analytic of conjuncture” for understanding the diverse array of elements—historical, social, 
economic, and political—that shape the current moment.  She describes how “different factors 
are dynamic, reacting to each other and new measures introduced from outside” (Li 2014:16).  
Within this framework, each element sets the conditions of possibility for others in constantly 
shifting configurations.30  I find this analytic useful for understanding the relations between 
citizens and state officials in Aysén.  Here, the Dictadura—and the authoritarian development 
project it inaugurated—continues to shape the conditions of possibility along the frontier both in 
terms of how citizens perceive the state and in how state officials deal with the local populace.  
                                                        
30 Li’s “analytic of conjuncture” (2014) is similar to Malm’s concept of “emergent properties” (2018) in that both 
rely on a relational approach to understand how social conditions are created.  However Li places a greater emphasis 
on the role of history, while Malm focuses primarily on present relations between the society and nature. 
 91 
This is evident in Hector’s assertion that islanders have not been able to give their opinion 
publicly “for very long” and the fact that he now has to walk daily up and down the steep main 
street of Puerto Aguirre past the Naval Base that stands were his family home used to be.  It is 
also evident in how the carabinero in Puerto Chacabuco describes how people don’t trust officers 
like him “because of what came before.”  Even the proliferation of social programs—programs 
that benefit ayseninos—following the return to democracy too was a response to the abuses that 
Chilean citizens endured for seventeen long years (Han 2012, 2011).   
 Yet the remoteness of the region—both real and socially constructed (Harms et al. 2014)—
means that state officials experience much the same vulnerability as the rural people they are 
charged with serving.  This shared vulnerability contributes to their new set of commitments.  It 
also requires state officials to participate in local networks of distribution and care and this too 
helps drive the—always uneven but often compassionate—implementation of state policy. 
 Juan’s commitment to Aysén is evident in the fact that he alone stayed in the region after the 
ISA crisis and is now building a house.  Likewise, his commitment to improving 
SERNAPESCA’s relations with local fishers is evident in his concern with how the old 
fisherman was received and his experience with the agency, even if he was the kind of citizen 
who had “never held a pen.” These commitments make him an effective and sympathetic figure 
within the vertically encompassing state—the “village-level state worker” par excellence 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002:985).  Cristina, the social worker, is likewise also a friendly face who 
tries to adapt national level programs to fit the unique needs of those living in Patagonia.  This 
extra work enables ayseninos to enroll in a host of social programs that afford them subsidies and 
benefits.  She is not “just putting in the time.” 
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When we consider not only the development project but also the public officials tasked with 
rendering it coherent, it becomes clear that the practice of care and the agency of nature exert an 
outsize influence on the success of the project itself by connecting the political and moral 
economies (Buch 2015).  Ecological knowledge shapes the practices of state officials.  They 
come to understand local ecologies—from seasonal cycles to species diversity—not only 
because they are tasked with regulating and ordering the production of natural resources but also 
because they share certain ecological dependencies with those they are committed to serve. 
Contrary to the description of bureaucracies as “dead zones” where state violence lurks just 
beneath the surface (Graeber 2015; Han 2012:66), anthropologists should consider bureaucratic 
offices lively places where the development project is contested, negotiated, and frequently 
adapted to better suit the needs of rural citizens.  This is not to say that the expansion of 
bureaucratic power does not exert a powerful depoliticizing effect (Ferguson 1994), simply that 
it also creates a dizzying array of sites in which new kinds of politics emerge from the messy, 
affect-driven interactions between state officials and citizens.  These interactions have an outsize 
impact on how public programs actually work, in many cases transforming their form and 
function to such an extent that they are barely recognizable to the metropolitan “experts” who 
designed them.   
The personal commitments of state officials like Juan and Cristina shape their interactions 
with local people.  They attempt to balance mandates to organize economic life so that it is 
efficient and productive—organizing actions at the core of Chile’s neoliberal development 
project—and to improve the lives of the rural citizens.  Capitalist aquaculture operators, 
however, lack the second mandate.  They are tasked with managing ecological, economic, and 
political risks in order to deliver predictable yields.  As we will see, rather than negotiating with 
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local people, this means excluding them, and rather than understanding local ecologies it means 




CHAPTER 3. ROUTINE LOSSES, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, AND WARMING 
OCEANS: MANAGING RISK ON CHILE’S AQUACULTURE FRONTIER 
 
 
Risk and Uncertainty on Chile’s Aquaculture Frontier 
  Risk represents a “relational order through which connections between people, ‘things’ and 
‘outcomes’ are constituted (Boholm 2003: 178).  In aquaculture, objects of risk—potential 
drivers of “unacceptable losses” of fish and profits—include commodity diseases and parasites, 
poor sanitation, unreliable workers, and new regulations that increase operating costs. Yet 
despite aquaculture operators’ efforts to calculate and manage these objects of risk, the highly 
variable conditions on the coast of southern Chile and its rapidly changing climate—in particular 
rising ocean temperatures in the southern Pacific—frustrate efforts to deliver predictable, 
sustainable salmon harvests. This creates something of a paradox: an industry that has positioned 
itself as capable of delivering sustainable, predictable yields from bounded, territorially-fixed 
production sites and providing employment for coastal people is also beset by uncertainty that 
cannot be measured or calculated (Chibnik 2011; Knight 1971). 
Examining this paradox reveals how, for aquaculture firms, uncertainty itself becomes a 
social technology (Benson and Kirsch 2010; Kirsch 2014; Rogers 2012) for managing political 
risk, allowing aquaculture firms to escape criticism and avoid costly new regulations.  However, 
it also reveals how, for aquaculture managers and state officials in Aysén, managing uncertainty 
shapes how these individuals see themselves and their industry.   
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For aquaculture managers, risk constitutes a framework that requires the introduction of new 
spatial and surveillance technologies to mitigate losses and maintain profitability and justifies the 
exclusion of unskilled and purportedly “unreliable” local workers from the industry’s most 
lucrative jobs. Describing their efforts to manage these risks—and meet industry standards set in 
Norway—they emphasize how their practices have changed over time to become more 
environmentally friendly and technically advanced.  But while some risks can be managed, 
uncertainty continues to define conditions at worksites in a highly variable coastal environment 
increasingly impacted by global climate change.   
In this chapter, I examine how new spatial technologies, strict labor practices, and selective 
interpretations of the law represent linked strategies for managing ecological, economic, and 
political risks, sustaining the growth of salmon aquaculture in southern Chile. I also consider 
how the discursive framing of the aquaculture industry as one beset by uncertainty and subject to 
unpredictable changes in climate blunts criticism that the industry contributes to harmful algal 
blooms and other environmental disasters (Bouwman et al. 2013; Heisler et al. 2008).   
However, I take seriously the claims of aquaculture managers as well as those of state 
officials. In addition to managing risks, these actors manage the inherent uncertainty of the 
coastal environment.  In the short term, managers accept this uncertainty and capture 
unpredictable profits by externalizing costs.  In the long term, they—like all good capitalists—
attempt to convert incalculable uncertainty into calculable risk where it is advantageous to do so 
(Chibnik 2011), learning from past mistakes and anticipating a sustainable future in which their 
industry generates predictable profits with few environmental impacts.  Many of the aquaculture 
managers and state officials I spoke to recognize salmon farming’s role in reshaping the ecology 
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of southern Chile and its contribution to recent environmental disasters, but for them the benefits 
of this industry, which they believe can and will be made sustainable, outweigh these costs.  
Understanding Risk and Uncertainty 
Managing risk has always been central to capitalism, and the ways in which individuals 
evaluate risk when making decisions have preoccupied economists and anthropologists for 
nearly a century.  For anthropologists, risk represents “the unpredictable variation in the outcome 
of a behavior” (Winterhalder, Lu, and Tucker 1999:302).  But, however unpredictable this 
variation, risk is distinct from true uncertainty (Knight 1971).  As economic anthropologist 
Michael Chibnik writes:  
In risky situations, decision makers can estimate the probabilities of different outcomes 
resulting from particular decisions. In uncertain situations, decision makers have no idea 
what the probabilities are of different outcomes.  In the real world… most decision-making 
situations combine elements of both risk and uncertainty (2011:61). 
Some anthropologists considering risk sensitivity have identified links between risk aversion 
and socioeconomic status (Bartlett 1980; Cancian 1984; Kuznar 2001) while others have 
examined livelihood diversification as a means of reducing risk (Chibnik 1994; Dressler et al. 
2016; Ellis 1998; Scoones 2009, 1999). Maritime anthropologist James Acheson has shown how, 
operating in a “heterogenous and uncertain environment” (1981:276), fishers manage uncertainty 
by entering into social arrangements and operating within multiple fisheries to take advantage of 
seasonal variation and migration (Acheson 1988; 1981).  More recently a literature has emerged 
around climate uncertainty that demonstrates how public programs help farmers adapt and 
manage risk in this context (Eakin 2005; Finan and Nelson 2001; West 2013). 
In virtually all of these cases, anthropologists have shown that individuals faced with 
unpredictable outcomes attempt to convert uncertainty to risk through information gathering, and 
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small scale experimentation (Chibnik 2011:71).  They also agree that what counts as uncertain or 
risky is culturally constructed based on shared understandings of safety and danger (Boholm 
2003; Sahlins 1976). This distinguishes anthropological approaches from the rational choice 
theories favored by economists that largely ignore uncertainty (incalculable risk) and foreground 
the “expected utility” of different potential outcomes. 
The distinction between uncertainty and risk is an important one.  However, my ethnographic 
analysis of Chilean aquaculture challenges the conventional wisdom that actors, even ones 
operating within an industry—and a culture—in which market-oriented logics have attained 
hegemony (Cárcamo-Huechante 2007; Moulian 1998), inevitably seek to convert uncertainty 
into calculable risk.  Put simply, uncertainty is productive for both aquaculture firms and 
managers in distinct yet connected ways.  
In the first half of this chapter, I survey the recent history of salmon aquaculture in Chile with 
a focus on state and industry efforts to manage ecological risks through the introduction of new 
spatial technologies, as well as industry efforts to manage labor risks through increased 
surveillance and the exclusion of certain types of workers.  In the second half, I interrogate the 
narrative of “continuous improvement” and its relationship to adopting practices developed in 
Norway, where salmon aquaculture began.  I conclude by exploring the role of uncertainty.  I 
suggest that while the invocation of uncertainty constitutes one of several corporate technologies 
(Michaels 2008; Rogers 2012) aquaculture firms deploy to blunt criticism of their industry’s 
environmental impacts, for aquaculture managers their ability to skillfully manage true 
uncertainty defines their sense of self and of their role within  Chile’s development project.   
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Managing Ecological Risk: New Spatial Technologies 
Aysén constitutes an aquaculture frontier, akin to other resource frontiers (Cons and 
Eilenberg 2019; Rasmussen and Lund 2018) that advance and retreat according to fluctuations in 
global market demands and new capitalist claims (Barney 2009; Fold and Hirsch 2009; Geiger 
2008; Tsing 2003) as well as the designs of state planners and new state policies (Li 2007; 
Ferguson 1994).  These plans and policies “depend on a simplified view of the landscape that 
deliberately realigns relations between people and space, often with unintended consequences 
(Eilenberg 2014:159; Scott 1998), and Chile’s aquaculture frontier is no exception. After nearly 
forty years, the fjords and estuaries of southern Chile have been divided into nesting concessions, 
“neighborhoods,” and macro-zones in the name of efficient and sustainable production. 
But it was not always this way.  The aquaculture frontier in Chile began to assume its current 
form in the mid-1980s, when salmon farms were established near the southern city of Puerto 
Montt and around the Chiloé archipelago.  The industry was promoted by Dictator Augusto 
Pinochet’s economic advisers, who saw aquaculture as a means to diversify the export sector and 
develop a new industry in the Far South (Barton and Fløysand 2010; Stern 2006:349). 31  
American financiers and Japanese experts partnered with Chilean firms to develop the first 
salmon farms (Swanson 2015).  Later, Chilean companies, including the seafood company Frio 
Sur and food giant Agrosuper S.A., started their own operations, but these were far from the 
technically advanced Japanese projects piloted elsewhere.  Workers fed fish by hand, distributing 
far more fish meal than was necessary for the caged salmon below them (interview, Reuben 
Leal, October 16, 2017) and creating mountains of nutrient rich deposits—not only fish food but 
also feces—below their cultivation centers.  
                                                        
31 Until this time, the only “industry” operating in the south—at least in the eyes of state officials—was timber, and 
this was primarily based in the Bio Bio Region around Concepción. 
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Salmon aquaculture gradually reshaped coastal life as companies opened factories in places 
like Quellón, where thousands came to work processing fish (Bustos Gallardo 2017).  
Eventually, as a result of the saturation of the Los Lagos region and a series of environmental 
disasters—the consequence of the haphazard nature of the aquaculture sector’s early 
development—the industry expanded into Aysén, where there were far fewer people living along 
the coast and where the waters could still reasonably be called “pristine,” even if they would not 
be for long.  This “spatial fix” (Harvey 2003) brought different changes to Aysén than it did to 
Los Lagos, but in Aysén today roughly 165 centers are operational at any given time (interview, 
Jorge Padilla Trujillo, July 25, 2018) and the region produces nearly 50% of Chile’s farmed 
salmon (SERNAPESCA 2016) which amounts to roughly one sixth of the salmon farmed 
worldwide (Sandvold et. al. 2013).32  
One of the reasons that the industry’s impact 
on Aysén has been different than it was when its 
epicenter was in Los Lagos is the effort that 
aquaculture operators have put into improving 
efficiency—and by extension, to mitigate losses 
by protecting the marine environment upon which 
their industry depends.  New regulations were 
enacted in the wake of the Infectious Salmon 
Anemia (ISA) crisis that devastated Chilean 
salmon stocks from 2007-2010 (Bustos-Gallardo 
                                                        
32 Chile produces between 31 and 33% of the world’s farmed salmon annually, making it the second largest 
producer after Norway, where the industry was born (see Lien 2015).  The two countries together produce more than 
























Figure 15: Export volume of farmed salmonoids by 
the three largest producer nations, January-
September 2018 (FAO 2019) 
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2013; Iizuka and Zanlungo 2016).  Technical advances across the industry made operations 
increasingly automated and standardized (Lien 2015), and workers became more familiar with 
the fish and could identify and isolate unhealthy individuals (Blanco et. al. 2015).   
A critical intervention was the creation of the barrio (neighborhood) system for cultivation 
centers and the grouping of 
concessions into these defined 
areas with similar 
environmental characteristics.  
According to both aquaculture 
operators and state officials, 
the introduction of this system 
represented a major technical 
innovation with profound 
environmental benefits.  In the 
barrio system, the different 
firms operating within each 
barrio are collectively 
responsible for environmental 
and sanitary conditions within 
that area (Iizuka 2016:144), 
incentivizing operators to 
cooperate to ensure that both the fish and the wider marine ecosystem in which they live remain 
healthy.  Thus, concessions, which are leased to individual companies, are grouped into barrios 
Figure 16: Map of the aquaculture frontier in southern Chile showing barrios 
and macrozones. (SERNAPESCA 2010) 
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and these, in turn, are grouped into macro-zones which are overseen by different offices of 
SERNAPESCA (the National Service for Fishing and Aquaculture) creating a nested system to 
manage risk by integrating economic growth and environmental responsibility. In practice this 
system makes the industry “legible” (Scott 1998) to those overseeing it but, for several reasons, 
does little to ameliorate the environmental or social impacts of the sector in remote coastal 
communities in Aysén where concessions are granted.   
First, concessions, barrios, and macro-zones are all designated with fixed spatial boundaries.   
Like fisheries and marine conservation areas, these zones are clearly defined on charts and 
satellite maps, yet are virtually meaningless in practice, when tides and currents render these 
arbitrary boundaries irrelevant, and toxins, waste, and other contaminants freely cross imaginary 
lines.  As policy experts have begun to recognize, this model, based on land-based systems for 
granting property and use rights, “obscures the interconnected character of the coastal 
environment” (Tecklin 2016:285).   
Second, the conditions that pushed the epicenter of aquaculture sector from Los Lagos to 
Aysén also pushed workers.  Companies quickly realized that it was cheaper to hire experienced 
workers from Puerto Montt than to train new workers in Aysén. Furthermore, the ISA crisis 
demonstrated to managers and supervisors the need for more sanitary practices and rapid 
responses to die-offs, both of which were easier to implement and maintain with experienced 
workers.  Those living in Aysén were quickly branded “unreliable” or “lazy” compared to their 
northern counterparts.  Managers complained that they did not show up on time or at all, even as 
their companies declined to provide the training or steady wages that would incentivize 
ayseninos, as those from the region are known, to adopt “normal” hours.   
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Managing Economic Risk: Surveillance, Exclusion, and Imported Labor 
For most of those who are able to work on the pontones, the technically advanced, floating 
structures where aquaculture workers live and monitor the growth and health of the fish, the job 
is ideal.  They have hot food, cable television, and high-speed internet—all in exchange for a few 
hours of work that they can do, as one aquaculture worker told me, “in their pajamas” and a 
willingness to spend two weeks at a 
time away from their families.  The 
fact that the process of farming fish 
requires workers to be on-site every 
day means that shifts continue 
through holidays, and that workers 
routinely miss Christmas, New 
Year’s, and family birthdays.  This 
is, according to most of the workers I 
spoke with, the hardest part of the job.  Moreover, several workers compared their time on-site to 
living in a monastery, since there are “no women” and alcohol is strictly prohibited.   
In recent years, pontones and the cages beneath them have been subject to another technical 
innovation—the deployment of on-site security cameras.  Initially, cameras placed underwater 
enabled workers to identify unhealthy fish and isolate them (Blanco et al. 2015).  Increasingly, 
however, cameras have been installed above the surface to monitor traffic to and from cultivation 
centers and the workers themselves.  Cermaq, an aquaculture firm owned by the Mitsubishi 
Corporation but headquartered in Oslo, has even installed cameras in the laboratories aboard its 
Figure 17: Aquaculture workers from the firm Blumar waiting to 
go to the airport following a 14-day shift 
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pontones so that fish necropsies can be observed by experts on land (interview, Jorge Padilla 
Trujillo, June 6, 2018).  
Despite the isolation from family, transient lifestyle, and increased surveillance, most 
workers I spoke to were satisfied because of the pay offered for offshore work:  between 1.5 and 
2 million Chilean pesos per month ($2,050-2,750 USD).  When the weather is bad, workers who 
have completed their turnos (shifts) are often stranded in remote ports like Puerto Aguirre and 
Melinka for days at a time waiting for a lancha rapida (smaller, faster boats contracted by 
aquaculture firms), the ferry, or a chartered plane to take them to the mainland, but they are 
financially compensated for this time.  While they wait, they spend hours watching cable 
television beside their packed bags, drying wet socks, and sharing memes with friends and 
coworkers via WhatsApp.  
Virtually all of those who work on the pontones are from outside of the Aysén region—and 
they are nearly all men.  In the early days of the industry, when salmon farms in the Los Lagos 
region were close to shore and accessible by road, aquaculture workers came in for day or night 
shifts but did not live on-site.  During this period, there were more women working in the 
industry, often as kukis (cooks) providing meals to other workers but also feeding the fish and 
tracking their growth.  Today, as centers have moved farther apart and farther offshore in order 
to comply with sanitation standards implemented after the ISA crisis, far fewer women work at 
cultivation centers.  Aquaculture managers justify their preference for male workers by arguing 
that women are unfit for offshore work under dangerous conditions that often require brute 
strength, yet they also claim that women can “cause problems” or “distractions” among men who 
spend weeks at a time away from home.  Risk management—both risks to workers and risks 
supposedly posed by workers—is used to justify selective employment at cultivation centers.  
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Whatever the justification, the result is that women have been largely shut out of more 
lucrative—and typically less physically demanding—work in the sector.  This has the effect of 
limiting their earning potential and transforming offshore cultivation centers into almost 
exclusively masculine environments.33 
Instead, women work at the processing plants where fish are filleted and prepared for export 
in places like Quellón and Puerto Chacabuco.  Not only are they considered more responsible 
and reliable than men working in this capacity—particularly in Aysén, where the male workforce 
is notorious among managers for failing to show up to work—but if they are providing a second 
income in a household with a male partner who works, however sporadically, they can work for 
lower wages.  These factory jobs, however, require long hours in cold, damp conditions.  
Furthermore, workers in plants like those in Puerto Chacabuco are considered “unskilled”—in 
contrast to those working on the pontones whose experience and technical expertise justifies 
flying them in from Puerto Montt and other northern cities—and therefore enjoy no job security.   
Like work at offshore cultivation centers, work in the factories takes place around the clock.  
Given the long hours, lack of job security, and low pay, it is hardly surprising that longtime 
residents of Aysén choose to work elsewhere when afforded the opportunity, leading to the 
problem of “rotation,” where workers are trained but only work for two or three months before 
they quit and must be replaced (interview, Vilma Cavieres, April 12, 2018).  To combat this 
problem, aquaculture and industrial fishing firms operating processing plants in Puerto 
Chacabuco hire Haitian and Afro-Colombian immigrants. Angel, an Afro-Colombian recently 
arrived from Cali, described his day: 
                                                        
33 While this chapter does not foreground gender, I am indebted to feminist scholars Heidi Tinsman and Rachel 
Schurman for their detailed analyses on the gendered impacts of neoliberalism in Chile.  
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I have been there [at the European aquaculture company’s factory] for ten months, and I 
got the job only a short time after I arrived, killing the salmon so they can be filleted.  I 
find the work is good, but the hard part is getting out of bed to get to it.  My shift starts at 
3:00 am and so the bus picks me up from my house at 2:20 or sometimes 2:30.   I think I 
am lucky to work for [the Europeans] because everyone tells me they pay better than Frio 
Sur.  They give me $432,000 pesos per month… fixed so I never get more… and they 
give me the clothes I wear to work at the factory and then I leave them there and they 
wash them there.  But the people are nice to me and I find the work agreeable.  So for 
this, I am here: it isn’t that there isn’t work in Colombia… there’s a lot of work, it’s just 
that what I make here is four times what I could make in Colombia. 
The feminization of the workforce in fish factories and at other export oriented production 
sites in the wake of Chile’s neoliberal “reforms” has been well documented (Pitchon 2015; 
Schurman 2004; Tinsman 2004) as has the use of immigrant or migrant labor in fields and 
factories around the world (Holmes 2013; Steusse 2016). In Aysén, the need for migrant workers 
is the result of local workers avoiding jobs where the work is tedious, the pay is low, and 
conditions are difficult. For aquaculture firms, the employment of outsiders like Angel represents 
another risk management strategy.  
Whereas longtime residents have 
extended kinship networks that 
afford them opportunities to work in 
other sectors and abandon the tedium 
of the fish processing plants, 
newcomers’ isolation makes them 
more likely to remain on the factory 
floor.  Moreover, their limited local 
networks—along with high wages 
Figure 18: Workers line up outside the FrioSur plant in Puerto 
Chacabuco 
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relative to those back home—makes them more willing to tolerate difficult working conditions.  
Numerous ayseninos told me that they would like to work on pontones and enjoy the modern 
luxuries that this work affords. Yet since they cannot break into this work due to their lack of 
experience or education, they forgo working in the industry altogether.   
Moreover, as the aquaculture industry exhausted the resources available in the Los Lagos 
region and the frontier moved south, the mobile workforce based in Los Lagos was able to 
leverage its experience and investments—in steel boats and heavy equipment like air 
compressors and deck cranes—to retain skilled or semi-skilled employment even as job sites 
shifted to Aysén. Workers from Los Lagos with more experience and access to capital were able 
to out-compete less experienced workers from Aysén, who amounted to a less disciplined 
workforce and who were ambivalent about working the tedious hours demanded by the industry.   
But the enthusiasm of “good” immigrants like Angel and the refusal of many ayseninos to 
work full-time in the region’s processing plants helps reinforce a narrative among aquaculture 
operators that ayseninos are “ungrateful,” “unreliable,” or “lazy.” Projecting these “backward” 
characteristics onto the local population also justifies and facilitates aquaculture operators’ 
militant secrecy and security.  As noted previously, many cultivation centers are now equipped 
with surveillance cameras, and stories about disgruntled or opportunistic locals stealing 
equipment, breaking cages, or poaching fish circulate widely in industry publications, in local 
newspapers, and on social media.  In contrast to these “thieves and opportunists,” those 
supervising the aquaculture sector present themselves as sensible, middle class professionals 
who, lamentably, must deal with these problems to maintain order and profitability. Many such 
professionals work in aquaculture-adjacent jobs as well, in laboratories that analyze everything 
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from shipments of eggs to water quality to levels of antibiotics, in schools paid for by 
aquaculture firms, or in government agencies tasked with regulating and optimizing the industry.  
Alfredo, for example, came to Puerto Aysén in order to work in this sector after finishing his 
studies in Concepción.  He worked in a laboratory monitoring water quality for a Chilean 
aquaculture firm before starting his own home-laboratory with his then-girlfriend and doing 
work under contract for several firms.  This work provided the young couple with enough 
income to buy a new Chinese SUV and move into a bigger house on the south side of town.  
After their breakup and the dissolution of their lab, Alfredo took a temporary job working on a 
well-boat, where he monitored the water quality in the tanks used to keep fish alive as they are 
transported from various centers in Aysén to the factories at Quellón, on the southern tip of 
Chiloé.  This work didn’t last long, not because the company didn’t have work for a newly 
single, well-educated laboratory technician, but because the passage between the Guaitecas 
archipelago, at the northern end of Aysén, and Quellón, at the southern tip of Chiloé, requires 
crossing the notoriously rough Gulf of Corcovado.  Most of those working on the steel hulled 
boats servicing cultivation centers and transporting salmon hail from maritime communities in 
places like Talcahuano, Ancud, and Castro and are inured to the extreme weather and waves that 
define these journeys. For a well-educated penquista,34 however, these rough crossings proved 
too much; Alfredo gets seasick. 
Elizabeth, another young professional, came from Santiago to work in a lab, though like 
Alfredo, she has since found other employment: 
I am here because of the salmoneras.  I came in 2013 because of my training and I 
worked in the lab—the only lab that they had [in Puerto Aysén] at that time—running 
                                                        
34 Someone from Concepción, Chile’s second largest city. 
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tests for the salmoneras.  That was at the end of the ISA crisis.  At the time, when the ISA 
came, they didn’t give the fish antibiotics… that’s why they were wiped out.  Now they 
give them injections because things have changed.   
She went on to explain that things have changed for her too, since she now has a child and 
has left the industry to work as a science teacher in two local schools, including Colegio Santa 
Teresa, where we met during another CONICYT Science and Technology Week event.  This 
private school35— the best in Puerto Aysén—was founded by the CEO of Frio Sur, Carlos Vial, 
and his wife, Gracia Cosmelli.  FrioSur, which at the time had both industrial fishing and salmon 
farming operations throughout Aysén,36 has been operating in the region since 1985 and exerts 
an outsize influence on the region, particularly in Puerto Chacabuco, where its fish processing 
plant is located, and in Puerto Aysén, where its workers’ syndicate is located.  As the head of 
that syndicate explained to me with great pride, “FrioSur es Aysén y Aysén es FrioSur” (“FrioSur 
is Aysén and Aysén is FrioSur”).  While the role of Frio Sur in establishing and funding the 
colegio helps shield the company from criticism, in this particular case this was a happy 
coincidence: Carlos and Gracia had small children and were concerned about the education they 
could receive in a frontier town like Puerto Aysén, when they established the school. 
Chasing the Norwegians  
Though ayseninos are a fractious group, everyone I talked to in the course of my fieldwork 
could agree on one thing when it came to the various aquaculture firms operating in Aysén: The 
Norwegians were the best people to work for and had the most professional organization.  Over 
and over, workers who spent time in the factories in Puerto Chacabuco told me how much better 
it was to work for Marine Harvest than Frio Sur.  Perhaps Frio Sur “is Aysén,” but ayseninos 
                                                        
35 Though it is technically a public-private partnership as there are no fully private schools in Aysén. 
36 They subsequently sold their aquaculture operations to Aqua Chile, which in turn was bought by Agro Super in a 
major industry consolidation finalized in late 2018. 
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have a clear preference for the Norwegians, whom they insist “have another mentality because 
they are European and Nordic” (interview, Hugo Araya Leiva, February 3, 2018).  It is worth it 
to work for them even though several workers, like Marco, who has lived his whole life in Puerto 
Aysén, insist that the Europeans “are always testing you.” 
“They treat you like a colleague,” he explained during our interview, elaborating on the 
differences between Marine Harvest and Frio Sur, both of which operate processing plants in 
Puerto Chacabuco.  “[Marine Harvest] is better organized, and there’s better pay and better food.  
The way they work is at first you get a one-month contract, then a three-month contract, and 
finally an indefinite contract so they can ‘test’ you.” 
The fact that Marine Harvest “tests” workers before offering long-term contracts—partially 
in an effort to solve the “rotation” problem—reveals the proliferation of “audit culture” 
(Strathern 2000) within aquaculture firms, in which managers use an “objective” calculus to 
evaluate their de-professionalized workforce and promote a culture of individual responsibility 
that benefits the company (Shore and Wright 2015:430).  Calculating the fitness of individual 
workers allows managers to assess how much risk they are assuming in terms of knowledge, 
skill, and dependability and to base their hiring (and rehiring) decisions on this assessment.   
But these assessments frustrate local workers who are otherwise keen to work for Marine 
Harvest because of its reputation and benefits, but who are accustomed to finding and 
maintaining work through subjective judgements and personal connections.  As Juanita, one of 
the women who now works at the Conaf nursery in Puerto Aysén described it to me, “They are 
surely better [than Frio Sur]… they might not receive you though—they are always testing 
people first!  So, if they are not going to hire you in the end, what is the point of going to them?”  
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It isn’t just the workers who have noted the better benefits and distinctive workplace culture 
of “the Norwegians.”  Juan Pérez, an official in SERNAPESCA’s regional office, described 
meetings between government officials and various salmoneras, and singled out Marine Harvest: 
They have a ‘type’ of worker.   When I walk into a meeting with various people from the 
salmoneras, I can always tell which ones are from Marine Harvest.  They are tall… they 
have lots of blondes, weon,37 so many blonde [men and women]!  Where do they get 
them? And they are thin… and you look and they have a laptop out and an iPhone and 
they are taking notes, and weon, no one else [from the Chilean companies present] is 
writing anything down, they don’t even have a notebook!  And, weon… the minas 
(chicks)!  When we used to have to go to do site visits or meet in their offices they would 
ask for volunteers and all the guys [from SERNAPESCA] would try to be the first to 
volunteer! 
As previously noted, the offshore cultivation centers where salmon are farmed have become 
almost exclusively masculine environments, but the offices of state agencies like SERNAPESCA 
are also sites where most of the professionals are men.  In Aysén, the region’s distance from the 
metropole means that many public employees only come for a short time and come alone, 
without their families.  In this context, being around women whose appearance is deemed “more 
European” is not only desirable for male officials, but it also provides material for running jokes.  
That Marine Harvest employs Chileans, including men, whose height, blonde hair, and fair skin 
marks them as unusual and cuico (posh) enhances the company’s prestige. 
The exceptionality of the Norwegians has also led Chilean firms to adopt elements of their 
culture—sometimes to humorous effect—as Juan described in the same interview, 
You can tell, just by looking at a list of the names of the cultivation centers of the various 
companies, which ones are in the X region because they all have Huilliche [indigenous] 
                                                        
37 “Weon” is a difficult word to translate despite its ubiquity in Chilean Spanish.  Here it is best translated as “dude,” 
and it conveys a familiarity between speaker and listener but with strangers it can be used as an insult akin to calling 
someone “fool” or “asshole” in American English. 
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names, you know, and which ones are in the XII region because they either have English 
names, because the islands were named by Darwin, you know, when he came in El 
Beagle.. But here [Aysén was the XI Region] they have names from Norway.  And weon, 
you see it with the boats too!  The boats with names like Thor, Odin, Heimdall… and it 
was so funny, because there was a boat called Don Francisco, right?  And it’s a very 
Chilean name, you know… super Spanish,38 and it was rusty and so they restored it, gave 
it new paint, and now it’s ‘Heimdall’!  Heimdall?39 Weon, here?!?   
Chilean politicians and professionals, like other Latin American elites, have a longstanding 
history of modeling policies and practices after Europeans and North Americans (Beckmann 
2009; Burns 1980) and the success of Norway in pioneering salmon farming makes this latest 
imitation understandable. Moreover, Chilean operators proudly claim that they are modeling 
their practices after Norwegian firms’ in order to emphasize their own commitment to improving 
and meeting industry-wide standards. Marine Harvest’s highly organized operations also shape 
how those in aquaculture think of Norway and Scandinavia.  Norway is first on the list of 
countries that Juan would like to visit.  Hernán Rebolledo, the regional representative of Salmon 
Chile (the professional association of Chilean salmon producers), has already visited Norway, 
and describes his trip in terms that make it seem nearly mythical, noting the country’s lack of 
pollution, its organized public transportation, and general cleanliness (interview, Hernán 
Rebolledo, October 16, 2017).    
                                                        
38 This term is used to invoke names that come from the Iberian Peninsula and therefore harken back to Chile’s 
colonial era. 
 
39 Heimdall or Heimdallr is the “shining god” in Norse Mythology who guards Valhalla and warns of invaders with 
his horn.  He is—quite ironically in this mestizo country which proudly touts its European-ness—the “whitest” of 
the Norse gods.  Jord, the name of the cargo vessel operated by Detroit Chile S.A. and seized in Puerto Aguirre by 
fishermen demanding compensation for the Ministry of Health’s closure of fisheries during the 2018 red tide, means 
“Earth” in Norwegian. 
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Anthropologist Heather Swanson has described how Japanese aquaculture operations and the 
demand for salmon in the Japanese market has created “shadow ecologies,” a term she borrows 
from political scientist Peter Dauvergn, beyond that country’s borders—notably in southern 
Chile (Swanson 2015).  But what has come to exist in Aysén might fairly be considered a 
“shadow economy” in which the financial success of Chilean salmon aquaculture depends on 
operators and government officials adopting practices and regulations first developed in Norway, 
where the sector has a longer history and where environmental laws are stricter.  At the same 
time, they closely monitor Norwegian aquaculture firms and track their rates of production to 
predict the rise or fall of salmon prices in the global marketplace—just as Norwegians watch 
Chile’s periodic environmental crises and “mass mortality events” for similar reasons.  
Moreover, the Norwegian model—held up as superior to the Chilean model by both supervisors 
and workers—provides endlessly moveable goal posts that operators use to demonstrate how 
they are continuously improving their own practices based on new strategies and practices in 
Europe.  That the Chilean industry is much worse for local ecologies is excusable as long as 
operators constantly chase the Norwegian ideal.  
Managing Political Risk: Maintaining Uncertainty 
At the boarding house in Puerto Aguirre, an island community at the epicenter of Aysén’s 
aquaculture industry, I shared a meal with a team of aquaculture workers from Aqua Chile—at 
that time, the largest Chilean firm in operation.40  Walter, Hector, Roberto, and Cristian had just 
finished a two-week shift at a cultivation center thirty minutes from Puerto Aquirre via lancha 
rapida.  The following day, they were scheduled to head to the island’s only airstrip and take a 
                                                        
40 Aqua Chile would eventually be bought by Los Fiordos, a subsidiary of AgroSuper, an industrial food production 
giant that primarily produces pork and chicken, but which has sought to use its capital to rapidly expand its formerly 
modest aquaculture operations. 
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chartered plane to Puerto Montt.  From there, Walter, Hector, and Roberto would board a bus 
and ride fourteen hours to Viña del Mar, the largely affluent seaside town just north of 
Valparaíso.  Cristian would have a shorter ride, since his family lives in Osorno, just an hour 
from Puerto Montt.  They explained that they would have seven days off before they returned to 
Aysén for another fourteen-day shift atop the floating cages where their “crop,” in this case trout, 
would be treated with antibiotics, fed, and eventually “harvested.”  Since they started this year’s 
cycle—which takes roughly twelve months for trout—only a few months previously, this 
“harvest” would not occur until December or January.   
Their use of this agricultural language signals not only the degree to which aquaculture 
operators seek to manage risk by controlling conditions at production sites in order to deliver 
sustained, predictable yields, but it also reveals a significant gulf between the logic of 
aquaculture and that of fishing.  Aquaculture operators, like others charged with managing 
animal populations for human benefit, think in terms of ownership (Nadasdy 2011:139-140); 
they own both the fish and, at least for the duration of their company’s lease, the territory where 
they are raised.  Though they think differently—fishers do not see themselves as “owning” their 
catches until they are in the boat—fishers are aware that the logic of ownership underwrites 
salmon production.  As more than one fisher told me, “los salmones tienen dueños” (“the salmon 
have owners”). 
Walter, Hector, Roberto, and Cristian pretty usually worked together at the same cultivation 
centers. Roberto—the boss— actually recruited Hector and Walter, something that is common 
among aquaculture workers.  Hector previously worked in construction but wanted to make more 
money in order to retire in another two or three years, and Walter was a mechanic working in a 
manufacturing plant outside Valparaíso. 
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Roberto, young and recently married, eagerly told me about their work, periodically 
adjusting his thick glasses as he talked.  He was frustrated that his industry was constantly 
criticized for contaminating, and argued that everyone contaminates “unless your car or your 
boat runs on water?”   
He paused to let the question sink in before answering himself, “no, of course not, it runs on 
petroleum.  The thing is to make sure people are implementing ‘best practices’ in order to 
contaminate the environment as little as possible.  For this we have to have mejora continua 
(continuous improvement), but this is what we do.  We learn from the past.”   
He complained about Greenpeace, the international environmental NGO that documented the 
tons of dead marine life that washed ashore during the 2016 red tides in the Chiloé archipelago 
and accused salmon producers of “poisoning” the sea, saying Greenpeace provided a “fun job” 
for those who belong to the NGO.  But he also lamented that the different aquaculture firms are 
in competition with each other “because obviously they are all private enterprises” and therefore 
did not share information—information that he explained was critical to making sure the industry 
contaminated less.  This lack of cooperation between firms not only means that they fail to share 
vital information, it also undermines one of the main objectives behind the barrio system 
described above: that firms take collective responsibility for the environmental and sanitary 
conditions within these designated areas. 
While I had heard much of this before, not only from other aquaculture workers but also 
from Juan, who is tasked with ensuring that the industry is improving and operating 
“sustainably” from his office at SERNAPESCA, what Roberto said next caught me off guard. 
“When I go home to Viña [del Mar], I don’t tell people what I do, because of how 
stigmatized it is in some circles to be working in salmon aquaculture.”  He continued, “only my 
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family knows, because I don’t tell anyone else.  And if they ask where I work, I just say ‘in the 
south’ and if they ask in what, I just say ‘work’ and talk about something else.” 
This theme of contamination—and a general defensiveness about it—came up frequently in 
other interviews.  Ivan, a mechanic who works ten-day shifts on a steel boat that services 
cultivation centers from its home port in Puerto Montt, bemoaned the attitude of other mechanics 
at his company, complaining that a good engine can run forever, but explaining that because the 
boat belongs to the company, there is little incentive for the other mechanics to see the engine as 
an investment worth caring for.  He guessed that the average engine on a boat like his now lasts 
ten years or less, describing how “the regulations are a joke for the workers.  When they have to 
change the oil… if they don’t have the bulb [a device like a turkey baster used to extract used 
motor oil] then they just send it overboard.” 
Farming the ocean—like terrestrial farming—also means contending with losses.  The 
production of monocultures is a risky proposition, and commodity diseases can wipe out entire 
stocks (Soluri 2011), plunging the industry and global markets into turmoil.  In this context, 
“routine losses” are considered acceptable whereas “mass mortality events” are not.  In 
laboratories—usually on land, but increasingly at offshore cultivation centers—veterinarians 
perform necropsies on fish suspected to have died of ISA or other infectious diseases and report 
their findings to SERNAPESCA.  Subcontractors do brisk business vacuuming dead fish out of 
cages before they can spread disease to healthy fish and disposing of the fish in terrestrial 
landfills where they will not contaminate the water column.  This unpleasant job is one of the 
few available to ayseninos who wish to work in the aquaculture sector—provided they have their 
own equipment. 
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As of 2018, however, Aysén did not have any landfills that could process the side effects of 
the massive die-offs that have periodically plagued the industry.  Dead and diseased fish were to 
be transported to the Los Lagos region by sea and disposed of in landfills there.  In the case of 
“routine losses” it made better economic sense to dispose of fish at sea, something multiple 
aquaculture workers told me was commonplace, even as they clarified that it didn’t happen at the 
cultivation centers where they worked.  
This is a common refrain.  It is almost always someone else who is doing the contaminating, 
however, rather than the subject of the interview.  In general, those working in the sector are 
quick to explain that while there is plenty of contamination as plastic, motor oil, and organic 
material is dumped into the water column from cultivation centers and the boats that service 
them, they are not guilty of such things.  Like other extractive industries, however, the sheer 
scale of aquaculture production means that the introduction of toxic material into the water 
column—along with organic material that contributes to the proliferation of toxic algae—is 
widespread.  As in mining, costs are externalized and toxic materials build up slowly through 
routine practices.  Over time, however, this externalization of costs contributes to disasters—in 
particular, harmful algal blooms—capable of devastating both the industry and local ecologies. 
However, even among those ostensibly concerned with the state of the environment, the fact 
that the aquaculture sector is “un poco contaminante” (“a little contaminating”) is not enough to 
outweigh the benefits that the industry has brought to Aysén.  Indeed, the CEO of Aqua Chile, 
Victor Hugo Puchi, was opposed to the HidroAysén project on the grounds that it would be too 
disruptive for the landscape and displace rural families living along the Pasqua and Baker Rivers.  
Aqua Chile, Los Fiordos, and Marine Harvest have sponsored beach cleaning events and 
educational programs for local students, and when a lack of public funds threatened the 2018 
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Fiesta del Pesca’o Frito (Festival of Fried Fish) in Puerto Cisnes—an event that draws tens of 
thousands of tourists to this otherwise sleepy port—Aqua Chile, Los Fiordos, Marine Farm, and 
Bella Vista sponsored the event.  
Climate change, particularly the 
warming southern Pacific, is also a 
frequent topic of discussion among 
professionals working in the 
industry.  As algal blooms have 
become more common, severe, and 
prolonged, there is an emerging 
scientific consensus that warmer 
ocean temperatures are a contributing factor (Anderson 2012; Glibert et al. 2018).  The warming 
planet, plastic strewn beaches, and extreme weather events are invoked frequently by actors 
within the aquaculture sector.  Indeed, on a national level, the Piñera government recently 
approved a ban on plastic bags to create “a healthy culture of recycling” and protect the 
country’s nearly 4,000 miles of coastline (Bonnefoy 2018).  Yet within the same year, Piñera’s 
Minister of National Assets, Felipe Ward, approved a reduction of the newly nationalized Parque 
Patagonia in order to facilitate gold mining by the Australian firm Equus Mining.  
On the surface, this all seems contradictory: the CEO of a major aquaculture firm which 
occupies scores of concessions throughout Aysén is opposed to a major hydroelectric project 
because it would displace local people; the government in Santiago is banning plastic bags 
throughout the country in the name of reducing pollution, but shrinking its network of parks in 
order to accommodate an industry with a history of contaminating the landscape; aquaculture 
Figure 19: A scene from the 2018 Fiesta del Pesca'o Frito 
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workers decry the carelessness of their peers in dealing with waste, but insist that it is always 
someone else who is dumping oil or organic materials into the Southern Ocean. 
This apparent contradiction, however, illustrates several ways in which Chilean aquaculture 
firms, with state support, undermine their critics as they “shape the world in accordance with 
their pursuit of profit, growth, and legitimacy” (Benson and Kirsch 2010:459).41  Minor, 
everyday acts of contamination are discursively normalized, and therefore do not constitute the 
kind of event that necessitates political action or ethical consideration (Povinelli 2011) and 
disavowal on the part of corporate polluters—enabled by a state that prioritizes economic growth 
above all else—means that cause and effect become murky and obvious connections are denied 
(Fortun 2014:319).  This disavowal is made easier by the deployment of corporate social 
technologies (Kirsch 2014; Rogers 2012) that seek to confuse marine science, deny access to 
sites where contamination takes place, insist corporate actors handle clean-up efforts, and 
otherwise limit the connection-making that is essential to apprehending the harm caused by late 
industrial capitalism.  Plastic floats, mooring balls, nylon lines, and motor oil containers wash 
ashore along the sparsely populated Chilean coastline.  Only a small fraction of these come from 
the fishing sector, which is miniscule compared to aquaculture.  Yet by sponsoring social events 
and beach clean ups, aquaculture firms reinforce the narrative that the salmoneras are “bonita” 
(lovely) and good for the region, even if they are “a little contaminating.”  
In the context of frequent escapes in which fish pens break due to extreme waves, tides, and 
winds and hundreds of thousands of non-native fish treated with antibiotics enter the wild, 
aquaculture operators act with impunity—even bending laws that they helped author. After a 
                                                        
41 This state support is often overt and direct.  Following the publication of an article critical of Chilean salmon 
farming practices in The New York Times in 2007, at the height of the ISA outbreak, the Chilean government 
launched an aggressive campaign in its defense, including letters to several major US media outlets and a lobbying 
campaign on the industry’s behalf (Latta and Cid Aguayo 2012:170). 
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major escape in which roughly 900,000 fish escaped from a cultivation center operated by the 
Norwegian firm Marine Harvest in the Los Lagos region, the company paid local fishers to catch 
the escaped salmon, despite a national law that prohibits fishing salmon on the grounds that 
allowing them to fish this lucrative species would encourage unscrupulous fishers to deliberately 
break cages and poach fish from cultivation centers.  This widely reported story—of an 
aquaculture operator paying fishers a bounty to capture escaped salmon which could potentially 
threaten native species—promoted a narrative in which these companies clean up their messes, 
and do so by partnering with local people, even as it demonstrated the power of corporations to 
bend or break the law when they deem it necessary or expedient.  Never mind that there are at 
least two or three escapes on this scale a year and millions of salmon living wild in Patagonia. 
Escapes nonetheless fuel criticism.  After the Marine Harvest escape, Juan explained to me 
what a headache it was for him to have to respond to calls from various media outlets: 
It’s always the same thing.  This happened in the X Region, so I tell them that I only 
work in the XI Region and I am not responsible for what happens there, and I don’t 
have information for this reason… even though I have been talking to my counterpart 
up there, obviously.  But this situation combines everything.  If people talk about the 
salmoneras as a polemic, they talk about three things: the use of antibiotics, the 
escape of fish, and the massive mortality, like what happened in Puerto Montt in 
2007.  And they are talking about these things in Santiago!  They are reporting 
broken cages and the escape and they are explaining how these fish are not fit for 
human consumption [because of how recently they were treated with antibiotics] in 
Santiago.  And for Santiago?  Weon, this is nothing to them! 
This criticism makes aquaculture proponents—whether they are operators themselves or 
public officials tasked with optimizing the industry—defensive.  As Juan’s response to media 
criticism and “polemics” makes clear, he sees himself as an expert who understands the 
appropriate use of antibiotics, the ecological impact of escapes, and the potential for mass 
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mortality events.  Moreover, he has to manage the inherent uncertainty generated by Aysén’s  
highly variable coastal environment and, increasingly, by global climate change.  He explicitly 
juxtaposes himself with those living in Santiago who are out of touch with what is actually 
happening in Aysén.  He feels it should be left to experts to diagnose and respond to problems—
continuously improving the aquaculture industry the process—and, as is common among those 
producing monocultures for the global market, he denounces “criticism or warnings about 
negative environmental or social impacts as primitive and unscientific” (Gudynas 2008:515).  
Interference from “outsiders” is bad for everyone because, as Juan implies, they fail to 
understand or care about the difference between the Los Lagos and Aysén Regions.  Ironically, 
this insistence that those in Santiago—in this case journalists and environmentalists—fail to 
understand conditions along Chile’s aquaculture frontier echoes complaints made by islanders 
and other local people in Aysén.  The only difference is that local people complain not about 
journalists and environmentalists, but about state officials and corporate managers. 
Conclusions 
Despite the negative social and environmental impacts of the industry, aquaculture managers 
like Roberto and public officials like Juan believe that they can manage risks by introducing new 
spatial technologies, employing a disciplined workforce, and adopting both professional and 
environmental practices from their Norwegian counterparts.  Roberto genuinely wishes that 
competing firms shared more information with one another because he believes that this would 
reduce the negative environmental impact of aquaculture and lead to “best practices” benefitting 
everyone.  Moreover, he ensures that his workforce is reliable by recruiting friends and 
neighbors for the “best” jobs in the industry—even as he keeps his work in aquaculture secret 
when he is home in Viña del Mar.  Juan cares about aquaculture with a convert’s zeal, spending 
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his spare time reading about what new policies have been implemented in Norway and 
meticulously documenting infractions and violations committed by operators who do not follow 
SERNAPESCA’s regulations.  He knows that there are limits to what he can do—he jokes often 
about how most operators would rather just pay a fine if they are caught than actually follow 
rules that could cut into their profit margins—but he believes that “continuous improvement” is 
more than just a slogan. 
Aquaculture managers like Roberto and public officials like Juan manage ecological, 
economic and political risks, yet they must also manage uncertainty.  Highly variable conditions 
on the coast of southern Chile along with recent, unprecedented environmental crises undermine 
efforts to deliver sustainable, predictable yields from bounded, territorially-fixed production 
sites.  No amount of risk management can stop the movement of wind and water or the diffusion 
of waste and other contaminants through the water column.  In the context of this uncertainty, 
continuous improvement is the best aquaculture managers can deliver.  Through their work to 
improve practices offshore and organize an unruly workforce, aquaculture operators and public 
officials come to see themselves as charismatic actors within Chile’s development project, 
building a sustainable industry under difficult and unpredictable conditions.   
Moreover, the genuine belief among aquaculture managers and state officials that their 
industry is indispensable and perfectible—even if most of its benefits are accrued in Santiago 
and Valparaíso—makes these men sympathetic figures.  It is far easier for journalists and 
environmentalists who criticize the aquaculture sector to do so when its representatives are 
politically connected men in expensive suits far from the industry’s day-to-day operations.  The 
very existence of diligent, ambitious young men who spend weeks at a time facing uncertainty in 
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the fjords of Aysén undermines the assertion that those working in aquaculture are indifferent to 
its impact on local ecologies. 
For aquaculture firms, however, uncertainty represents a social technology (Benson and 
Kirsch 2010; Kirsch 2014; Rogers 2012) that can be strategically deployed to escape criticism 
and avoid costly new regulations. By discursively framing aquaculture as one source of 
contamination among many and environmental crises as inevitable byproducts of unprecedented 
climate change, aquaculture firms maintain uncertainty about their industry’s long term 
sustainability.  As long as “everyone contaminates,” the dumping of oil from boats servicing 
cultivation centers and the escape of fish treated with antibiotics remain routine, quasi-events—
part of the “everyday cruddiness” of contemporary capitalism (Povinelli 2011). As long as rising 
ocean temperatures make the industry’s impacts uncertain, aquaculture firms—and the Chilean 
state—can continue to take a reactive rather than proactive approach to the environmental crises 




CHAPTER 4. TOXIC VITALITY, MASS MORTALITY, AND LOST LIVELIHOODS: 
THE EVENTFULNESS OF RED TIDES 
 
 
Harmful Algal Blooms and Red Tides 
 The harmful algal bloom (HAB) that hit the Chiloé archipelago in 2016 and subsequent 
demonstrations by angry local fishers vaulted this phenomenon into headlines across the country 
and led the nightly news for weeks, once again shining a spotlight on the aquaculture sector and 
its impact on southern Chile (Thomas 2018).  Environmentalists decried the bloom as the result 
of salmon farms cutting corners and dumping waste offshore (Fernando González 2016) while 
the industry—admitting that some mistakes had been made—argued that periodic blooms are 
natural and pointed to the lack of consensus in the scientific community about why harmful algal 
blooms have steadily grown worse over the past several decades (Anderson 2012).  Multinational 
aquaculture firms scrambled to cut their losses and dispose of tons of dead fish while fishers and 
their families took to the streets to demand financial compensation from the state for their lost 
livelihoods.  These protests paralyzed the archipelago for more than ten days before fishers and 
government officials reached an agreement over compensation for those affected (Daughters 
2016b). 
 So when a new algal bloom was reported in Aysén in late December of 2017, there was 
already a precedent which informed the responses of scientists, aquaculture managers, state 
officials, fishing families, and environmentalists.  What these distinct groups of concerned actors 
did not know at the time that the bloom was first reported, however, was that the HAB that 
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emerged in Aysén as the waters warmed in the early days of the austral summer would be the 
most toxic ever recorded anywhere on earth.  This information did not make international news, 
partly because of the remoteness of Aysén, but also because aquaculture operators and state 
officials framed the algal bloom as an object of risk—one among many—that could be managed.  
In the months that followed, however, the contamination of the coast of Aysén and the incidents 
it provoked revealed the incommensurability of the social projects undertaken by aquaculture 
operators, state officials backing the industry and fishing families.  Moreover, the 
acknowledgement by scientists, state officials, and aquaculture operators that the harmful algal 
bloom contaminating Aysén’s fjords and estuaries was unprecedented transformed the situation 
along the coast of Patagonia into a red tide—a disastrous event capable of inspiring ethical and 
political demands rather than quasi-event that could be apprehended and evaluated as somehow 
normal or natural (Povinelli 2011:8).   
 The language matters here.  The transformation from a quasi-event to event is evident in the 
terms used by the different stakeholders in accordance with their distinct social projects.  
Initially, aquaculture operators and state officials consistently referred to the contamination of 
the coastline as a floración de alga nociva (harmful algal bloom).  Those living on the coast, 
however, referred to the emergent conditions on the coast that led to the closure of fisheries as 
marea roja (red tide), a term that has gone out of fashion with scientists even as it has developed 
greater potency in the public imagination (Glibert et al. 2018).  When the eventfulness of the 
bloom became impossible to deny, virtually everyone along the coast adopted red tide as the 
appropriate label for the unfolding disaster.  My own language matters as well, and my use of the 
term “disaster” is not incidental.  Among anthropologists concerned with crises and disasters—
natural, social, or, as in the case of red tide, socio-natural—disasters constitute “contested arenas 
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where hegemonic visions of societal advancement are challenged by the voices and experiences 
of those most impacted by catastrophes” (Barrios 2017:157).  Disasters are therefore events that 
require the state to respond to its citizens and establish suffering as a basis for citizenship claims. 
As I have detailed elsewhere, aquaculture operators and state officials view industrial salmon 
aquaculture as a perfectible and ultimately sustainable industry capable of delivering predictable 
yields—and profits that will help sustain Chile’s economic growth.  State officials, however, 
have a mandate not only to ensure economic growth but also to provide services to rural people 
who are considered especially vulnerable.  This allows fishing families to articulate biological 
citizenship claims based on the state’s failure to prevent or mitigate conditions that threaten their 
livelihoods—and their lives.  
 But before examining how Aysén’s unprecedented harmful algal bloom became a red tide—a  
disaster that required a state response—and revealed the incommensurability of the various 
social projects underway along the coast,  we must pose a simple question: what are harmful 
algal blooms, and what are red tides? 
Harmful Algal Blooms and Red Tides: Assemblages and Disasters 
 Harmful algal blooms occur when a comparatively small subset of microscopic algal species 
proliferate rapidly in the water column, negatively impacting other species living in coastal 
environments (Glibert 2018:10).  Marine biologists distinguish between two kinds of HABs.  
The first occurs when non-toxic algae cause harm via their high biomass, leading to the depletion 
of oxygen as they decay, a condition known as hypoxia, or otherwise causing the destruction of 
marine habitats.  The second occurs when toxic algae reach sufficient concentration to poison 
marine wildlife and humans (Anderson et al. 2002:705).  It was this kind of toxic contamination 
that led to the closure of fisheries in Chiloé in 2016 and in Aysén in 2018. I consider HABs 
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assemblages in keeping with the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987).  They are a heterotopic 
collection of elements—often not precisely the same elements—with “uneven topographies, 
because some of the points at which the various affects and bodies cross paths are more heavily              
trafficked than others” (Bennett 2010:24).  European explorers reported discolored water and 
contaminated shellfish in the Americas as early as the seventeenth century and there is evidence 
that harmful algal blooms impacted indigenous communities for millennia before their arrival 
(Magaña et al. 2003; Prakash et al, 1971).  They have grown more powerful and more frequent in 
recent decades, however, due to industrial agricultural and aquacultural practices that deposit 
enormous quantities of organic material into near shore waters (Anderson et al. 2002; Heisler et 
al. 2008; Naylor et al. 1998).  Likewise, rising ocean temperatures—symptoms of the 
Anthropocene—have led to the appearance of HABs at higher latitudes where they were once 
unheard of (Anderson 2012).  As marine biologist Patricia Glibert writes, 
It is now unequivocally recognized that the global expansion of HABs is continuing, 
with increasing abundance, frequency, and geographic extent of HABs (with new 
species being documented in new areas). It is also well accepted that human activities, 
especially nutrient pollution and climate changes, are an important, if not the most 
important, contributor(s) to this expansion (Glibert 2018:54).  
 Harmful algal blooms are therefore socio-natural assemblages, occurring naturally for 
thousands of years but growing worse because of human “progress.”  Within these assemblages, 
toxic dinoflagellates, a subgroup of algae named for their whip-like tails, are the most essential 
group of actors, despite their microscopic size.  Among these, Alexandrium catenella, Karenia 
brevis, and Karenia mikimotoi were present at levels previously unknown in 2017-2018.  In 
December 2017, salmon cultivation centers began to report high levels of these paralysis 
inducing microorganisms. Bivalves collected along the coast of Aysén and tested during the peak 
of the red tide by Instituto de Fomento Pesquero (IFOP), the state-funded research institute 
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charged with conducting laboratory analysis and measuring toxin levels, contained 143,130 
micrograms of paralysis inducing toxin—more than 40 times the previous record of 3,214 
micrograms and nearly 2,000 times the 80 micrograms deemed safe for human consumption. 
 K. brevis is commonly found at low density in coastal waters.  It is only in higher densities 
that it becomes harmful.  K. mikimotoi and A. catenella, on the other hand, had never before been 
encountered along the coast of Patagonia.  They, like salmon, are introduced species—although 
their introduction was accidental.  These tiny organisms feed off of nutrients introduced into the 
water column and proliferate rapidly.  Together they produce brevetoxins which can cause acute 
gastrointestinal problems, neurological effects including paralysis, and even death when 
consumed in sufficient doses.  Marine species that consume bivalves or that filter dinoflagellates 
in high enough concentrations can succumb to the brevetoxins, washing up on shorelines and 
causing further illness.  Pelagic fish like merluza austral (southern hake)—and of course 
salmon—can asphyxiate as eutrophication spurs explosive growth among dinoflagellates leading 
to a drop in oxygen levels in their habitats.42 In high concentrations, like those generated by even 
the most environmentally conscious aquaculture operations, dead fish pose a threat to public 
health and must be disposed of safely.  This has not always been the case in southern Chile, 
where operators have dumped dead fish along with other waste offshore, effectively 





                                                        
42 Wild species like hake are less susceptible to asphyxiation, however, as they can freely move to waters with 




Figure 20: Timeline of recent HABs, state, and local responses in southern Chile 
 
 
March 2016 4,000 tons of aquaculture waste dumped off the coast of the Chiloé archipelago 
sparking an unprecedented harmful algal bloom. 
  
May 2016 Fishers in the Chiloé archipelago blockade their island, protesting a ban on fishing and 
the failure of state officials to provide for residents during a catastrophic red tide.  
State officials eventually agree to pay $750,000 pesos (roughly $1100 USD) to fishers 
as compensation for lost livelihoods. 
 
December 2017 Harmful algal bloom detected in the waters off the coast of Aysén.   
 
January 5-10, 2018 Eleven people from Puerto Aguirre, Caleta Andrade, and Quellón are hospitalized 
after eating mollusks containing brevetoxins. Ministry of Health bans collection of 
bivalves throughout the region. 
 
January 27, 2018 Thousands descend on Puerto Cisnes for the annual Fiesta del Pesca’o Frito.  The 
fiesta is sponsored by industrial aquaculture firms Los Fiordos, Aqua Chile, Marine 
Farm, and Bella Vista. 
 
January 28, 2018 Cermaq, an aquaculture firm owned by the Mitsubishi Corporation, reports mass 
mortality events at two of its cultivation centers due to the ongoing algal bloom. 
 
February 7, 2018 Residents of Puerto Aguirre issue demands to the regional government in the face of 
the ongoing algal bloom including the declaration of a catastrophe zone, an increase in 
quota size for unaffected species, the removal of the captain in charge of the local 
naval squadron, monthly cash transfers to senior citizens, and to be made a comuna. 
 
February 9, 2018 Residents of Puerto Aguirre—primarily women—storm the ferry MV Queulat and 
occupy its decks for several hours to pressure state officials to meet their demands. 
 
February 12-13, 2018 Fishers in Puerto Aysén meet with the provincial governor to press their demands for 
financial compensation. 
 
February 14, 2018 SERNAPESCA reports that significant salmon losses have occurred at 82 cultivation 
centers across the Los Lagos, Aysén, and Magallanes Regions totaling 2,450 tons.  In 
Aysén alone, 68 centers have collectively reported 1,066 tons of lost salmonoids. 
 
February 15, 2018 Protests erupt in Melinka. 
 
March 3, 2018 After a week of tense phone calls between residents and the Intendenta in Coyhaique, 
fishers in Puerto Aguirre attempt to seize the ferry MV Queulat for a second time.  
When they are unsuccessful they seize the MV Jord, a 650-ton cargo vessel belonging 
to Detroit Chile, S.A. delivering fish meal to nearby cultivation centers. 
 
March 7, 2018 The MV Jord escapes Puerto Aguirre.  Violent clashes between residents and sailors 
from the Chilean Navy. 
 
April 2018 Fishers in Aysén receive payment of $320,000 pesos (roughly $640 USD) to cover 
losses during January and February, with an additional $160,000 pesos ($320 USD) 





 Along the coast of Aysén, where residents sustain multi-occupational careers in part by 
harvesting choros (Mytilus platensis, blue mussels), locos (Concholepas concholepas, Chilean 
abalone),43 and several kinds of almejas (Veneridae, clams) and other bivalves, these toxins are 
especially dangerous since they build up in these bivalves as they filter seawater to feed. 
Between January 5 and 10, 2018, eleven people living between Puerto Aguirre and Quellón had 
been hospitalized after eating bivalves—
mussels and clams—containing brevetoxins 
produced by toxic dinoflagellates.  An 
additional forty-four people in Puerto 
Aguirre also fell ill during this time—a 
testament to the community’s continued 
reliance on subsistence fishing— but since 
victims’ symptoms did not require 
hospitalization, they did not report their 
illness.44   
 Harmful algal blooms are socio-natural 
assemblages that must be measured, 
mapped, and mitigated through the 
                                                        
43 The fiebre del loco (loco fever) saw hundreds of fishers up and down the Chilean coast harvest loco to meet 
soaring demand in the 1990s and was even the subject of a famous comedic film by the same name.  As a result of 
this boom, loco is now a protected species that can only be legally harvested from management areas where the 
species is strictly monitored.  However given the topography of the coast of Aysén and the difficulty of 
enforcement, many fishers from Puerto Aguirre, Caleta Andrade, and other communities continue to collect loco for 
their own consumption.   Fishers also argue that this species is “unaffected by” red tide since it feeds differently than 
mussels and clams, however scientists and state officials insist that when high levels of brevetoxin are found in 
bivalves locos are also contaminated and should be avoided. 
 
44 This reflects islanders’ longstanding mistrust of government officials as well as their assessment that more 
reported cases of shellfish poisoning would prolong the closure of local fisheries. 
Figure 21: A sign in Puerto Aguirre warns residents 
that unlike El Caleuche, red tide is not a myth 
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application of new technologies and practices, but red tides are disasters that pose an acute threat 
to human life and inspire biological citizenship claims.  In Puerto Aguirre, islanders recognized 
the unfolding red tide event, even as scientists scrambled to measure toxin levels along the coast 
and state officials and aquaculture operators sought to limit the industry’s losses.  It was only 
when the eventfulness of the conditions along the coast could no longer be denied—when the die 
offs at cultivation centers constituted a “massive mortality event” and protests in coastal 
communities disrupted transportation up and down the coast—that scientists and state officials 
began to discuss red tide.  
Scientists: Measuring the Bloom 
 Contamination of fish, whether due to HABs, the overapplication of antibiotics, or outbreaks 
of sea lice can not only cause massive mortality among high-value salmon but also damage the 
reputation of Chilean seafood around the world.  When The New York Times published an article 
detailing, among other things, the treatment of Chilean farmed salmon with antibiotics and the 
impact of large-scale salmon farming on coastal ecosystems in 2008, the first Bachelet 
Government pushed back aggressively to defend the industry, publishing responses in American 
newspapers and sending officials to meet with suppliers and reassure them about the quality of 
Chilean farmed fish (Latta and Aguayo 2012:170).   For officials at SERNAPESCA, the Ministry 
of Health, and IFOP, HABs are a national problem to be solved as quickly as possible.  This is 
reflected in how officials construct their own narratives about HABs, the protocols they follow 
during outbreaks, and above all, the communication between those monitoring and responding to 
the bloom and their bosses in the metropole.  HABs must be measured and, perhaps most 
crucially, mapped.  This is where IFOP enters the picture.  This institute—a public private 
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partnership, though in the case of Aysén, a state agency45—is tasked with measuring toxin levels 
in bivalves collected at regular intervals from various caletas (fishing grounds) throughout the 
region.   
 The office of IFOP’s regional director, Hernán Padilla, is adorned with a large map of the 
region with pushpins marking 87 sites along the coastline.  At 79 of these sites, Hernán 
explained, IFOP routinely tests toxin levels from banks of mollusks as well as water quality, 
while at the remaining 8 sites—farther from shore—they test only water quality.  This is part of a 
national program for monitoring the emergence of HABs, which Herán told me first occurred in 
1990.  This national program, however, has only been implemented in Chile’s three 
southernmost regions—not coincidentally where salmon aquaculture comprises a significant part 
of the coastal economy.  In the course of our conversation, Hernán repeatedly lamented the 
limited frequency with which he was able to send members of his laboratory to test sites, as well 
as the amount of time it took to run tests on the collected samples and report the results to area 
fishers, who he admitted, were most affected by any outbreak.  He also excitedly showed me an 
app on his smartphone which was being developed to help better communicate lab results to the 
wider public.  Fishers with the app could, in theory, select any of the 87 test sites offshore, and 
find out the most recent test results as well as when this test had been conducted.  Hernán was 
particularly excited about the color coding they had built into the app—red signified the greatest 
danger and a complete ban on harvesting, yellow signified caution, and green signified safe. 
                                                        
45 In true neoliberal fashion, IFOP is expected to cover some of its own operating expenses by providing contract 
work to the private sector, in particular industrial fishing and aquaculture operations.  In Aysén, however, 100% of 
the institute’s operating budget comes from the state, since state officials recognize its vital role helping to optimize 
the growth of aquaculture (and since state officials recognize that most of the aquaculture operators in the region 
either have their own, superior laboratories or contract with private labs to ensure the quality and safety of their 
products). 
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 Still, he told me, there was typically a two-month lag between when most of the samples 
were collected and when test results were made available, largely a function of how difficult it 
was to visit all of the organization’s designated sites.  Since IFOP does not own any boats, they 
typically enlist area fishers to transport them to and from test sites.46 This further complicates 
testing and often increases delays collecting samples and releasing test results to the wider public 
as fishers repeatedly reschedule visits either for personal reasons or due to inclement weather and 
dangerous seas (interview, Hernán Padilla, March 9, 2018).  
 IFOP’s approach to, and enactment of, harmful algal blooms is spatially and temporally 
punctuated.  Since they can only visit mandated test sites every two months, official data lags 
behind “true” conditions on the coast.  Moreover, while the sites they test are selected as 
“representative”—the site at Raul Marín Balmaceda, for instance, was chosen because this port 
has one of the highest freshwater inputs of any port in the region and therefore represents areas 
where there is a confluence of freshwater and seawater—they cannot possibly account for or 
represent the unique conditions found in every inlet and bay up and down the region’s coastline.  
Finally, these sites are ranked according to the “exploitable biomass”—a measure determined by 
estimating the size of the bank of mollusks available to be harvested within the testing area—and 
there is very little variation year to year, meaning that they are fixed points monitored due to 
their potential economic value. 
 This slippage between environmental and economic concerns is common in the parlance of 
state officials, not only at IFOP but also among those at SERNAPESCA who are tasked with 
                                                        
46 This, like the income IFOP is supposed to generate by providing services to industrial fishing and aquaculture 
firms, is a feature, not a bug, of Chile’s neoliberal approach to governance.  The idea is that providing contract work 
to the private sector—in this case renting boats—operations are more efficient (fishers are experts in navigation 
while IFOP staff are mostly trained marine biologists who, the thinking goes, are less proficient in operating boats, 
etc.) and beneficial to the local economy.  The reality, as Hernán’s frustration over the difficulty of getting to and 
from test sites makes clear, is anything but efficient.  
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ensuring the sustainable development of the aquaculture sector.  Their mandate to deliver mejora 
continua (continuous improvement) necessitates quantifiable results—ideally evidence of 
increasing productivity and decreasing losses—and so for state officials, the units of 
measurement, whether during normal operations or in moments of crisis, are nearly always tons 
of fish and US Dollars. 
State Officials and Aquaculture Managers: Calculating and Mitigating Losses 
 I was in the car with Juan coming back from the Fiesta de Pesca’o Frito (Festival of Fried 
Fish) in Puerto Cisnes—a “traditional” event47 sponsored by Chilean aquaculture firms operating 
in the region—when the enactment of the unfolding harmful algal bloom changed dramatically, 
this time because of corporate interests.  As recently as January 13, Juan had told me that while 
there was an algal bloom that had effected Puerto Aguirre, three hours offshore, it had yet to 
affect salmon stocks at local cultivation centers and “the Ministry of Health’s decision to close 
mollusk fisheries across the region was probably just a precaution” undertaken to make up for 
past failures on the part of the government to respond adequately to disasters.    
 Now we were in the midst of one of our freewheeling conversations about differences 
between the United States and Chile, one of Juan’s favorite topics, when he cut me off to take a 
phone call. 
“Hola Juan?”  A voice crackled on the other end of the line. 
“Hello, with whom am I speaking?”  Juan asked politely.   
“It’s Claudio,” the voice responded. 
“Ah, hello Claudio, how are you?” Juan asked.  Claudio is the regional director for a 
Japanese-owned aquaculture company operating in Los Lagos and Aysén.  He began to detail the 
                                                        
47 While it is based on the Chilote mingas (community work parties) that have been a part of life on the Chiloé 
archipelago for hundreds of years, the festival in Puerto Cisnes was inaugurated less than a decade ago. 
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grim situation at his company’s cultivation centers for Juan, who listened intently, as did I.  They 
had dead fish in fourteen different cages across two centers, one in Canal Darwin and another off 
Isla Matilda, farther to the north.  Moreover, several fishermen had reported catches containing 
dead merluza.  The bloom, which up to this point had only affected shellfish, now seemed to be 
spreading and affecting pelagic species. 
Juan and Claudio began to talk through some calculations.  Dead fish in fourteen cages at 
two cultivation centers, each containing at least two tons of biomass, meant that the situation 
required the activation of the official “contingency plan” since 15,000 kilos of dead fish is 
classified as a “massive mortality event” by SERNAPESCA.  After some discussion, the two 
men agreed that there were likely 20,000 kilos of dead fish at that moment. Claudio repeatedly 
pushed for a lower number, but Juan was polite but firm, repeatedly explaining the math behind 
his calculations before asking more questions.   
“And will you transfer the dead fish to Puerto Montt for disposal?” Juan’s questions came 
quickly, “and can you move the living fish to other cages?  Is there space?” 
“I don’t know yet,” Claudio answered, “I haven’t been to the centers [where there have been 
die-offs] yet.” 
“Okay Claudio,” Juan began to detail next steps, “I will need you to email me all of this 
information so that it is written down and official.  I will be back in the office this afternoon.”  It 
was Sunday, but this new information required immediate attention, so he would go into the 
SERNAPESCA office in Puerto Aysén as soon as we got back. 
Claudio promised to send the information to Juan and they signed off. 
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After we rode in silence for several minutes, I began to ask questions about the call and about 
next steps.  Juan was stressed now, driving faster and no longer commenting on the scenery in 
the beautiful Mañihuales valley.   
He explained that the salmoneras are obligated to report any kind of die-off in their pens to 
SERNAPESCA within 24 hours and that this has to be in the form of a formal report.  He then 
added, as if to himself, “and this guy can call me as many times as he wants, but it doesn’t mean 
anything until I have the report.”   
We rode in silence for a few more minutes before Juan offered, “20,000 isn’t so bad… the 
problem is more that the last time they activated the plan they estimated 140,000 and it turned 
out that it was more like 360,000.  They always estimate really low.” 
“So this could be much worse?” I clarified. 
“Yeah, but we won’t know for a couple of days.”  Juan said, “they won’t even get rid of the 
fish today.  That’s part of the problem.  It’s like if you were locked in a room and you knew you 
only had oxygen for twenty days, and so you breathed the minimum amount.  You could live.  
But no matter what, after 20 days, you die.  In nature, the [living] fish would swim away [from 
the dead ones] but in the cages they can’t go anywhere.” 
More silence. 
“It’s because there’s been all this rain, and no wind.”  Juan said as the mountains around 
Puerto Aysén came into view, ringed by low clouds.  “Rain is good, usually.  But without wind, 
the rain, which naturally carries nutrients from the hills into the fjords, is very bad.  The nutrients 
feed the algae and things get worse.  You need wind so that the water moves in large quantities 
and this hasn’t happened.” 
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Juan has been in the region long enough that he has an excellent understanding of how the 
weather impacts the aquaculture industry and the overall health of the fish at the various 
cultivation centers along the coast.  Still, his last comment is instructive.  The aquaculture sector 
has been successful in Chile, in the words of its executives, politicians, and even local workers, 
because the fish are “perfectly adapted to the conditions in the country’s Far South.”  There are 
abundant rivers and streams that cascade down the mountains of the submarine cordillera, 
mixing clear, fresh water into estuaries and fjords where the fish are penned for most of their 
lifecycle. 
What this does not take into account is that conditions in the Far South are in a constant state 
of change and these changes have only become more extreme with rising ocean temperatures in 
the South Pacific.  Rain without wind may not be common, but it happens just as surely as fog 
envelopes the islands or storms blow the fishing fleet off course and shut down ferry service—
and it is happening more frequently. 
The conversation between Claudio and Juan—a manager working for a multinational 
operation worth millions of dollars and a government official tasked with regulating that 
operation—opens a window on the priorities of both men and the extent to which the relationship 
between capital and the state is dialectical.  The harmful algal bloom is enacted by both men 
slightly differently, but they collaborate in fundamental ways once there has been an outbreak. 
First, both enact the harmful algal bloom as something that is punctuated.  State projects 
along frontiers rely on territorialization, perhaps none more so than the development of 
aquaculture.  As discussed in my earlier chapter on aquaculture production and risk management, 
the coast of Patagonia has been divided into macrozones, barrios, and concessions to improve 
sanitation and encourage “corporate responsibility” (Iizuka 2016:144; Barton and Fløysand 
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2010).  Identifying centers that have been impacted and distinguishing them from centers that 
have not effectively re-orders a harmful algal bloom, changing it from an organic, flexible and 
all-encompassing phenomenon—in other words, an assemblage whose dynamics are fluid—into 
something punctuated, and (at least momentarily) fixed.  In this sense, blooms become visible to 
state officials in a manner that mirrors the industry with which they are concerned: the 
outbreak’s impact on individual, anchored cultivation centers within designated barrios.  Even 
IFOP, which theoretically provides objective monitoring of sites along the coast throughout the 
year, relies on fixed testing sites that are the same year-in and year-out.  Mapping the extent of 
the harmful algae’s impact therefore, means following the imaginary lines between these sites 
rather than the areas around them, effectively overlooking the movement of both human and 
non-human actors across and through a fundamentally fluid space. 
Second, Juan’s assertion that the near constant rain along the coast “naturally” carries 
nutrients down the steep hillsides of the fjords and into the marine environment echoes the 
narrative promoted by aquaculture operators, that eutrophication is a natural phenomenon for 
which they cannot be held responsible (Kirsch 2014).  By naturalizing their impact on the marine 
ecosystem—the mountains of fish meal and feces on the sea floor below their cultivation 
centers—aquaculture firms continue to claim that they engage in “sustainable practices.”  Since 
SERNAPESCA’s mandate is not only to regulate but also to help facilitate the development of 
aquaculture, the narratives promoted by capitalist firms and state agents are similar if not 
identical.  Moreover, even Juan’s invocation of the unusual lack of wind is part of a larger 
discourse, common among aquaculture operators and state agents alike, that blames global 
changes in climate for the industry’s periodic crises—from rising ocean temperatures that cause 
 138 
more severe and long-lasting red tides to severe storms that batter cultivation centers and cause 
cages to break and fish to escape. 
Finally, Juan and Claudio’s conversation about the impact of the harmful algal bloom points 
to another overlap in the discourse among aquaculture operators and the state agents tasked with 
regulating their industry: describing incidents along the coast in terms of profits and losses.  
Since “every gram of salmon flesh that is added to each fish during the production cycle adds to 
profit,” (Lien 2015:77) fish are referred to by weight rather than number.  Massive mortality 
events are determined by the tonnage lost, not by the number of dead fish.  As Marienne Lien has 
observed, tons are an economic unit and make salmon legible “as biomass” in multiple markets, 
at multiple scales and to multiple actors within the supply chain (Lien 2015:102). For Juan, 
harmful algal blooms cause the loss of tons that could otherwise be sold, powering the national 
economy, demonstrating the sustained growth of the sector, and most importantly, showing that 
the centers he is tasked with regulating are doing things “the right way.”  For Claudio, things are 
simpler: harmful algal blooms cause the loss of tons that could otherwise be sold and therefore 
undermine the profitability of his company’s operations across the region.  
Claudio’s efforts to downplay the severity of the “mass mortality” at the two centers in 
question are therefore calculated—a reaction to the losses that he knows his company has already 
incurred.  He is the beneficiary of the extent to which his industry, rather than state officials, 
scientists, or local fishers, controls the flow of information from offshore sites to offices on the 
mainland.  By foregrounding the extent to which a certain quantity of nutrients entering the 
region’s fjords is “natural,” Juan is helping the industry in its assertion that highly variable 
conditions on the coast impact aquaculture operations, not the other way around.  Moreover, as 
their conversation makes clear, he is hamstrung by his reliance on corporate actors like Claudio 
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to report their losses and the extent of the phenomena that cause them.  As noted earlier, 
SERNAPESCA does not own a single boat—a manifestation of Chile’s dogged adherence to the 
neoliberal orthodoxy that public-private partnerships are more efficient and cost-effective than 
state spending and public ownership—and therefore the agency relies on the industry to transport 
its employees to offshore cultivation centers where they conduct their inspections.  No one will 
be dispatched to Claudio’s center—fixed sites where the presence of harmful algae has been 
documented—for several days during which the decision making about how best to respond to 
the die-off of tens of thousands of fish will be entirely up to their “owners,” regardless of the fact 
that at sea the side effects of this kind of mass mortality event move well beyond the boundaries 
of porous salmon cages.  Juan cannot even trigger the protocols, newly developed, for dealing 
with this kind of event until his office receives a formal report of the extent of the die-off, in 
writing.  Even when this happens, the meetings at SERNAPESCA will highlight the extent to 
which the state, following rather than leading the forces of capital, will articulate the event—for 
now there is no denying the “eventfulness” of the bloom given its impact on the aquaculture 
industry—in economic terms. 
An article from the Chilean industry website Aqua.cl based on information provided by 
SERNAPESCA and published on February 13, 2018—a week after the phone call between 
Claudio and Juan—highlights the economic terms in which red tide is calculated and measured 
among those regulating and working in the aquaculture sector: 
The presence of the first microalgae (Alexandrium catenella) has been detected in 30 
cultivation centers throughout the region since January 13.  This event has caused the 
death of 140 tons of salmonoids.   The presence of the second microalgae (Karenia 
mikimotoi) has cost the industry 3,000 tons in losses, valued at $15.5 million USD.  
Invermar [a Chilean salmonera] alone notified authorities yesterday that they had lost 
1,600 tons, with a value equivalent to roughly $8.25 million USD. 
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 This attention to the financial costs generated by the presence of toxic dinoflagellates should 
by now be expected.  State officials and aquaculture operators alike experience a harmful algal 
bloom as a disruption that can be overcome and, eventually, a risk that can be managed.  Losses 
are a fact of life in the aquaculture business, and routine losses incurred by die-offs are offset by 
the scale of production.  These are therefore “quasi-events”—ordinary incidents that are nothing 
more than the “cost of doing business.”  Aggregating the “massive mortality event” of February 
2018 in the same terms that are used for these losses—kilos, tons, number of cages affected, 
etc.—managers and state officials strained, but ultimately failed, to deny the eventfulness of the 
2017-2018 bloom. 
Fishing Families: Incalculable Danger 
 Those living in remote coastal communities do not measure their livelihoods in tons or in 
dollars, nor do they understand their watery landscape as a series of bounded territories marked 
with dotted lines.  Under normal circumstances, this means they are consigned to another 
category of actor by state officials, a category that Elizabeth Povinelli pithily refers to as 
“impractical and disagreeable” (Povinelli 2011:78).  This helps justify their exclusion from 
lucrative jobs in the aquaculture sector.   
 Coastal residents, however, understand the frontier as an unbounded, multifunctional 
landscape.  In the Islas Huichas, islanders have historically sustained themselves pursuing 
multiple marine resources.  Until the red tides made this impossible, they were able to “endure 
the material conditions that compose their limbo” (ibid) through the social project of 
colonization, strategically provisioning themselves and their communities through the flexible 
exploitation of different native species within Aysén’s coastal ecosystem. This is a distinct, 
social project incommensurate to that of the capitalists, who seek to maximize the production of 
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a single resource destined for export—salmon—and therefore to maximize their profits in stark, 
financial terms.   
 For area fishers, the red tides first came to Aysén around 1990.  More used to maritime 
temporalities in which the cycle of seasons and particularly vicious storms are more important 
than the date on the calendar, most of the older generation in Puerto Aguirre cannot pinpoint the 
exact year they became aware of these new and dangerous phenomena.  Nearly everyone agrees, 
however, that before the early 1990s, red tides were unknown in Aysén. 
 When the red tides began, their impact was not initially economic but personal, and it was 
traumatic.  José Nahualquín, who fishes between Puerto Aysén and Laguna San Rafael at the 
bottom of the region, described how he became sick for the first time, and how he didn’t know 
what was wrong at first because he had never before fallen ill like this. 
 “I have been here [Puerto 
Aysén] fourteen years and before 
this I spent three years fishing out 
of Aguirre… and my cousin who 
has been fishing for twenty years, 
he also says that when he started 
everything was clear…. No one 
ever got sick.  And I remember I 
was out with my wife and we had 
been collecting choritos zapatos (mussels),48 and she said ‘I’ll make pancakes’ in butter, with 
                                                        
48 A side effect of the fact that the coast of Patagonia has been sparsely populated by humans for most of its history 
is that marine bivalves are often enormous and choritos zapatos are called this because their shells can frequently be 
the size of the bottom of a woman’s shoe. 
Figure 22: José describes getting sick from contaminated mariscos 
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onion, you know… and she got sick first.  She was so sick she was on the floor.  And I radioed 
on the VHF to my cousin, because I could feel it too.  I had no strength.” 
 He squeezed his arm and showed me his hand shaking, before he continued, “I had no 
strength to do anything.  And I think it was milk that saved me.  I took a little milk with salt and 
later it made me better.  That was before the salmoneras.  Before that we didn’t know.” 
 Isabel—who with her husband Luís runs the boarding house in Puerto Aguirre—lost a son to 
the toxins in 1998.  Standing over the new wood-burning stove that had just been installed in the 
kitchen, she told me that she remembered the year so precisely because he was two years old 
when he died, and he was born in 1996. 
 “I remember also,” she said, “this year the water was so warm.  Normally, you know, in the 
summer even on hot days you put your hand in the water and it’s freezing, but in this year, the 
water was tibia (lukewarm) and it was so strange.  And I remember we were cooking mariscos 
(mollusks), all of us together and he was playing on the floor… but he asked for one.  I 
remember that he asked for one, because a child this small, it’s strange, but he grew up by the sea 
and we were eating them so we gave him one, and he ate half of it and then we put what he 
didn’t eat back on the grill. 
 “And he was on the floor and my daughter said that we should move him, but he always 
played on the floor and I told her that he was comfortable there so it was fine.  But then a few 
minutes later I realized that he wasn’t moving, and I picked him up and he was like a doll.” 
 His arm was like this,” she paused and let her arm swing loosely in the socket before 
continuing, “and so… I remember his father running to get help, and I took him in my arms and 
ran to the post [the medical post on the island].  And he was paralyzed, but I remember we took 
him, and he reached up—he was so weak—and touched his lips because I am sure he couldn’t 
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feel them.  He reached up so lightly and touched them.  I remember this, and that he asked me 
for water.  But when we got to the clinic there was nothing, there were no paramedics at that 
time, there wasn’t even any oxygen, and this is why he died.  Later they told me that he was dead 
before we got to the clinic but that wasn’t true, because I remember him looking at me on the bed 
there and then closing his eyes.” 
  She paused again and looked out the window, as if to collect herself, though her manner was 
more resigned than bereaved.  She continued, “and after this, from when my son died, actually, I 
couldn’t eat mariscos for five years.  It wasn’t that they were bad, I used to love them, but I 
would taste something and I would feel my mouth go to sleep, like I couldn’t feel it.  And this 
was all in my mind, it was psychological, but for five years it was like this.  Because it only takes 
one.  And that night I remember we threw the mariscos outside after he was sick and the cats and 
dogs ate them and not one of them fell because they [the leftover mariscos] weren’t bad.  But the 
one that he [her son] ate was.  It was like it was fate.  And this year [2018], when they were 
bringing in choros I remember I told Luis, after I tasted one and it was bad, I told him ‘throw 
them all away.’ And he did.”  
 She concluded, crossing her arms, “and that was when people started getting sick.” 
 Fishing families do not calculate the kind of loss that Isabel described to me.  A death in the 
family—particularly the death of a child—can never be “routine” or “acceptable.”  Moreover, 
the eventfulness of death does not need to be established.  This event, which impacted Isabel to 
such an extent that she experienced physical paralysis when eating mariscos for years after, 
began the moment she realized her son was in grave danger.  Moreover, it began with an intimate 
act—collecting and eating mariscos normally sustains, rather than threatens, life—and forever 
shattered the sense of safety provided by the family hearth.  
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 In contemporary biopolitical states, the people have an expectation that the state will care for 
them as biological citizens (Foucault 1990).  In Chile, this expectation only emerged after the 
return to democracy, but it was underwritten by the introduction of a host of social programs 
designed to improve the wellbeing of its most vulnerable citizens.  In Aysén, state officials are 
expected to facilitate economic growth—in particular the growth of the aquaculture sector—and 
to improve (or at least protect) the lives of rural people.  This is how, as Foucault asserted, 
population becomes “an object in the hands of the government” and providing programs, 
technologies, and policies ostensibly in the interest of the population becomes the stated 
objective of officials and technocrats (Foucault 2006:140).  For this kind of governance to 
remain uncontested the interest of individuals and the interest of the population must be 
considered one and the same. 
 This is impossible when death—not simply financial loss—is on the line.  Death exposes a 
rift between interest aggregated at the level of the population and the interest of individuals, for 
whom death can only be personal and unique.  Yet for families who have been poisoned in the 
most literal sense and who have seen death result from something as intimate as eating 
something with which they have provisioned their tables for generations, there is a lack of 
recognition.  The same aggregating practices that ensure that the impacts of harmful algal 
blooms are measured in losses of “biomass” rather than fish make individuals poisoned by red 
tide invisible to the forces of capital that threaten to envelop them as well as invisible to state 
officials—officials tasked with protecting their physical wellbeing as surely as they are tasked 
with protecting an industry deemed vital to the economic wellbeing of the state.   
 “If the aquaculture industry left tomorrow,” Juan once told me with confidence, “it wouldn’t 
make any difference in the life of the people here.”  
 145 
 In a sense, he was right.  Most people living along the coast did not sustain themselves with 
wages paid directly by the aquaculture sector.  But other than in these narrowly defined 
economic terms, he could not have been more wrong. 
Environmentalists: Defending “Pure” Nature 
Those most concerned with the industry leaving “tomorrow”—and actively advocating it—
are a handful of local environmentalists.  While the massive die-offs caused by the 2016 red tide 
incident that closed fisheries around Chiloé received international attention, with representatives 
from Greenpeace protesting Michelle Bachelet on her trip to the United Kingdom and The 
Guardian reporting breathlessly about the protests up and down the archipelago, the 2018 red 
tide in Aysén garnered relatively little attention outside of Chile.  The remoteness of the coastline 
and the political power of aquaculture firms, themselves in the middle of negotiating two major 
mergers during this time, made it hard for those impacted to gain recognition.  Peter Hartmann, a 
retired architect from central Chile who now lives in Coyhaique and advocates for a number of 
environmental causes,49 used his weekly editorial in the local newspaper El Divisadero to lay 
blame for the red tide outbreak squarely at the feet of the salmoneras, and to sharply criticize 
SERNAPESCA for being complicit: 
While the salmon producers pretend that nothing is happening, it turns out that 
SERNAPESCA has been in a state of emergency since January, and, they assure us, 
they are finally publishing the mortality levels reported by the companies.  Little by 
little we have learned that these [mortality levels] are quite high.  There are also 
questions about what happens with the dead fish (and whether or not to believe the 
companies).  SERNAPESCA says that they have been processed or have been 
disposed of in landfills, but there are those who estimate that there is no capacity for 
so much and we learned in a meeting between salmon producers and the regional 
                                                        
49 Hartmann was a key figure in the local struggle to derail the HidroAysén project and a member of the 
international coalition formed during this struggle, Patagonia Sin Represas. 
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government (on February 5, 2018) that they agreed dumping the fish into the sea was 
a possibility. (Hartmann 2018). 
But Hartmann’s approach echoed that of other environmentalists who seem “more worried 
about pumas than people,” to use a derisive turn of phrase common among locals living in 
Patagonia.  He pointed to SERNAPESCA’s February 8 invocation of External Resolution 
N˚475/2018, which required well-boats transporting salmon from Aysén to the factories at 
Quellón to change the water in the tanks carrying live salmon within a designated “polygon” in 
the Gulf of Corcovado, between the southern end of the Los Lagos Region and Aysén.  The 
reason for this resolution is that this deep water area is far from sites where benthic species are 
collected by area fishers, and water released from potentially contaminated salmon is less likely 
to impact mussels, clams, and other bivalves—yet another spatial fix based on economic 
priorities.  Hartmann was, in his editorial at least, incensed that SERNAPESCA would invoke 
this resolution when the Ministry of the Economy had already declared a state of emergency for 
the Aysén region, requiring that no aquatic species could be brought in or out with the notable 
exception of farmed salmon.  Furthermore, the Gulf of Corcovado is a well-known feeding 
ground for the Blue Whale, which Hartmann argued could be threatened by the release of 
contaminated water from the well-boats trafficking the sea-lanes between Aysén and Quellón. 
Hartmann and others practice a kind of environmentalism that owes a debt to John Muir and 
other early romantic wilderness advocates—those early 20th Century conservationists who 
sought to preserve the tracts of undeveloped land that they saw as the last vestiges of an ancient 
and natural world in which humans were strange newcomers (Purdy 2015:24).  I first became 
aware of Hartmann and his ideas regarding conservation when he raised his hand during a public 
meeting of coastal stakeholders—the Navy, research scientists from the Universidad Austral, and 
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officials from SERNAPESCA, among others50—regarding the implementation of marine 
management areas.  Hartmann complained that the proposed plan for these areas was “very 
anthropocentric.”   The exasperated scientist fielding questions shot back that since he had been 
talking about a management area that would be administered by human beings, “of course this is 
going to be anthropogenic!” 
Hartmann’s preference is for “pure nature”—the kind of wilderness that has been privileged 
in Patagonia by North American and European environmentalists who see the region as a last 
redoubt of pristine landscapes unaffected by humans.  The fact that salmon aquaculture is 
modifying the coastline, generating billions of dollars of revenue from an invasive species that 
has permanently changed local ecologies, means that they are a particularly good target for 
criticism.  And he is not incorrect about their impact on the landscape.  The mountains of fish 
meal and feces that build up below cultivation centers provide rich nutrients that feed the 
dinoflagellates that proliferate exponentially and toxify the water column.  But his polemic style 
may be doing more harm than good: he, and others like him, gloss over the fact that rising ocean 
temperatures in the Pacific—generated by increased CO2 in the atmosphere very little of which 
comes from Chile—are also a factor.  Likewise, it is very easy for Hartmann’s critics to observe 
that algal blooms occurred naturally for millennia—naturalizing the impact of the aquaculture 
industry (Kirsch 2014:138-140)—even if they appear to be growing more severe in their impact 
and duration. 
Moreover, Hartmann has something in common with the aquaculture operators he criticizes: 
he, like other environmentalists for whom Patagonia is an object of concern, erase its long term 
residents just as surely as the aquaculture firms who see the coast as an empty space open for 
                                                        
50 Though it is worth noting that there was not a single local fisher present. 
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capitalist exploitation.  For both groups, rural people are invisible.  Ironically, international 
environmentalists’ image of Patagonia as a space of “pure wilderness” prevents them from 
forming alliances with islanders most impacted by the growth of salmon aquaculture. 
Conservation, like colonization, regulation, and production, is a social project that requires 
disaggregating aspects of social worlds and aggregating individual projects “into a more or less 
whole—a definable and describable thing” (Povinelli 2011:8).  For Hartmann this “describable 
thing” is the abuse of Nature by the aquaculture firms aided and abetted by a government that 
fails to care about biodiversity and native species—in particular the Blue Whale.   Local people 
simply do not factor in. 
Conclusions 
Red tides force the state to respond to its citizens because they are disasters whose 
eventfulness cannot be denied.  They represent an acute threat that is not measured in financial 
losses but in human lives.  Unlike the contamination of the fjords and channels of coastal 
Patagonia with fish meal, feces, antibiotics, toxic dinoflagellates, and dead fish—in bland 
economic parlance, the externalization of the costs of aquaculture—red tides “seem to 
necessitate ethical reflection and political and civic engagement” (Povinelli 2011:13-14).  These 
events emerge from the interactions of a host of human and non-human actors, both highly 
visible and practically invisible.  Moreover, red tides represent crises that call forth the state 
(Parenti 2016:166) as officials declare states of emergency to address social and physical—rather 
than financial—harm.  Red tides reveal the extent to which modern capital depends on the state 
to create the conditions necessary for production and accumulation, and provoke those living in 
remote coastal communities to issue biological citizenship claims. 
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But even harmful algal blooms reveal how an aquaculture industry built on fixed spatial 
boundaries—salmon aquaculture—is more precarious than older sectors of the local economy 
that require mobility and flexibility among those involved.  “Farming the sea” draws on older 
practices of land tenure and enclosure well suited to ordering the terrestrial landscape, but it is 
inadequate in fluid spaces.  Furthermore, salmon is a monoculture, and the cultivation centers 
along the Patagonian coastline must be thought of as 21st Century plantations: sites for producing 
sameness in the name of economic value (Tsing 2015).  As such they are vulnerable to plantation 
diseases (Soluri 2011), from ISA and sea lice outbreaks to the algal blooms that suffocate 
millions of fish, further contaminating the water column.   
In contrast, local strategies for shifting livelihoods in accordance with the season are more 
durable and less precarious. When they cannot collect clams, mussels, and other bivalves, 
residents of remote coastal communities cut firewood from nearby uninhabited islands or dive 
for urchins that command high prices in Asia and are likewise unaffected by brevetoxins. 
Harmful algal blooms are socio-natural assemblages comprised of different actors with 
varying degrees of agency in their emergence and sustained impacts.  Fish meal and feces 
provide an influx of nutrients for toxic dinoflagellates which proliferate in the water column.  
Scientists measure the presence of these dinoflagellates at test sites, identifying the bloom and 
mapping its spatial and temporal extent.  State officials and aquaculture operators work to 
mitigate losses and protect profits.  When local people become sick or die, however, harmful 
algal blooms transform into red tides. 
Harmful algal blooms are assemblages, but red tides are disasters—events in which 
hegemonic visions of development are contested from below.  During these events, outraged 
fishers turn to local leaders who put pressure on state bureaucrats and demand compensation for 
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lost livelihoods as well as the suffering endured by their neighbors, whether or not they fish.  
This final step—the negotiations between government bureaucrats and community leaders—
points to another way in which red tides, and the way they are enacted within the varied social 
projects of distinct actors, re-order social life on the Chilean frontier.  While they personally 
devastate individual families and prove incredibly costly for aquaculture firms when massive 
mortality events occur at multiple cultivation centers, red tides can be made, at a community 
level, lucrative under the right conditions.   
At a collective level—particularly among “paper fishers” who sell their fishing quotas to 
industrial firms rather than putting to sea themselves—red tides provide an opportunity for 
remuneration in the form of direct cash transfers.  Buyouts for those affected—or more 
accurately those who qualify as “active fishers” because their registration in the SERNAPESCA 
database is up to date—inject cash into communities where it is sorely needed.  These direct cash 
transfers enable those who receive them to perform distributive labor.  However, because the 
development discourses of the Chilean state depend on the creation of a modern, disciplined 
workforce, state officials are wary of anything that could be perceived as a “handout” or “gift,” 
receiving compensation requires a carefully calculated performance and complex coordination 
among those demanding payment. 
First, community members have to assert their status as victims, both of the conditions that 
have made their livelihood impossible—the toxins that have built up in the species they would 
collect to sell and eat—and of indifferent or incompetent government officials more concerned 
with protecting the aquaculture industry than keeping them safe.  These biological citizenship 
claims, however, require that they be visible to the state.  They must be registered with 
SERNAPESCA and also contact their elected representatives, demonstrating outside of 
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municipal buildings, and blockading bridges and roads.  If government officials are more 
concerned with the aquaculture sector, those demonstrating for compensation are well aware that 
they must disrupt this sector to gain attention for their cause. 
Finally, they must keep pressure on government officials.  Many of those living on the 
frontier have had limited contact with state bureaucracy, either because they actively avoid it or 
because the state is not powerful or vertically encompassing enough in far flung island 
communities, for them to engage with it frequently.  This means that they do not always grasp 
the process in which money is allocated and delivered through a series of agencies and offices 
and therefore is always slow to arrive.  They do, however, know that the process takes time and 
they have to be patient and not waver in the face of officials who appear to be dragging their feet.  




CHAPTER 5. FISHERS WHO DON’T FISH: REDISTRIBUTION AND COMMUNITY 
IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
 
 
The Battle of Puerto Aguirre 
On March 7, 2018, the normally 
quiet island community at Puerto 
Aguirre exploded into chaos. Fishers 
had seized the Jord, a 650-ton cargo 
vessel delivering fish meal to nearby 
salmon farms in order to force state 
officials to come through with 
promised financial compensation for 
the community. At issue was the 
basis for claiming this 
compensation—gaining a share of 
public funds that would make up for 
the closure of regional fisheries due 
to a toxic red tide.  After negotiations 
between islanders and state officials 
stalled, and with his bosses in 
Santiago concerned about their 
Figure 23: Fishers surround the Jord, March 3, 2018 
Figure 24: Chart from the Jord showing the Aysén Fjord and 
salmon farms 
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mounting losses, the captain of the cargo ship used  the early morning flood tide to escape the 
pier at Puerto Aguirre.  Watchful fishermen attempted to storm the ship, and when they were 
prevented from boarding by the port’s small retinue of sailors from the Chilean navy, they hurled 
stones at the ship’s bridge, the sailors, and eventually the offices of the Navy itself.  The sailors 
responded with tear gas and the fishers retreated to the far side of the narrow street leading to the 
municipal pier.  
I stood on the side of the fishers that morning and could hear Francisco ‘Pancho’ Diaz, de 
facto spokesman for the fishers, explaining the situation to someone from the local media on his 
mobile phone: “and now they’re saying that they don’t have any money, not 50 pesos, to give to 
forty, twenty-five, five… not even one more fisherman in the whole region!”  He yelled, “and 
this morning, you can see from the video we took, we tried to approach the vessel and the sailors, 
they attacked us and started everything… you can see it clearly!”  
Pancho’s head was bleeding—he 
had been hit by a rock in the 
crossfire—yet he was determined to 
remain in control of the volatile 
situation.  He had spent the previous 
week meeting with the heads of other 
fishing syndicates from Puerto Aguirre 
and nearby Caleta Andrade.  They had 
made multiple phone calls to the 
regional intendent on the mainland making the case that more islanders deserved compensation, 
but these had been fruitless.  They had planned to seize the ferry, a lifeline for communities up 
Figure 25: Pancho on the phone during the standoff, March 7, 2018 
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and down this remote coastline, but when it was re-routed they were forced to improvise.  They 
seized the Jord instead and erected barricades, blocking access to the port.  
But Pancho and the heads of the other syndicates on the island qualified for, and were 
already scheduled to receive, public funds.  They were duly registered in the government 
database as “active” fishers, meaning that cash would be deposited directly into their bank 
accounts at the end of the month.  These “paper fishers,” officially registered artisanal fishers 
who sell their quotas to industrial firms instead of fishing themselves, were therefore taking 
action on behalf of neighbors who would be “left out” if they were unable to convince public 
officials to distribute public funds more widely.  They were, in effect, challenging the hegemony 
of the state to determine both the impact of the red tide event and who could make claims in its 
aftermath in order to secure a distributive outcome that would benefit the community as a whole.   
This confrontation in Puerto Aguirre over the distribution of public funds and others like it 
reveal how the capitalist production of commodities along contemporary resource frontiers 
increasingly requires state interventions in the form of social programs and income payments as 
well as the importance of these programs to rural people.  Though the world is more reliant on 
fish and marine resources than it has ever been, fishers are becoming another “surplus” rural 
population due to the combination of corporate aquaculture supported by state planners, new 
laws intended to prevent fisheries collapse, and warming seas contaminated with industrial 
waste.  However, by successfully negotiating for financial compensation during environmental 
crises, these rural people, deemed to have “limited relevance” to capital (Li 2010:67; Sassen 
2010), can not only augment their earnings—often mitigating the impact of capitalist 
contamination on their households—but also establish themselves as community leaders by 
providing for family, friends, and neighbors who are unable to win compensation for themselves. 
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James Ferguson has labeled the kind of work undertaken by men like Pancho “distributive 
labor,” describing how “those who are able to access resources as dependents of the state are 
themselves a source of income for others we might term ‘sub-dependents’” (Ferguson 
2015:104).  By selling quotas, accessing public funds, and winning compensation from the state 
during moments of crisis, fishers like Pancho distribute cash through community networks, 
reshaping them in the process.  These “pescadores de papel” (“paper fishers”)—a pejorative 
label applied to fishers who spend most of their time in port yet maintain an “active” status in the 
state database—are vital actors who help sustain their community when new economic sectors 
fail to provide employment and traditional sectors are suddenly off limits.   
Yet in the course of my research, I found distribution across social networks to be dynamic, 
undermining fixed categories of “dependents” and “sub-dependents.”  Moreover, as political 
economists since Marx have recognized, labor is an abstraction created for the sake of 
measurement and control (Guyer 2018:191; Marx 1978:336-342).  Labor is alienated, but 
distribution remains embedded in community relations even when the funds being distributed 
come from the state.  “Distributive labor,” therefore, signals not a particular type of work but 
rather an emerging domain of the political economy.   
Paper fishers, intermediaries skilled at navigating bureaucracy, create and capture assets, 
transforming fishing quotas into assets that can be bundled, traded, or sold.  They then re-
socialize these assets, asserting that they belong to their communities based on their collective 
dependence on the sea and negotiating with state officials in order to expand the number of 
claimants and increase the public funds available.  This, in turn, elevates their own status—
provided they can successfully access and manage the movement of cash and capital—and 
establishes them as community leaders who can provide for vulnerable friends and neighbors. 
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 Paper fishers’ familiarity with the bureaucratic procedures necessary to maintain and sell 
fishing quotas helps explain their sophisticated interactions with the state apparatus, yet they 
must also skillfully navigate complex community politics to avoid charges of cronyism or self-
interest.  The ability of men like Pancho to become leaders, despite tension with fishers who still 
put to sea, is therefore highly contingent and comes with numerous responsibilities.  The failure 
to deliver cash, particularly in moments of crisis, can quickly undermine all claims to authority 
within the community.  Thus, paper fishers’ work not only includes using bureaucratic skills to 
secure public funds but also overseeing the redistribution of private funds and resources when 
the state fails to deliver.  They must, in other words, be willing give up some of their own 
earnings to those who have none and be able to convince others to do the same. 
Who counts as a fisher? 
Aguas Muertas (Dead Waters) is all that is left of the port of Puerto Aysén on the mainland.  
Here, just north of town, an industrial cement pier beneath a bridge provides dock space for a 
dozen larger fishing boats—mostly 
wooden but some steel—that work 
transporting goods to nearby 
salmon farms or to island 
communities like Puerto Aguirre.  
Only a few of the boats that tie up 
at this spot, where muddy water 
rises and falls with the tide, are 
still used for fishing.  Figure 26: Boats docked at Aguas Muertas, Puerto Aysén 
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One of those boats is the José Francisco, which belongs to the Nahualquín family.  Its 
patriarch, Don José, has been fishing for over three decades.  We spoke in the galley of the José 
Francisco while he took a break from building new housing to cover the boat’s aft 
companionway on a rare sunny afternoon.  The galley was covered in boxes and tools and 
smelled like varnish, paint, and diesel fuel—a combination of odors familiar to anyone with 
experience on working boats.  I asked Don José how it was that so few of the “fishing” boats tied 
up at Aguas Muertas were used to fish. 
 “It’s a long story,” the short, barrel-chested fisherman began, “but it goes back to the merluza 
(hake) boom [in the late 1980s].  During this time, everyone went to fish.  Everyone!  So they 
opened a register, which they hadn’t really had before under law N° 244.  So they created an 
alternative: Code 900.  Under this code, all those new fishermen who were going after the 
merluza were registered.  But they only knew merluza and when the boom diminished and the 
prices went down, they installed themselves on land again.” 
 While this degree of specificity, with regard to the number of each law and the code used to 
register those who took part in the merluza boom, may seem unusual, it is quite common among 
fishers along the coast of Aysén.  It is both a byproduct of bureaucratic measures introduced—
and often brutally enforced—during Chile’s military dictatorship and a testament to the state’s 
ability to make itself “vertically encompassing” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) through a 
proliferation of governing technologies and agents.  The coastline has become a bureaucratic 
world but fishers like Don José still live in it. 
 “But they are still registered, even if they don’t fish?”  I asked, confused. 
 “Correct,” Don José continued, “but its puro papel (pure paper).  And if they don’t have 
desembarcaciones (catches), all they have to do is provide a paper that says they took out this 
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much congrio (Genypterus chilensis, conger eel), this many kilos of róbalo (rock cod), and then 
they get it stamped and that’s it.  So for us, this is very bad, because they have a quota… we have 
a quota, everyone who is registered has a quota.  But now they sell their quotas.  So they are not 
in competition with us, now we are in competition with the companies [industrial fishing firms].  
And they are big enough that the prices don’t change.  We used to get more sometimes, but today 
it’s 700 pesos per fish and that price will never increase.” 
 “Because these people are selling their quotas to the industrial operations?”  I wanted to 
know more about those who traded in paper, effectively transforming their participation in a 
public program—Chile’s system of transferable fishing quotas—into a fungible asset that could 
be bundled, traded, or sold.  Chilean fishers, as anyone who has worked with them is aware, are a 
fractious and petty group under the best of circumstances, but while I had heard these complaints 
before, I had yet to meet anyone who mentioned selling their quota. 
 “Correct.  And the quota for congrio is, for example, 140 kilos per year, and for merluza it’s 
something else… one fish is like 4 kilos anyway… And those who stay on land can sell all of 
this, but for us it’s very bad.  And each fisherman has 3-4,000 kilos in his quota per year, and the 
companies buy at a rate of 650 pesos per kilo, so for them that’s good money.  But it’s 
prejudiced against us.  And when something like this [the red tide] happens, the people are like 
chickens looking for grain,” he paused, spreading his arm wide as though he himself was 
dispersing the grain and then using his other hand to make a pinching motion to imitate 
collecting it.  “Then everyone is a fisherman,” he concluded with a shrug. 
 I asked him about whether he would receive the promised compensation for those determined 
to have been affected by the red tide.   
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 “Since we take many [different] products from the sea… caracoles (snails) for example… 
well, they are affected, but not much.  But we have catches and I heard on the radio that they are 
giving money to those who really have catches so it’s likely that we will get money, yes.  But the 
government has problems with the ones [fishers] who stay on land… they’re the ones who will 
go to the streets because the government can’t give to just some without having to give to all.”   
 Don José’s distinction between fishers who “really have catches” and fishers “who stay on 
land” highlights the contemporary reality of fishing along the coast of Patagonia.  Fishing is a 
subsistence activity which, like most small-scale resource extraction, requires “intimacy with 
ecological cycles” (Hébert 2015:34).  In this model, the catch has value in-and-of itself since it is 
what will be consumed.  A fisher’s decision making, in this case, is based on what is most 
readily available and safely secured.51  Fishing is also a market-oriented activity; the fisher 
considers the price certain catches command—merluza, for instance—and fishes accordingly, 
tactically seeking his or her maximum earning potential.52  So far, these two models provide a 
classic example of Marx’s distinction between use and exchange value (Marx 1978:303-305). 
 Yet as soon as the state guarantees transferable quotas—granting a share of the total catch 
allowed in the region to individual fishers—fishing becomes a political as well as an economic 
activity. Fishers can monetize their participation in the quota system by selling their quotas while 
staying on land.  By pushing state officials to expand quotas, either increasing the size of the 
catch to which individual fishers within their community are entitled or increasing the ranks of 
the community members who receive quotas, they increase their earning potential. They can also 
earn more if they bundle their quotas together to sell, something common in contemporary 
                                                        
51 Which is in turn determined by a wide range of factors, from the size of the boat to the season to the weather 
conditions—hence the need for ecological knowledge. 
 
52 And often feeding his or her family with “inferior” species that can only be sold on the market for a modest price. 
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fishing syndicates, which jealously guard the quotas of members who can no longer put to sea 
because they are too old or infirm for precisely this purpose. The maintenance of “active” quotas 
among fishers who cannot go to sea facilitates redistribution—of quotas and equipment or of the 
profits from the sale of these assets.  Far from being the exclusive domain of enterprising 
individuals, fishing—or not fishing, as the case may be—is community-based, and decision 
making is most often collective (Acheson 1988).  Moreover, however fractious fishing 
communities appear on the surface, their ability to mobilize in moments of crisis reveals their 
“agonistic unity” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009:2). 
 Don José’s observation that the government “can’t give to some without giving to all” in 
times of crisis, is substantiated when fishers like Pancho mobilize hundreds of their neighbors to 
put pressure on state officials.  Once the government in Santiago has agreed to distribute funds to 
fishers based on certain criteria, taking to the street becomes a means for those who do not meet 
these criteria to get paid anyway.  Thus, moments of crisis are also moments of opportunity.  
Furthermore, even if they fail to win 
more inclusive standards, by 
supporting local organizers and 
working as a community these actors 
reify their position within the 
preexisting, informal distribution 
networks that can provide aid in the 
absence of public funds.  Regardless 
of their outcome, however, 
mobilizations create precisely the 
Figure 27: Fishers block access to the municipal pier in Puerto 
Aguirre, March 3, 2018 
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kind of “problems” that Don José is referring to: raucous meetings, public demonstrations, and—
when these fail—ship seizures and blockades.  
Angry fishers wasted little time in creating precisely these kinds of “problems” when the 
Ministry of Health banned the harvest, sale, and consumption of bivalves throughout the Aysén 
Region.  IFOP reported abnormally high levels in mussels and other species collected from 
caletas (fishing grounds) up and down the coast.  While they did not recommend the closure of 
pelagic fisheries, the ban on mollusks was enough to send shock waves throughout the region. 
As Don José explained, most fishers—even those who do not spend much time at sea—
receive quotas for multiple species.  Unlike merluza, a pelagic species with high market value, 
mollusks are largely consumed locally, meaning that the ban took food from household tables 
throughout the region. Up and down the coast, fishers responded by blocking roads and piers.  
They were eager to meet with officials and discuss compensation for their lost livelihoods as 
well as public programs that would funnel resources into their communities; road blocks, ferry 
occupations, and ship seizures were established tactics designed to force state officials to respond 
to their demands.53 The response by state officials, from the Ministry of the Interior in Santiago 
to the Regional Government, was the same in each community: qualifying fishers would receive 
financial compensation, in the form of cash transferred directly into their accounts via Banco 
Estado, for the months they could not fish.54 
But it was who could claim the status of “qualified” fisher and therefore claim compensation 
for a lost livelihood that was in dispute.  State officials sought to define “fisher” narrowly, like 
                                                        
53 These tactics were deployed by the protestors on Chiloé in 2016 and were effective in attracting widespread media 
attention.  They were also a key feature of the 2012 protests across Aysén. 
 
54 Though technically private, Banco Estado provides financial services for the Chilean state. 
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Don José, and to provide compensation only to those who received quotas for species directly 
affected by the harmful algal bloom and who had registered catches in the previous year and 
were thereby “active” in the SERNAPESCA (Servicio Nacional de Pesca y Aquaculture)55 
database. Community leaders like Pancho, on the other hand, sought to define “fisher” broadly to 
include anyone whose livelihood was affected and based their claims for what they considered 
their “rightful share” (Ferguson 2015:176-177) on their residence in communities where citizens 
historically depended on the now-contaminated sea. Like state officials, they also kept detailed 
notes on the ongoing negotiations and maintained lists of who they deemed deserving financial 
compensation.  
As they advanced their claims, paper fishers drew on decades of experience with state 
programs designed to regulate, sustain, develop, and provide services to their communities 
through the provision of subsidies, bonuses, and community-based public sector work.  For a 
generation, the Chilean state has governed the Aysén region through the strategic provision of 
benefits and direct cash transfers—a process that accelerated after widespread protests initiated 
and organized by fishers paralyzed the region in 2012 (Zibechi 2012). This succeeded in 
placating the restive populace and allowed the aquaculture industry to expand without 
incorporating “unreliable” local workers (Bustos-Gallardo 2017) and in some cases to displace 
them altogether.  
Public Programs within Multi-Occupational Careers 
Local people, particularly in rural areas where natural resources remain abundant and kinship 
networks remain strong, mobilize local knowledge and relationships as they attempt to mitigate 
                                                        
55 The National Service for Fishing and Aquaculture is tasked with overseeing fishing and aquaculture, enforcing the 
policies developed by Subpesca, the Subsecretariat for Fishing and Aquaculture, which in is turn housed within the 
Ministry for the Economy, Development, and Tourism. 
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risks associated with ecological vulnerability (Ebel 2018; Walker et al. 2004), faraway market 
fluctuations (Hébert 2015; Tsing 2015), and the obstacles and shortcomings inherent in state 
development and regulation (Ferguson 1994; Gupta 2012; Scott 2009, 1999).  To hedge against 
these numerous risks, households rely on “an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and 
assets” to sustain themselves and improve their overall well-being (Ellis 2000:14). These 
activities depend on multi-functional landscapes as local people combine and recombine 
livelihoods based on available resources as well as opportunities available through kinship 
networks and trans-local influences (Cleary 1993; Dressler et al. 2016:78).   
As I described in Chapter One, scholars concerned with this kind of income diversification in 
Latin America have identified a “new rurality” (Kay 2008; Martinez 2010; Schneider 2009), in 
which neoliberal policies favoring export oriented industries facilitate multi-occupational careers 
by creating opportunities outside of traditional economic sectors. This “new rurality” creates 
opportunities but also increases precarity among workers (Bengoa 2003:82). In this context, the 
redistribution of resources through community networks is not only beneficial, but necessary. 
In Aysén’s island communities, some of the most isolated parts of Chile, traditional practices 
like semi-subsistence fishing and gardening have proven more durable than on the mainland.  
These practices not only enhance household resilience during moments of economic instability 
or crisis but also help sustain entire communities as goods circulate through informal networks of 
distribution.  The periodic, material support afforded to families who find themselves particularly 
vulnerable—and the knowledge that any family could find themselves in a similar position—
reinforces a collective consciousness among islanders, even as they articulate fiercely 
independent identities.  
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Despite the durability of these longstanding practices and networks, however, the multi-
occupational careers of islanders and coastal people—like those of rural people displaced by new 
industries elsewhere—now also include short-term, community-based employment in the public 
sector and non-contributory cash transfers during economic downturns or environmental crises. 
Even in neoliberal Chile, policies of privatization and marketization designed to encourage 
foreign investment have long been accompanied by programs of direct distribution.  When the 
efficient production of export commodities fails to provide employment for much of the rural 
population, state officials provide subsidies and community-based public sector jobs to keep 
frustrated local people from disrupting the multinational industries they deem critical to 
sustaining national economic growth.  
This has resulted in residents of Aysén mobilizing not to protest state regulations but to 
demand greater access to the kinds of social programs that have proliferated across the region—
even as they decry state officials’ incompetence in local matters.  These social programs 
expanded in both scale and number following mass mobilizations across Aysén.  In 2012, 44 
days of roadblocks initiated by striking fishers forced the Piñera Government to announce a raft 
of new subsidies, infrastructure projects, and community-based employment programs for the 
region (Zibechi 2012).  These projects provided unanticipated benefits for rural people and 
taught them a valuable lesson.  As Ferguson argues, “cash does not so much as compensate for 
inactivity as complement and enable a range of activities” (Ferguson 2015:136), and individuals 
living along the frontier now rely on short-term, public employment and cash transfers to sustain 
longstanding multi-occupational careers bound to the region’s unique ecology.  
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Commodities, Quotas, and Cash: The Making of a Fungible Asset 
However, receiving subsidies and participating in community-based employment programs 
are not the only—or even the most significant—ways that paper fishers like Pancho developed 
the bureaucratic skills necessary to negotiate with state officials during moments of crisis.  
Indeed, the “paper” in “paper fisher” refers to the documentation guaranteeing fishers’ 
transferrable fishing quotas introduced under Chile’s controversial Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura 
(known as the Ley de Pesca, or “Fishing Law”). 
Chile’s Fishing Law, like many laws regarding resource production and use, was designed as 
a means to organize the sector and ensure its sustainability. When it was first implemented in 
1991, however, bureaucrats were tasked only with the first of these dual mandates. Fishers were 
required to register themselves, their vessels, and their catches with the Navy and with 
SERNAPESCA. Fishers who had previously fished with no documentation whatsoever describe 
this period as a frustrating one in which they were suddenly awash in bureaucracy. 
When the Fishing Law was revised in 2002,56 Chilean authorities implemented the current 
system of quotas with limited transferability among fishers. But while the law created a national 
registry of fishers and catches up and down the country’s 4,000 km of coastline, Aysén was 
given exceptional status: whereas the fishing law stipulates that quotas be granted to the fishing 
vessel for all of Chile’s other regions, in Aysén they are granted to individual fishers.  Crucially, 
even fishers who don’t own a boat are entitled to a share of the fish stocks offshore.    
                                                        
56 Under the direction of then-deputy Pablo Longueira, leading to the law’s “re-branding” as the Ley Longueira. 
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This exceptional status has enabled 
fishers in Aysén to maintain a degree of 
economic autonomy, allowing for the 
creation of a new, valuable asset: the quota 
itself, rendered on a piece of paper with an 
official stamp from SERNAPESCA. During 
the “good years” of the early 2000s, when 
merluza commanded high prices and 
operating costs were relatively low, this 
paperwork authorized fishers from Puerto 
Aguirre to fish and to sell their catches 
legally.  Demand from Spain, in particular, 
drove the market for merluza, and at its peak 
the merluza “boom” provided work not only for islanders and others from Aysén but also the 
crews of Spanish-flagged vessels working farther offshore.  When the global financial crisis and 
near collapse of the Eurozone crashed this market, however, enterprising local fishers 
transformed the documents that guaranteed their quotas to objects of value in their own right.  
After all, the quotas were transferrable and these documents enabled their sale.  Whereas 
previously fishers had mostly transferred quotas to family members or others within their 
syndicate, now they sold to Frio Sur, a Chilean industrial fishing operation based in the region. 
Intermediaries did brisk business buying up quotas and handling transfer paperwork rather than 
buying and selling fish.  Transactions took place in musty offices rather than on rolling decks, 
and while selling quotas did not provide fishers as much as they earned selling fish during the 
Figure 28: Certificate of registration with SERNAPESCA 
 167 
“good years,” it eliminated operating expenses altogether as well as the risks associated with 
navigating the coast in inclement weather.57  
Eventually, some fishers became so adept at negotiating the sale of their quotas, tracking the 
market price of the species to which they had legal right, and leveraging connections within 
industrial firms that they made their own deals, sidestepping intermediaries to keep a larger share 
of their quota’s value.  Paper fishers also utilized skills developed interacting with government 
agencies to gain a foothold in public programs that provided them, along with their friends and 
family, the cash they needed to sustain themselves without depending on an aquaculture industry 
that did not want them or a fishing industry subject to ever more frequent busts.  
Pancho, who organized the protests in Puerto Aguirre, was one such fisher—well-versed in 
local politics and capable of coordinating among multiple syndicates to sell for the largest profit, 
all while staying in port.  While those who still went to sea often criticized paper fishers like him, 
his ability to win marginally higher prices for others made working with him advantageous.  He 
had, in other words, developed skills “to administer, persuade, and at times coerce residents 
toward a common purpose,” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009:7). Whereas before he needed lines, 
diving gear, and a boat, he now needed lists of who belonged to which local syndicate, up-to-
date market prices, the paperwork that certified his quota, but most importantly, relationships 
with other fishers.  
In Aysén, fishers have become intimate with bureaucratic cycles and public programs in 
addition to ecological cycles and local politics.  Intimacy with the state apparatus enables them to 
successfully access their “rightful share” of public funds.  Because of their decades of experience 
                                                        
57 As late as 2010, the communities of Puerto Aguirre, Caleta Andrade, Puerto Gala, and Puerto Gaviota would lose 
between three and ten fishers annually during the month of May due to the unpredictability of autumn weather.  
Most of these individuals were never found. 
 168 
dealing with the quota system and interacting with officials from SERNAPESCA, paper fishers 
can and do take advantage of public programs and avoid depending on increasingly precarious 
sectors of the maritime economy—depending instead on state officials with whom they can 
negotiate. As Ferguson writes:  
Where social assistance looms so large in the citizen-state relationship, the state may well 
appear to the citizen not principally as the protector of equal rights but as a material 
benefactor or even patron, while the positive content of citizenship itself may 
increasingly come to rest precisely on being a rightful and deserving dependent of the 
state (2015:162). 
What this emphasis on citizenship overlooks, however—and what the demonstrations in 
Aysén reveal—is how claims for a rightful share become more powerful through community 
mobilizations and how these mobilizations can expand the size and scope of this share. By 
working as a community to win inclusion for claimants already imbricated in dynamic 
distributive networks, but who are not considered “active” fishers, rural residents can access 
a greater share of public funds than they could acting as individual citizens. In rallying their 
friends and neighbors to demand cash for quotas as well as broader criteria to determine who 
is eligible to receive this cash, paper fishers effectively transform individual assets into 
community assets in times of crisis. 
Negotiating the Margin: Redistribution in Moments of Ecological Crisis 
 In Aguas Muertas there were no ship seizures, though this was likely because Puerto Aysén 
is the capital of the province of Aysén and therefore home to the office of the provincial 
governor.  This made it comparatively easy for angry fishers to gain an audience and express 
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their grievances, as they did on February 13, three weeks before the protests offshore in Puerto 
Aguirre culminated in violence.  
 This meeting was the second of two that a small group of fishers, led by Angelica—a middle 
aged woman whose long nails and carefully applied makeup signal that she no longer regularly 
handles catches—were able to arrange on short notice.  In this meeting, it was the governor who 
spoke first, seemingly to set the parameters of the discussion. 
  “Listen,” he began patiently, “as you know, the red tide is a natural phenomenon that comes 
from time to time and stays 
indefinitely sometimes, and we live 
with it.  Los Lagos and Aysén… it 
isn’t just us that are affected.  For 
those who are directly affected, there 
will be a payment of 160,000 pesos 
per month from the day that the 
situation was declared.  This means 
160 for January, 160 for February, 
and there will be 160 for March, and 
it will be renewable…” 
 Angelica cut in, “yes, but the issue is who will benefit? 
 “That is up to Santiago,” the governor calmly replied, “unfortunately it is not in my hands, 
but most importantly it will go to those with registered catches.” 
 “Yes, but what about those who collect on shore?” Angelica asked, “we don’t have registered 
catches…” 
Figure 29: Fishers meet with the governor in Puerto Aysén, 
February 13, 2018 
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 “I don’t have all the details, like I said, it is for Santiago to decide… Subpesca,58 the Ministry 
of the Economy…” 
 “But we will be left out.”   
 “I don’t decide,” the governor repeated, “It is the job of SERNAPESCA.” 
 “But I went to SERNAPESCA and they told me the same: ‘only those with registered 
catches…’” 
 Angelica’s phone rang again, beeped to indicate that text messages had arrived, and generally 
was such a nuisance that she eventually answered to tell the caller she was busy before handing 
the phone to Francisca, the younger woman seated beside her.  Her people wanted updates, but 
as yet, she had none to give. 
 She continued, “… and those of us who collect on land don’t have to register catches, and we 
never have.” 
 “And your husband,” the governor asked Angelica, “he is registered and a fisherman?” 
“Yes,” she replied, “he will qualify, but…” 
 “Look,” Amerigo, the spokesman for the assembled men and Angelica’s deputy, broke in, “I 
am a fisherman and I am registered, I am the president of my syndicate and I will get the 
benefits, but I am also human.” He paused for emphasis before continuing, “I have to look after 
the people who I know do not have their documents, but who are fishers all the same… the 
people I know will be left out. I know them!” 
 Amerigo’s anger clearly stemmed from the responsibility he felt to win compensation for 
those in his extended network who did not meet the criteria for cash transfers and from the 
feeling that his chance to do so was slipping away.  He wasn’t the only one who felt this way. 
                                                        
58 The Sub-secretary of Fishing and Aquaculture, the government agency makes the policies that SERNAPESCA is 
bound to enforce. 
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 “We well understand the benefits,” Angelica’s voice was rising as well, “but who will get 
them is the problem.  You say you don’t know, but we do!  We will be left out.” 
 The governor tried—and failed—to hide his own frustration as he responded.  “Look, I have 
nothing else to add.  Like I said, I don’t know.  This [who will qualify for compensation] will be 
decided in Santiago by the Ministry of the Economy.”   
 The meeting was over. 
 Outside, the group gathered at the curb in front of the building to decide what to do next 
given the intransigence of the governor and, by extension, the government.   
 “We are so few, what can we do?” Francisca directed the question to no one in particular. 
 “We’ll be left out,” said Angelica, flatly. 
 “They didn’t sign anything?”  Roberto, a friend of Amerigo’s who had arrived late, asked.  
 “No.” 
 “But I heard they declared the whole region a catastrophe zone.  If that’s the case, the money 
will have to arrive, si o si (yes or yes).”  Roberto said, “but they really didn’t sign anything?” 
 “No,” Angelica confirmed, shaking her head. 
 “But if they declare this a catastrophe zone, we have everything to gain,” Roberto insisted, 
“because if they give money to Puerto Aguirre, that is this region.  And there are more of us 
here.” 
 Despite the apparent fruitlessness of the encounter, gaining an audience with the governor 
required significant coordination by Angelica and Amerigo.  They had to assemble their contacts 
in the community—those with quotas destined to receive compensation and those without—as 
well as reach out to contacts in Puerto Cisnes and Puerto Aguirre.  At the same time, they 
recognized that their inability to get the governor to sign onto a new agreement was a major 
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setback. The governor’s signature (and official stamp) would have not only indicated that he was 
willing to negotiate on the matter of who qualified for financial compensation but also would 
have allowed Angelica and Amerigo to claim the status of “official” negotiators on behalf of 
their community.  Instead, they were rebuffed.  They would have to coordinate with those fishers 
coming down from Puerto Cisnes and, as Roberto advocated as the group dispersed, they might 
have to seize the highway.  
Distribution as a Basis for Community Leadership 
In Puerto Aguirre a few weeks later, Pancho was also coordinating. He and his deputy 
Marcela—who organized and safeguarded notes from every meeting they had with state 
officials—had compiled a list of everyone they considered deserving of the compensation 
package previously promised by state officials and obtained the official roster of “active” fishers 
in Puerto Aguirre from SERNAPESCA for comparison. The list compiled by Pancho and 
Marcela had nearly 400 names on it.  The list from SERNAPESCA had 181.   
Pancho called a community meeting, and Marcela stood on the front steps of a house next to 
the fuel depot, reading the official list to the waiting crowd, thereby revealing who in the 
community state officials recognized as deserving compensation for the closure of local 
fisheries.  When she finished, Pancho instructed those in the crowd whose names were not on the 
official list but who had participated in the mobilization to follow Marcela after the meeting so 
she could add them to her list.  He decried those who chose not to participate in the community 
uprising, saying that he had hoped that everyone would come together “as an island,” but he 
emphasized that he and Marcela would continue to fight for everyone who showed up.  
Distribution required first defining legitimate claimants—namely those who participated in the 
various actions designed to bring state officials to the negotiating table. 
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He then called for a vote to confirm that 
this plan was agreeable to all those assembled.  
From my perch on the steps of a nearby 
house, I tried to count the hands, but quickly 
gave up since the vote was virtually 
unanimous.  After the vote, several people 
praised Pancho and Marcela for their hard 
work and organizational skills. Pancho then 
drew the meeting to a close by making sure 
those assembled understood that those who 
received cash transfers were expected to give 
$5,000 pesos (roughly $7 USD) to Marcela so 
that this could be redistributed to those who 
were not recognized by the authorities and 
would therefore get nothing. 
This moment illustrates how distribution re-socializes resources and why it remains 
embedded in community relations.  As state power expands, states enact policies ostensibly to 
protect communal assets.59  Under neoliberalism, this is done by granting shares of communal 
resources to individuals, effectively converting them into private assets and “harnessing the 
profit motive to both conservation and economic efficiency” (Mansfield 2004:313).  Yet by 
                                                        
59 In this case to prevent the collapse of fisheries due to overfishing. 
Figure 30: Marcela reads the list of fishers whose claims 
for compensation will be recognized by SERNAPESCA, 
March 6, 2018 
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redistributing the profits afforded by these private assets, intermediaries think collectively and 
provide for their communities—enhancing their prestige along the way.60 
 Redistribution is the underlying source of power wielded by paper fishers in communities 
like Puerto Aguirre, particularly since they no longer enjoy the prestige associated with fishing.  
Pancho’s highly visible work—making phone calls to the regional intendent, conducting 
interviews with local media, negotiating with state officials, and planning the seizure of the 
Jord—forced even those who complain about his influence to recognize his authority. Moreover, 
his willingness to give up some of his own cash to those receiving none and his insistence that 
others do the same established him as a leader that other fishers—both those who put to sea and 
those who sell their quotas61—are wise to follow.   
 On the mainland, Amerigo was being honest when he told the governor in Puerto Aysén that 
he had to look after the people without documents “but who are fishers all the same.” He, like 
Pancho, was responsible for the redistribution of public funds to those whose lack of official 
registration rendered them invisible to the state.  Failing to meet this responsibility would impact 
his standing in the community.  Distribution involves “a set of social relations, social institutions, 
and social processes” (Ferguson 2015:102), but crucially it also produces them.  Those who 
distribute must demonstrate an ability to command an audience with state officials and to 
represent community members who are uniquely vulnerable, all while maintaining a non-partisan 
stance. Distribution is a moral, as well as economic, project. 
                                                        
60 Keith Hart’s exploration of the role of entrepreneurs—neither swindlers nor public benefactors but both—within 
communities in Ghana is instructive here (Hart 1975). 
 
61 These are by no means fixed categories.  The fact that fishers have been able to sell their quotas to industrial 
operators for more than a decade means that fishers are more or less active depending on a range of factors.  A fisher 
who fishes one summer may fall ill the next and sell his quota for the year before returning to work the following 
year; fishers who do not own boats may sell their quotas if they can’t find a spot on a boat putting to sea for several 
months, etc.  Finally, the need to maintain one’s “active” status with SERNAPESCA means that even paper fishers 
who seldom put to sea register catches at least once a year. 
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Though community-wide redistribution occurs during mundane moments as well as moments 
of crisis, it is especially important during the latter, when supplies are scarce and resources that 
islanders have traditionally exploited are suddenly unavailable. These moments of scarcity may 
be caused by the natural rhythms of the sea—one reason that distributive networks existed 
among islanders and coastal people long before public programs and subsidies—but they are also 
increasingly anthropogenic.  During the red tide crisis, when state officials anticipated that 
islanders would seize the ferry and re-routed it to prevent such a disruption, the work undertaken 
by paper fishers like Pancho and 
Marcela helped sustain the 
community even as supplies 
dwindled.  Indeed, when islanders 
elected to blockade the port and to 
seize nearby ships, one of the first 
things organized was the olla común 
(common pot), a community kitchen 
that provided hot meals, tea, and 
coffee to those keeping vigil on the 
waterfront. 
Months after the violent conflict on the pier, I met with Pancho and Marcela as they walked 
me through proposals they had made to the local governor on a recent trip to the mainland that 
islanders receive payment for beach cleaning.  Marcela explained that there was a $600-million-
peso program to fund beach cleanup across the region and that they planned to receive a share of 
that money.  They also lobbied for increased quotas for manta ray and congrio. Surely some of 
Figure 31: Women distribute coffee and sopaipillas as part of the 
olla común 
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the funds from this public employment program and from these increased quotas would end up 
in their pockets, but most would support other islanders in their extended networks.   
And the redistribution of public goods isn’t restricted to direct cash transfers or public 
employment programs—it can take the form of a public secret (Taussig 1999).  In 2017, 
Pancho’s son was fired from his temporary position as a laborer at the local Conaf facility after 
dozens of bags of cement went missing from the facility over a two-month period. Around this 
time, numerous households in Puerto Aguirre replaced rotting wooden steps outside their front 
doors with new ones cast from concrete.  And while Pancho’s son has not been invited back to 
Conaf since his dismissal, he was never charged with theft.  Furthermore, during my last visit to 
the island, Pancho himself was working at their facility, suggesting that in communities like 
Puerto Aguirre, state officials have no choice but to accept this periodic, clandestine 
redistribution of resources. 
State, Citizenship, and Corporate Solidarities 
Though residents’ multi-occupational careers remain bound to the ecology of coastal 
Patagonia as they have for generations, the need to establish and reinforce market-based relations 
among rural citizens has required extensive organizing actions (Foucault 2008) on the part of 
state officials.  Officials charged with implementing these actions understand individuals as 
rational economic actors and have created incentive structures aimed at certain populations 
(Mansfield 2004).  Chile’s quota system, framed as a means of preventing fisheries collapse, is 
precisely this kind of market-based program designed to encourage fishers to make decisions 
based on cost-benefit analyses. 
On this frontier, however, claims that state interventions improve local well-being, whether 
via programs designed to deliver public services or policies designed to facilitate economic 
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growth, have become increasingly suspect.  It is not difficult for residents to see that these 
programs are failing to deliver promised services and that conditions beneficial to capital are 
often detrimental to their households—as well as to the environment on which they depend.  
As noted previously, quotas, which grant each fisher a potential maximum catch that can be 
monetized even if is never caught, have encouraged fishers to think like “rational” economic 
actors and to complete the various bureaucratic steps needed to retain their “active” status.  But 
the potential, monetary value of the catch, represented by the official documents carried by each 
fisher, as well as these fishers’ familiarity with state bureaucracy, shaped their strategies and 
demands during the red tide crisis. Fishers demanded compensation in cash and demanded it on 
the basis that the state had failed to meet its responsibility to its offshore communities.  
Dependency insinuates itself throughout the Chilean case, where increasingly frequent socio-
natural disasters call forth the state (Carruthers 2001; Iizuka 2016; Latta and Cid Aguayo 2012).  
Yet claims for state benefits are most effective when they are articulated collectively, leading to 
the emergence of collectives whose identities are based on place rather than ethnicity or class.62 
Pancho, who wanted to come together “as an island,” oversaw the redistribution of resources 
accordingly, and negotiated with state officials on behalf of his community rather than as an 
individual citizen. 
The quota system and the socio-political conditions it has created exemplify a dialectical 
formation that emerges from negotiations between state officials and community leaders like 
Pancho, Marcela, Angelica, and Amerigo.  Skillfully managed, quotas become yet another 
source of cash guaranteed, though in this case not directly granted, by the state.  During moments 
of crisis, however, quotas also become official records of coastal communities’ dependence on 
                                                        
62 Classism and discrimination—particularly against individuals with Mapuche surnames—remain systemic 
problems in Chile. 
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the sea and right to a share of its bounty, reinforcing rural people’s status as victims of 
environmental catastrophes that require state responses and legitimizing their claims for 
compensation.63 
Quotas therefore represent the expansion of state power and a means of limiting that power. 
State officials have succeeded in requiring fishers to register and officially record their catches, 
encompassing the ports and piers of the region within the state apparatus; yet paper fishers like 
Pancho use quotas to maintain a degree of political and economic autonomy, not just for 
themselves but, by distributing the cash they earn from selling these quotas, for their 
communities as well.  
Butler’s distinction between precariousness and precarity, the former being the vulnerability 
of embodied existence and the latter being the socio-political arrangements that differentially 
distribute that vulnerability among subjects (Butler 2016, 2004), is instructive here. State policies 
that favor aquaculture firms and industrial fishing operations increase the precarity of artisanal 
fishers in places like Puerto Aguirre.  However, the proliferation of public programs designed to 
placate those for whom highly mobile, contemporary capital has little use but to whom it is 
highly vulnerable and the redistribution of public funds by community leaders limit the 
precariousness felt by rural people, even during moments of environmental crisis.  
The confrontations between fishers and state officials in Puerto Aguirre and Puerto Aysén 
exemplify the complex negotiations and strategic collaborations between the state, capital, and 
citizens from which new networks of distribution emerge and community leaders arise. Yet these 
networks of distribution are contingent, and distribution itself remains embedded in community 
                                                        
63 The precedent for direct cash transfers to those whose livelihoods are affected by disasters was already firmly in 
place when fishers in the Chiloé archipelago blockaded their island to demand compensation for the closure of 
fisheries due to their own toxic red tide in 2016 (Thomas 2018; Daughters 2016b).  Fishers were eventually paid a 
“bonus” of $750,000 pesos, provided they were registered with SERNAPESCA. 
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relations, even and especially if the cash being distributed comes from a faraway metropole.  To 
call the work of fishers like Pancho, Marcela, and Angelica labor therefore incorrectly implies 
their alienation; as Amerigo angrily told the governor during their futile meeting, he is president 
of his syndicate “but also human.”  
Through their cultivation of bureaucratic skills and community relationships, these actors—
who are more able to cultivate both because of their time in port—become political 
representatives for neighbors who have neither.  Fishers like Don José may complain about paper 
fishers, but they cannot deny the highly visible work they do on land. Pancho organizes 
community meetings and mobilizes hundreds of islanders, securing new public programs that 
benefit his community; Marcela takes notes and safeguards official documents, acts which seem 
mundane but which provide evidence that state officials have broken promises and failed to 
deliver assistance that islanders deserve during moments of ecological collapse; Angelica 
coordinates with other fishers in ports up and down the coast and commands meetings with the 
governor, demonstrating her leadership capabilities even when these meetings go nowhere.  
Conclusions 
For much of the twentieth century, wage labor dominated economic life in industrialized 
states, but that is changing, as Ferguson and others observe (Allison 2013; Butler 2004; Ferguson 
2015).  As precarity increases globally, distributive programs that provide subsidies, direct cash 
transfers, and community-based employment for citizens as well as systems that entitle 
individuals or households to a “rightful share” (Ferguson 2015:176-177) of local or national 
resources are becoming more important and more common.  Around the world, conditions found 
in places like Puerto Aguirre and Puerto Aysén are becoming “the new normal” as automation, 
globalization, and contamination combine to put pressure on communities (Kirsch 2014: Moore 
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2015; Nixon 2011).  The community-wide protests in Aysén, which elevated the harmful algal 
bloom to something beyond “everyday cruddiness” (Povinelli 2011) that required a state 
response, anticipated the coming storm in Santiago.  There too, citizens would march and raise 
roadblocks to demand a new social contract that guaranteed them a “rightful share” of Chile’s 
miraculous economic growth. 
Distribution produces new social institutions and processes rooted in community and elevates 
the actors who oversee it.  In Aysén, market fluctuations that reduced the market value of 
merluza, and toxic red tides that made harvesting mollusks impossible for months at a time, 
together facilitated the emergence of paper fishers as community leaders.  Their ability to turn a 
resource—not fish but the paper guaranteeing a right to fish—into a fungible asset has made 
them indispensable.  But just as distributive programs have proliferated, so too have these kinds 
of intermediaries.  These actors, skilled at winning a share of public funds but also imbricated in 
community networks and thus uniquely positioned to redistribute those funds, can now be found 
in communities on nearly every continent.   
Dynamic distributive networks embedded in local politics have always been especially 
important in remote, rural communities and, as noted earlier in this chapter, these networks 
predate the arrival and expansion of the state apparatus.  However, the redistribution of public 
funds has become critical to the continued existence of these communities, especially along 
resource frontiers, where it enables residents to sustain multi-occupational careers and semi-
subsistence practices despite periodic booms and busts.  
And yet, paradoxically, public programs that provide cash to rural people—if they succeed—
also sustain contemporary capitalism in far flung places where restive populations can easily 
disrupt the supply chains upon which it depends.  Intermediaries like paper fishers, who oversee 
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the redistribution of public funds, provide a service to the state by improving programs designed 
in faraway offices that fail to take local conditions, relationships, and histories into account.  
Just as the informal economy supports the formal economy, the redistribution of public funds 
that sustains coastal communities also supports the multinational industry that threatens to 
overwhelm them. In Aysén, the fact that the aquaculture industry is uniquely vulnerable to a 
restive local population that can close ports, cut highways, and seize ships motivates the 
proliferation of public programs which are in turn adapted to meet local needs.  The relationships 
that organize the redistribution of relatively meager but nonetheless essential public funds 







Un Lugar Clave 
It was after dark, and I stood under the narrow eve of my friend Juan’s cabin in Puerto 
Aysén.  It was raining, as always, and we were sharing a smoke outside, listening to the patter of 
the rain against the corrugated tin roof overhead, and chatting idly.  I had just returned to the 
mainland from my fourth trip to Puerto Aguirre.  Juan was fascinated, and a little amused, that I 
kept returning to this remote place, but he admitted that it loomed large in his day-to-day work at 
SERNAPESCA. 
 “It makes me laugh, but Puerto Aguirre is un lugar clave (a key place), weon” he said, staring 
into the middle distance and exhaling a cloud of smoke.  “And for that, I wish that 
SERNAPESCA had an office there.  They had plans to put an office there, but with Piñera 
announcing 20% budget cuts across all the subsecretaries, this isn’t going to happen soon.”  
 “What about it makes it so ‘key’ for you?” I asked, exhaling my own little cloud into the 
rainy night. 
 “Well,” he explained, “to come from Puerto Aysén [on the mainland] and to visit a 
cultivation center you have to plan, and for many of the centers it’s six hours or more… and it’s 
always ‘what days does the lancha run?’ and ‘is it running?’  and ‘oh no, something happened.’  
‘Oh, Puerto Aguirre is closed for bad weather.’  It can be that too, weon.  Or you’re out and 
you’re trying to get back and ‘Oh, no, Puerto Chacabuco is closed.’  There are so many 
problems.  And since Aguirre is right there, right in the middle of all those centers, we could 
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have one person doing all the things that we do [in Puerto Aysén], and they are right there!  And 
if the weather’s bad, they can just return to their cabaña.  In contrast, it takes us coordination and 
days or even weeks.  Aguirre is right in the middle of everything!” 
 I laughed and agreed that it was complicated getting to and from the islands.  In fact, over 
four trips and two years, I had never been able to get back from Puerto Aguirre as originally 
planned.  After the first two such experiences, I now brought extra clothing and factored an extra 
two or three days into my travels, no longer scheduling any meetings or interviews on the 
mainland until I was absolutely sure there would be a window to get back. 
 Juan laughed at the fact that I, a gringo, had figured this out.  Then he continued, “But it’s a 
strange place, Aguirre.  Like if you’re walking around, I bet, and you talk to someone and you 
ask where they are from, and they say ‘Oh, I’m from Puerto Montt,’ or ‘I’m from Concepción’ or 
‘I’m from Chiloé.’  It’s probably impossible to meet anyone who grew up there.” 
 I didn’t know how to respond.  Juan and I were used to silence when one of us couldn’t 
figure out how to translate an idea or when the conversation simply “ran out of gas” because we 
were too tired to go on.  In this case, however, mine was a stunned silence.  I couldn’t believe 
Juan’s impression.  I had met dozens of people who grew up in Puerto Aguirre, and a handful of 
people who were born on nearby islands with no permanent inhabitants in itinerant fishing or 
logging camps where their parents had been working for months or even years.  They had 
eventually moved to Puerto Aguirre where life was comparatively easy, but they were certainly 
from the area. 
How could someone who saw Puerto Aguirre as “a key place” and had visited the 
community numerous times because of his position at SERNAPESCA think that no one was 
born there?  Juan wasn’t stupid, nor was he callous.  In our conversations he reflected 
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thoughtfully and critically on the development of the region, the differences between Aysén and 
other parts of the country where he had lived and studied, and the frequent problems he 
encountered in his office.  He was, in this capacity, a caring bureaucrat committed to his 
neighbors and to the remote region he now called home.  I also knew him to be compassionate 
and generous outside the office, not just with me, but also with the nine-year-old son of his 
sometime-girlfriend whom he watched when she was out of town. How could he overlook an 
entire population?   
Juan is committed to Aysén and to the ayseninos with whom—and for whom—he works, but 
he is equally committed to Chile’s post-dictatorship development project, a project in which the 
diversification of the export sector through the expansion and perfection of the aquaculture 
industry plays a key role.  As I have shown, state officials and aquaculture operators have 
responded to the industry’s periodic crises—ISA, the spread of sea lice and other parasites, and 
harmful algal blooms—by implementing spatial fixes, transforming the fjords and estuaries of 
Aysén into “official landscapes” (Nixon 2011:17) divided into concessions, barrios, and 
macrozones.  As journalist Christian Parenti writes, “the modern state’s territoriality delivers 
nonhuman nature to capital accumulation by way of its place-based property regimes, its 
production of infrastructure, and its scientific and intellectual practices” (2016:167).   
 For this to be possible, state officials must frame the spaces where they work as “timeless 
unpeopled lands—open to extraction and exploitation of various sorts” (Cons and Eilenberg 
2019:12).  This allows them to see themselves as charismatic actors within Chile’s development 
project, building the nation by building a sustainable industry under difficult and unpredictable 
conditions where once there was nothing.  Paradoxically, in order to make the frontier in 
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accordance with their own social projects state officials often overlook the frontier-making 
projects already underway when they arrive. 
What happens along contemporary frontiers, however, is highly contingent on what came 
before. Despite the dreams of state planners and capitalists, even along the most remote, sparsely 
populated frontiers there are no “empty” spaces, and nothing is free.  As I described in Chapter 
One, though Patagonia is often idealized as “pristine” in the marketing materials of multinational 
aquaculture firms and outdoor apparel companies, this region constitutes a landscape that has 
been occupied for generations by people who creatively pursue multi-occupational careers bound 
to both local ecologies and global market niches.  In coastal communities, people like Isabel and 
her partner Luis, Oscar and his son Milton, and Hector and his sister Edith take advantage of 
periodic booms, fishing for abalone and hake for markets as far away as Japan and Spain.  These 
booms bring newcomers to the region as well, triggering moments of accelerated settlement.  
This is what created “plastic towns” like Puerto Gala, Puerto Gaviota, and the now extinct 
Kalkiman, where middlemen like Carlos contracted fishers who put to sea under dangerous and 
sometimes fatal conditions. 
When these booms turn to busts, however, as they inevitably do, multiplicity returns.  
Longtime coastal residents strategically shift to other seasonal livelihoods—a range of  
subsistence and semi-subsistence practices that have sustained their communities since their 
founding.  This is how it has always been, after all; the exploitation of cipres de las guaitecas 
and the production of sea lion skins in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were underwritten by 
the harvest of meager vegetables from household gardens, the felling of hardwood stands for 
firewood, and the trade in potatoes grown in island communities.   
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Participation in public programs has become an integral part of residents’ multi-occupational 
careers.  This is perhaps surprising given Chile’s reputation as a laboratory for neoliberalism 
(Harvey 2005; Klein 2007; Melillo 2015), but successive governments have multiplied programs 
to distribute public funds, provide 
material goods, and offer an array 
of safety nets.  While it has not 
always been intentional—the use 
of fishing quotas as community 
assets and as the basis for 
biological citizenship claims, for 
instance, was unanticipated—
these programs have helped 
sustain traditional multi-occupational careers and allowed coastal people to avoid low-paying, 
tedious work in the fish plants in Puerto Chacabuco.   
Implementing these public programs, whether they are designed to provide services to rural 
people or organize sectors of the rural economy, has required the state to mobilize a veritable 
army of bureaucrats.  As I described in Chapter Two, officials like Juan, Salvador, and his wife, 
Teresa, become enmeshed in the regimes and networks of care—non-market regimes of value 
that Chilean neoliberal policies have largely disaggregated and reorganized elsewhere—and 
committed to the rural people they serve.  This commitment, along with conditions on the 
frontier that render these officials nearly as vulnerable as their less affluent neighbors, 
encourages officials from outside the region to develop ecological knowledge. Like longtime 
residents of coastal Patagonia, newly arrived officials gain an “intimacy with ecological cycles” 
Figure 32: Women working at the Conaf nursery in Puerto Aysén 
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(Hébert 2015:34).  This is in part because many of them are tasked with regulating nature for the 
sake of sustained, predictable production and economic growth, but it is also because of their 
interactions with local people and because of their own ecological dependencies.  In coastal 
communities it continues to be impossible to make it through the winter without building a fire. 
Rural people and state officials have made and remade this frontier in accordance with their 
distinct social projects (Povinelli 2011); but those living on the coast have been able to sustain 
the ecologically based, multi-occupational careers of their forbearers.  They balance their 
exploitation of the multi-functional coastal landscape, their involvement in informal distributive 
networks, and their participation in relatively new public programs (which in turn create formal 
distributive networks in which the state is the primary benefactor).  This approach to economic 
life on the frontier is underwritten by fractious cooperation and collaboration, but it is well 
adapted to uncertainty.  It has enabled remote coastal communities to survive and thrive despite 
state and capitalist interventions. 
The arrival of industrial salmon aquaculture, however, poses a grave threat to these 
communities.  As I described in Chapter Three, despite being promoted for its sustainability, the 
aquaculture industry in southern Chile is best understood in technical terms as extractive.  Like 
other extractive industries, salmon farming is characterized by weak integration into the local 
economy (Bustos-Gallardo 2017) but significant political influence (Barton and Fløysand 2010).  
It generates enormous amounts of waste as operators externalize the costs of dealing with dead 
and diseased fish during mass mortality events and ignore organic material deposited on the sea 
floor during routine production periods.  Disasters at cultivation sites—unavoidable given the 
overwhelming power of storms, winds, and currents in this watery landscape—lead to the escape 
of hundreds of thousands of non-native salmonoids well adapted to the conditions of coastal 
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Patagonia and capable of devastating its fragile ecology.  This means that coastal waters that 
once represented recurring cycles of seasonal variability and rich biodiversity have been 
humanized into a destructible unpredictability—ironically through the efforts of aquaculture 
operators seeking to mitigate ecological risks and deliver predictable yields. 
Putting Nature to Work 
Underlying the current crisis in Patagonia—and along resource frontiers worldwide—are 
distinct understandings of nature determined by the different social projects of varied actors.  
Aquaculture operators have sought to protect their industry from both catastrophic losses and 
public criticism through the application of new spatial technologies and the deployment of 
scientific knowledge.  Nature is their laboratory.  This has thus far allowed them to expand their 
operations and boost production, no small feat given the relatively short history of Chilean 
salmon farming.  It has failed, however, to limit the industry’s ecological footprint as aquaculture 
operations exhaust the  “cheap nature” (Moore 2015) on which their production relies. 
Aquaculture firms recognize this.  Even as they sponsor beach cleaning events and tout new 
practices designed to prevent the spread of disease and limit escapes, companies with 
headquarters in Santiago and Puerto Montt—and even Oslo—continue to shift their operations 
south.   Setting aside concerns about the industry’s impact on local people and their livelihoods, 
one wonders just where these companies will go when they have contaminated not only the coast 
of Los Lagos, but also Aysén and Magallanes.   
Local understandings of nature are different, although they are still definitively Modern.  As I 
discovered during the procession of San Pedro in Puerto Aguirre, ayseninos understand nature in 
relation to their own practices, opportunistically converting ancient forests and fjords into multi-
functional landscapes capable of sustaining their households and communities.  While periodic 
 189 
global demands for seafood connect them to wider circuits of capital, they have never abandoned 
the semi-subsistence practices of their forbearers.  Nature is separate from—and lends meaning 
to—the civilization that they have carved out in otherwise wild places along the coast of 
Patagonia.  Yet they continue to live their lives in accordance with maritime temporalities 
dictated by the wind, tides, and currents that determine the conditions of possibility in their 
watery world and to respect the awesome power of these natural forces. 
These distinct understandings of nature coexisted uneasily, but coexisted nonetheless, for 
nearly two decades, until recent harmful algal blooms revealed their incommensurability.  The 
toxic contamination of marine resources upon which coastal people depend transformed the 
chronic, everyday conditions created by aquaculture practices into a red tide event—a disaster 
that required that the state respond to its citizens (Barrios 2017; Povinelli 2011).   
This event also revealed the extent to which the development favored by Chilean state 
officials—which privileges multinational corporations over rural workers and growth over 
sustainability—was incompatible with the goals of residents.  Ayseninos recognized this first.  
They made their claims to state officials, but understood that their ability to force these officials 
to negotiate was contingent upon their ability to disrupt the flow of commodities out of their 
region. They targeted infrastructure projects and transportation networks—blockading highways 
and bridges, attempting to occupy the ferry, and seizing the Jord and its crew—revealing not 
only how important aquaculture is to state officials but also how vulnerable the industry is to 
disruption.   
Residents also used their fishing quotas to demonstrate their communities’ continued 
dependence on the sea.  This facilitated their citizenship claims since, in granting them quotas, 
the state had already formally recognized these actors as dependent on marine resources 
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(whether or not they put to sea).  When the Ministry of Health closed fisheries throughout the 
region, the state had to provide some form of compensation to these officially recognized 
individuals, or legitimize fishers’ criticism that they were abandoning the citizens they were 
expected to serve—abandoning their responsibility, as Juan put it, to “actually take care of 
people.”   This meant bureaucrats were forced to negotiate not over whether fishers should 
receive compensation for their lost livelihoods, but rather how much compensation fishers should 
receive and who counted as a fisher.   
During these negotiations, the very strategies that residents have used for generations to 
sustain themselves on the coast of Patagonia meant that these actors were in a much better 
position than state officials.  Angry fishers faced the challenge of forcing state officials to 
meet—no small task given the small size of their communities but one they managed through 
escalating acts of civil disobedience—but they had already strategically shifted their livelihoods.  
Islanders—not state officials—recognized that the harmful algal bloom would create severe and 
prolonged conditions capable of sickening or even killing members of their community.  While 
only eleven people had been hospitalized during the first weeks of the bloom, forty four people 
in Puerto Aguirre had fallen ill, unbeknownst to state officials, and word rippled out to other 
island communities quickly.  Thus, even before state officials agreed to any financial 
compensation, islanders had already buffered themselves as best they could against the 
impending environmental disaster. Those with the equipment to do so either began fishing for 
king crab or urchins (species unaffected by toxins in the water column) or abandoned fishing 
other species in favor of pursuing crab and urchins full-time.  Others, like Milton and Oscar, 
temporarily abandoned their “factory” in favor of harvesting firewood at their fishing camp and 
selling it in Caleta Andrade and Puerto Aguirre.  Still others took temporary employment on 
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larger fishing vessels destined for offshore waters or ports outside the region, landing as far away 
as Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas in the Magallanes Region.  Their multi-occupational careers 
and their familiarity and comfort with maritime temporalities—in which weather events and the 
cycle of seasons are more important than the date on the calendar—helped islanders put pressure 
on state officials with strict deadlines to resolve social problems and restore civic harmony. 
Thus, the citizens of Puerto Aguirre, Puerto Aysén, and other communities up and down the 
coast to put nature to work in two distinct ways.  First, they strategically shifted their livelihoods, 
exploiting natural resources unaffected by the harmful algal bloom.  Second, they used their 
longstanding dependence on local ecologies—a dependence recognized by the state—as a basis 
for demanding compensation in the form of public funds.  By making demands to state officials 
with their own ecological dependencies and commitments and doing so in the bureaucratic 
language of the state apparatus, community leaders eventually received and redistributed public 
funds, helping sustain their communities until the toxins in the water column subsided.   
The Significance of Settlement 
This strategy depended on residents’ transformation of the environment into a 
multifunctional landscape and this transformation is the basis for coastal residents’ defense of 
place.  As anthropologist Roy Rappaport wrote, “nature is seen by humans through a screen of 
beliefs, knowledge, and purposes, and it is in terms of their images of nature, rather than of the 
actual structure of nature, that they act” (1979:97).  Those who settled the coast of Patagonia do 
not see themselves as part of nature, but they see themselves as living in relation to it.  Because 
of the degree to which they are highly adapted to their environment—not in an indigenous way 
but an ingenious one nonetheless—they will be here long after aquaculture workers no longer 
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frequent the piers and boarding houses in their communities.  Provided salmon aquaculture does 
not cause complete ecological collapse, their descendants will likely outlast the industry itself.   
However, when it comes to the study of frontiers, anthropologists, like Juan, often overlook 
certain types of people and certain kinds of histories. Anthropology, thanks to its colonial 
origins, has an uncomfortable relationship with settlers.  Anthropologists prefer to tell stories in 
which rural people are either an emerging proletariat with limited agency to resist the relentless 
power of global capitalism (Harvey 2003; Sassen 2014, 2010; Wolf 1986) or indigenous actors 
whose territorial claims predate current capitalist configurations and whose ontologies are not 
defined by the Modern nature/culture binary (Blaser 2011; Geiger 2008; Kohn 2013).   This 
work is tremendously important, particularly as it becomes evident that the capitalist imperative 
for continuous growth is destroying the planet. 
But what about the people who do not fit into either of these categories? 
Those who have settled the coast of Patagonia are such people, and overlooking them means 
ignoring their everyday practices—and by extension, their relationship to the landscape from 
which they make a living.  This relationship represents not only a subsistence strategy but also a 
political tactic that has enabled ayseninos to resist efforts to organize them into a disciplined 
workforce—much to the consternation of the human resources director at the fish plant in Puerto 
Chacabuco.  It also makes frontier residents uniquely vulnerable to the conditions of 
environmental harm created by industrial aquaculture operations and warming ocean 
temperatures.  This vulnerability motivates their political mobilization in times of crisis, as 
communities come together to challenge the hegemony of the powerful in determining both the 
extent of disasters and who can make claims in their wake (Barrios 2017; Fortun 2001) using a 
range of tactics including ship seizures and strikes. 
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Citizenship and the State in Post-Dictatorship Chile 
In these moments, coastal residents challenge the state, but they are not antagonists to state 
officials.  They attacked the local naval office during the peak of the red tide disaster following 
the escape of the Jord, but accepted that the Navy would dispatch sailors to oversee the safety 
and security of their procession of San Pedro months later.  Moreover, as bureaucracies expand 
and more power relations are networked through state channels (Ferguson 1994), many residents 
develop bureaucratic skills necessary to maintain and sell their quotas and to enroll in public 
employment programs—in some cases operating like petty bureaucrats themselves.  The 
familiarity “paper fishers” have with bureaucratic procedures, for example, not only enables their 
sophisticated interaction with state officials during crises, but also enhances their prestige—
enabling them to wield greater power within their communities during mundane moments.   
In contemporary states, Partha Chaterjee writes, governments secure legitimacy “not by the 
participation of citizens in matters of the state, but by claiming to provide for the wellbeing of 
the population” (2004:34).  However, does not the provision of services—ostensibly to improve 
people’s lives—create opportunities for greater citizen participation?  This certainly appears to 
be the case in Aysén, where 24% of the population is employed in the public sector (INE 2017).  
But participating in public programs, accessing public funds, and working on public projects is 
not the only way that citizens shape the trajectory of development.   
Coastal residents’ daily interactions with state officials—particularly officials who are 
committed to the region and the rural lifeways they see disappearing from other parts of Chile—
makes their influence personal as well.  They teach newly arrived bureaucrats when to sweep 
their chimneys and how to buy dry, properly cured firewood (occasionally after selling them a 
load or two of substandard logs); they attend meetings with school officials where they discuss 
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their children as well as local affairs; they oversee the preparation of cordero al palo (slow 
roasted lamb) for state and corporate events.  Simply put, they teach newly arrived bureaucrats 
how to live in Aysén.  Upon arrival these state officials, despite their higher pay and superior 
education, encounter conditions in which they are as vulnerable as the local people they serve. 
They therefore affect, but are also affected by, frontier practices and imaginaries, imaginaries that 
contribute to the negotiation of new forms of governance as officials and rural citizens attempt to 
bring their distinct social projects into alignment.  The results are surprising.   
As I have noted elsewhere, Chile is famously a laboratory for neoliberalism.  In Aysén, 
corporate aquaculture firms wield enormous power and dramatically alter local ecologies, 
increasing livelihood insecurity among islanders and other coastal residents who still engage in 
semi-subsistence fishing.  State projects—organizing actions undertaken to “create the proper 
structures enabling the market to operate freely and efficiently” (Foucault 2008; Fletcher 
2010:173)—facilitate the smooth flow of commodities out of the region.  Despite all this, 
however, conditions along the coast of Patagonia limit the successful implementation of 
neoliberal governance.  Neoliberalism is a project that “endeavors to create a social reality that it 
suggests already exists”  (Lemke 2001:203), but this has no purchase in places defined by shared 
vulnerability, regimes and networks of care, and the redistribution of resources.  Aysén is such a 
place, but so are many other parts of Chile.  So, for that matter, are many parts of the world. 
From the Metropole to the Frontier 
 The quintessential frontier myth is that these wild spaces are made—conquered even—by 
rugged individuals.  A host of scholars across a range of disciplines have challenged this notion, 
by providing evidence that frontiers wax and wane according to the needs of global markets and 
the designs of state planners (Eilenberg 2014; Harvey 2003; Tsing 2005).  Capitalist forces drive 
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the opening of new frontiers, they argue, and frontier dynamics dissolve existing property 
systems, political jurisdictions, and social relations creating liminal spaces where new regimes of 
resource control are eventually established through the exercise of state power (Rasmussen and 
Lund 2018:388).  For some anthropologists, these spaces of convergence and conjunction (Li 
2000) can be understood through the “assemblage” analytic.  Considering frontier assemblages, 
they contend, allows for a fuller understanding of “the intertwined materialities, actors, cultural 
logics, spatial dynamics, ecologies and political economic processes that produce particular 
places as resource frontiers (Cons and Eilenberg 2019:2).   
These approaches, like those of scholars who advocate greater consideration of how frontiers 
are recursive spaces shaped by their own unique histories and “prone to periodic (often highly 
contingent) cycles of birth, demise, and reformation” (Middleton 2019; Stoller 2016), represent 
important interventions.  They undermine not only nationalist narratives about archetypal—and 
apocryphal—“rugged individuals” but also capitalist narratives in which frontiers represent 
empty spaces awaiting development.  In place of these myths, they show these spaces are created 
by state and corporate investments designed to extract resources and produce commodities at the 
edges of the global economy.  In this narrative, world markets shape the dynamics and 
underlying logic of frontiers. 
Talking with those living on the coast of Aysén, however, it becomes clear that while global 
markets and state-backed capitalist claims create the conditions for new frontiers, these 
conditions are contested, negotiated, and reordered in local communities.  Current scholarship on 
frontiers, though it mentions local people and the “traditional livelihoods of neglected rural 
communities” (Fold and Hirsch 2009:96), focuses too much on how frontiers are created and not 
enough on what frontiers create.  Furthermore, in their desire to avoid privileging “specific 
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causal understandings” (Cons and Eilenberg 2019:3), scholars examining frontier assemblages 
risk overlooking how the new identities, subjectivities, and political concerns that emerge along 
contemporary resource frontiers shape political life in the metropole and influence the trajectory 
of national development. 
From the Frontier to the Metropole 
Chileans will go to the polls on April 26, 2020 and vote in a national referendum to 
determine whether or not to adopt a new constitution to replace the one started just days after the 
1973 coup and completed in 1980.  The vote is the outcome of massive, country-wide protests 
that began in Santiago on October 18, 2019.  This, activists assert, was the moment when Chile 
“woke up” and citizens demanded a new social contract after years of rising living costs, 
corruption scandals, and income inequality.   
The reality, however, is not so simple.  While the demonstrations of October and November 
of 2019 were by far the largest, they were just the latest in a series of mobilizations in which 
citizens protested neoliberalism, the privatization of national resources, and the resultant gap 
between Chile’s “haves” and “have nots.”  What made these most recent mobilizations stand out 
was the diverse array of actors from across the political spectrum who took part, but even this 
was only unique in its scale.  The demands of the citizens who marched down the alameda in 
Santiago last year are eerily reminiscent of the demands that mobilized ayseninos in 2012.  Like 
their counterparts in the metropole, theirs was a broad coalition that brought together fishing 
families, students, environmentalists, pensioners, and a considerable number of public officials.  
When these ayseninos effectively closed their region for 44 days, they were demanding a 
“rightful share” of the wealth generated by the nascent industries in their region.  While the 
impending HidroAysén project contributed to citizens’ ire, it was not only because this project 
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had the potential to remake the landscape around the Pasqua and Baker Rivers, threatening rural 
lifeways.  Residents were equally angry that the profits generated by the project would go to a 
few, well-connected Chilean elites and to multinational energy companies and that the power 
generated would be transmitted to Santiago, leaving residents with the same astronomical 
electric bills.  Hydroelectric development—supposedly sustainable—would irrevocably 
transform the landscape of Patagonia without providing any benefit to local people. 
It has taken longer for Chileans to recognize that industrial aquaculture has many of the same 
problems.  The reasons for this are complex.  First, the coast is difficult to navigate and its damp, 
unpredictable weather often renders offshore aquaculture operations impossible to access and 
observe.  Second, aquaculture firms have buffered themselves from criticism by sponsoring local 
events and, during environmental crises, pointing to rising ocean temperatures rather than their 
own practices as the leading cause of harmful algal blooms.  Third, ayseninos’ flexibility and 
familiarity with local ecologies has enabled them to operate strategically to avoid the worst 
consequences of the aquaculture industry’s environmental impacts.   
But while these factors delayed conflicts over the environmental, economic, and social 
impacts of salmon aquaculture, they could not prevent them—as the demonstrations that rocked 
Chiloé in 2016 and Aysén in 2018 made abundantly clear.  Moreover, the issues at the heart of 
these protests—who benefited from state-sponsored development projects and who paid their 
costs—were also at the heart of the protests in Santiago when Chile “woke up” in 2019. 
This is why frontiers matter.  As Frederick Jackson Turner famously argued, frontier 
conditions and the ways that citizens respond and adapt to them shape national institutions 
(1975).  More recent scholars have shown how policies and projects designed in the metropole 
and implemented along remote resource frontiers remake these spaces as state planners attempt 
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to bring them into line with the rest of the country and make their resources available to global 
markets.  However, responses to these policies and projects that emerge from the everyday 
practices of local people and their relationship with local natures challenge and reorient the 
national development project.   When residents of Aysén’s remote, coastal communities protest 
their lost livelihoods and the contamination of their landscape, they link the moral and political 
economies and demand—like their counterparts in Santiago—a new social contract.  I hope they 
get it. 
Another Procession 
The first time I went to Puerto Aguirre, in the summer of 2016, I witnessed something 
unusual.  Waiting for the motor launch that would take me back to the mainland the next day, I 
noticed that there were considerably more people on the pier than usual.  The launch arrived, 
followed by the usual flurry of activity as people disembarked and some of the islanders on the 
dock loaded goods purchased in Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén into waiting pickup trucks, vans 
and wheelbarrows to be carted off to their homes. 
But then another boat came into view; this one was neither blue nor orange, like the launches 
that provide subsidized transport to islanders, but rather the unmistakable grey of modern 
warships.  This was a Chilean Navy patrol boat, larger than the vessels maintained by the small 
retinue of sailors on the island, and as it approached Puerto Aguirre it became clear that it too 
was destined for the municipal pier—not the Naval base.  Many of the islanders who had helped 
unload the launch returned to the pier and stood waiting, watching the patrol boat arrive.  Once it 
was close enough, these islanders helped the sailors aboard tie up.  This accomplished, the sailors 
disappeared below decks before returning with a wreath of artificial flowers, a simple wooden 
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cross bearing the inscription “1990-2016,” a candelabra, and finally, a wooden casket adorned 
with a picture of Christ. 
The casket was carefully handed from the deck of the patrol boat to a group of men who had 
pushed to the front of the crowd.  
They, with help from several of the 
sailors, loaded the casket into the 
back of a waiting pickup truck and 
then climbed into the bed to ride with 
it, hoisting a teenage boy into the 
back of the truck as it began to move.  
More than three hundred people had 
assembled on the pier by this time—
a third of the tiny port’s inhabitants. This crowd walked in silence behind the truck as it made its 
way up the steep hillside towards the Catholic Church. 
That night at the boarding house, Luis and Isabel held a rehearsal for nearly two dozen 
church members, who would perform in the home of the deceased young man later in the 
evening.  The assembled islanders wore purple capes and held as-yet unlighted candles as they 
stood in a circle around Luis and Carlos, who played accordion and guitar and led the group in a 
series of hymns and folk songs.  At the conclusion of the rehearsal, everyone climbed into cars 
and the bed of a waiting pickup, impervious to the strong wind and sleet battering the island.  
This procession made its way up the hill once more, destined for the home of the grieving 
family.  They were not alone, however.  As I watched from the street outside the boarding house, 
Figure 33: The funeral procession in Puerto Aguirre 
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I saw hundreds of others making their way through the streets and alleys of this tiny community, 
bundled against the cold. 
Chileans largely stopped using the word compañero after the 1973 coup.  The word, which 
literally means “one with whom I share bread,” was strongly associated with the Chilean Left 
and Unidad Popular.  To those who supported the Dictadura, the word signified Chile’s 
disastrous “road to socialism” and inspired memories of bread lines and economic instability.64  
To those who supported Allende, the word was dangerous.  Using it publicly, one risked 
detention and torture or worse.  Chile returned to democracy in 1990, but as successive 
democratic governments continued the Dictadura’s neoliberal economic policies and maintained 
the 1980 Constitution, there was no place in Chilean society for this word and its communal 
connotations.  
Watching people come together for the funeral in Puerto Aguirre and, years later, watching 
its residents organize the olla común (shared pot) to feed members of the community demanding 
compensation for livelihoods lost during the red tide disaster, I realized that while the word was 
no longer in use, the simple act at its root—sharing food—continues to define life along Chile’s 
remote, coastal frontier. The conditions in Aysén necessitate interdependence, even if fishers are 
a fractious group.  Longtime residents rely on one another to sustain multi-occupational careers 
inextricably bound to local ecologies in a landscape marked by uncertainty—now more than 
ever.  The identities, subjectivities, and politics that emerge here, at the limits of neoliberal 
governance, emerge through cooperation and create communities that work together to overcome 
the hardships associated with living in some of the most remote places on earth.  Compañerismo, 
                                                        
64Even if the shortages of the Popular Unity years were largely caused by the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency acting under the direction of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 
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solidarity, fellowship, sharing—or redistributing—could never disappear in this context, even if 
the label “compañero” did. 
As Chileans go to the polls to decide on whether to adopt a new constitution, redistribution 
looms large.  Citizens across the political spectrum are fed up with the enrichment of elites, 
political corruption, privatization, and rising living costs for the working and middle classes.  
The question of who benefits from Chile’s “miraculous” development and who pays its costs is 
at the heart of the #Chiledespertó protests.  This question, however, first emerged along the 
country’s resource frontiers, where the industrial production and extraction of valuable 
commodities has reshaped landscapes and undermined the traditional livelihoods that depend on 
them.  Chile may have “woken up” in October 2019, but those living in its most remote 
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